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This thesis examines the structures of authority in the political theories of Thomas 
Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. In milieux marked by crises of political legitimacy, civil 
unrest and war, both Hobbes and Schmitt strove to develop new theoretical 
foundations in support of their conservative visions of the authority of the state. The 
exhaustion of traditional means of legitimation, such as divine right or romantic 
ideals of community, demanded innovative alternatives. Though Hobbes and Schmitt 
drew on a wide range of sources, I argue that religious practices were centrally 
important. Focussing on questions of the source and genesis of authority, my study 
argues that in different ways both identify participation as key to the origination of 
authority. 
In part one, through a chronological investigation of Hobbes’ works, I 
demonstrate that he assembles a multi-faceted theoretical support for authority. 
While the covenant is essential for establishing the artifice of sovereign potestas, I 
argue that Hobbes progressively supplements this fragile artifice with a series of 
additional apparatuses: civil worship based on religious practices, authorisation 
based on theatrical analogies and educational and pedagogical practices drawn from 
a general, almost polytheistic, conception of religion. However, I show that 
ultimately Hobbes’ mechanistic psychology undermines his attempt at an integrated 
and scientific account of worship and pedagogy.  
In part two, I divide Schmitt’s oeuvre into monarchical and democratic 
writings. Investigating the monarchical works, I trace his elaboration of a distinctive 
‘commissary authority’ from the Roman dictator to the katechon. I show that this 
‘personalist office’ can be understood as an attempt to renovate the traditional 
doctrine of divine right. Returning to the democratic writings of 1923-32, I 
contextualise Schmitt’s revisionist conception of democracy and focus on the 
legitimating role of acts of acclamation, understood as an act of assent, rather than 
legal or contractual consent. I argue that a key influence on this participatory model 





This research project would not have been possibly without the support from 
colleagues at CRMEP and friends. I would like to thank my supervisor Peter 
Hallward for his dedicated support, encouragement, criticism and provocations over 
the last four years. His detailed comments on drafts and numerous discussions over 
the years have helped me immensely. I would also like to thank my second 
supervisor Howard Caygill and the professors of CRMEP, especially Étienne Balibar 
and Éric Alliez for their provocative questions, comments and criticisms. In addition, 
I am grateful for the various discussions and questions concerning my research 
prompted by reading groups at CRMEP, Brighton University and elsewhere. I would 
especially like to thank Kyle Moore, Luís Carneiro, Jorge Varela, Melayna Lamb, 
German Primera Villamizar, Daniel Steuer, Jeronimo Rilla, Cillian Ó Fathaigh and 
Austin Gross for their assistance with proof-reading, discussion or advice. Finally, I 
would like to thank Pamela Perniss, for the numerous forms of assistance, advice, 
criticism and support she has provided over the duration. 
 
The research project was generously funded by three-year full-time studentship from 













Introduction: Hobbes, Schmitt, Auctoritas, Religion and Law 9 
1 The Problem of Authority in Hobbes and Schmitt 10 
2 Authority, Auctoritas and Power 22 
3 Religion, Theology and Politics 29 
4 Law and Recht 33 
Part I: Thomas Hobbes 35 
Chapter 1: Worship, Potentia and Authorisation 36 
1 Chivalry or Deceit: Two Visions of Early Modern Authority 39 
(i) Lipsius’ Auctoritas and Reason of State 39 
(ii) Stuart Chivalry: Charles, Augustus and the Reform of the Nobility 43 
2 The Artifice of the Contract 45 
3 Worship and Potentia 57 
4 Author and Actor 69 
Chapter 2: Religion, Politics and Pedagogy 76 
1 Hobbes’ Sacred History 79 
(i) The Judaic Period: Abraham and Moses 80 
(ii) The Regeneration as the Divine Interregnum 82 
(iii) The Kingdom to Come 85 
2 Authority of the Arbiter: Christianity in the Hobbesian State 86 
3 Natural Religion and the Consecration of the State 91 
4 Pedagogical Authority: The Divine Right of Sovereign Pastor 97 
5 The Aporia of Juridical and Pedagogical Authority 104 
Part II : Carl Schmitt 110 
Chapter 3: Commissary Authority 111 
1 Max Weber and the Bureaucratic Apparatus 114 
2 The Commissary Dictator 120 
(i) The Task 125 
(ii) The Hierarchy 129 
3 The Dignity of the Representative 132 
Political Theology and Authority 132 
Representation 134 
5 
(i) Mediation 136 
(ii) Commission (Stellvertretung) 140 
4 The Katechon and Nomos 145 
5 The Divine Right of the Katechon 153 
Chapter 4: The Energy of Democratic Authority 159 
1 ‘Democracy’ in Weimar 162 
2 The People and the Enemy 167 
(i) The Doctrine of the Volksgeist 168 
(ii) The Enemy 172 
(iii) Enthusiasm and Energy 174 
(iv) Participation 179 
3 Acclamation: The People Can Only Cry ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 180 
(i) Acclamation and Democracy 183 
(ii) Acclamation contra Voting 185 
(iii) The People Can Only Answer 187 
(iv) Acclamation as Assent 189 
4 State, Movement, People 194 
(i) The ‘Concrete’ State Form of the Twentieth Century 195 









3D Thomas Hobbes, Three Discourses: A Critical Modern Edition of 
Newly Identified Work of the Young Hobbes, Ed, ed. Noel B. 
Reynolds and Arlene W. Saxonhouse (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995).  
AW Thomas Hobbes, Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, trans. 
Harold Whitmore Jones (London: Crosby Lockwood Staples, 
1976). 
B Thomas Hobbes, ‘Behemoth, or the Long Parliament’, in The 
Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. 10: 
Behemoth, or The Long Parliament, ed. Paul Seaward, Thomas 
Hobbes, and Paul Seaward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
Corresp  Thomas Hobbes, The Correspondence: Volume I: 1622-1659 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
DC Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck and M. 
Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Latin edition used: Thomas Hobbes, De Cive. The Latin Version: A 
Critical Edition by Howard Warrender, ed. Howard Warrender, 
The Clarendon Edition of the Philosophical Works of Thomas 
Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
DCLE Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student 
of the Common Laws of England (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997). 
EL Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural & Politic, ed. M. 
M. Goldsmith Ferdinand Tönnes (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 
1969). 
EW Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of 
Malmesbury (London: J. Bohn, 1845). 
HE Thomas Hobbes, Historia Ecclesiastica. Critical Edition, Including 
Text, Translation, Introduction, Commentary and Notes, ed. 
Patricia Springborg, Patricia Stablein, and Paul Wilson, trans. 
Patricia Springborg, vol. 31 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008). 
L&N Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall on 
Liberty and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
Lev Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, with Selected Variants from the Latin 
7 
Edition of 1668, ed. Edwin Curley (Cambridge: Hackett, 1994). 
Latin edition used: Thomas Hobbes, The Clarendon Edition of the 
Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. 4: Leviathan: The English and 
Latin Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). I follow the 
convention advocated by the European Hobbes Society and cite the 
chapter and paragraph numbers, rather than page numbers. 
TTE Thomas Hobbes, Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political 
Theory: The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, ed. Deborah 
Baumgold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
 
Carl Schmitt  
Where specific terminology is at stake, I distinguish the English and German 
(Deutsch) page numbers by a preceding ‘E’ or ‘D’ respectively. Otherwise, I cite 
only the English translations where they are available.  
 
3P Carl Schmitt, ‘Three Possibilities for a Christian Conception of 
History’, Telos, no. 147 (2009): 167–70. The review essay ‘Drei 
Möglichkeiten eines christlichen Geschichtsbildes’ was originally 
published as ‘Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung’ in Universitas 
5 (1950): 927–31. 
3T Carl Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, trans. Joseph 
W. Bendersky (London: Praeger Publishers, 2004 [1934]). 
CP Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, The Concept of the Political 
Expanded Edition, ed. and trans. George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1927, 1932]). German editions 
used: Carl Schmitt, ‘Der Begriff des Politischen’, ed. Emil Lederer, 
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 58, no. 10 (1927): 
1–33; Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit 
einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1991). 
Crisis Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen 
Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988 [1923]). German 
edition used: Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des 
heutigen Parlamentarismus, vol. 1 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2017). 
CT Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Seitzer 
(London: Duke University Press, 2008 [1928]). German edition 
used: Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2017). 
D Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern 
Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle, trans. 
Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014 
[1921]). German edition used: Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Berlin: 
8 
Duncker & Humblot, 2015). 
DPS Carl Schmitt, ‘“Dialogue on New Space” [1958]’, in Dialogues on 
Power and Space, ed. Federico Finchelstein and Andreas Kalyvas 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 51–83. 
Ex Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus: Experiences, 1945 - 47, ed. 
Andreas Kalyvas and Federico Finchelstein, trans. Matthew 
Hannah (Cambridge: Polity, 2017 [1950]). 
Gloss Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947 - 1951, 
ed. Eberhard Freiherr von Medem (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 
1991). 
H Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into the 
Play, trans. David Pan and Jennifer R. Rust (New York: Telos 
Press Publishing, 2009 [1956]). 
L&L Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer 
(London: Duke University Press, 2004 [1932]). German edition 
used: Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1988). 
LST Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
N Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of 
the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York: 
Telos Press Publishing, 2006 [1950]). German edition used: Carl 
Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974). 
P&B Carl Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-
Versailles 1923-1939 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 
Hamburg, 1940). 
PR Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, trans. Guy Oakes 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988 [1919]). German edition used: 
Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (München: Verlag von Duncker 
& Humblot, 1919). 
PT Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005 [1922]). German edition used: Carl Schmitt, 
Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität 
(Berlin, Germany: Duncker & Humblot, 2015). 
 
RCPF Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, ed. George 
Schwab and G. L. Ulmen, trans. G. L. Ulmen (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1996 [1923]). German edition used: Carl Schmitt, Römischer 
9 
Katholizismus und politische Form (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2016). 
SGN Carl Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 
1916-1969, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1995). 
SMP Carl Schmitt, State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of 
the Political Unity [1933]; The Question of Legality [1950], ed. 
and trans. Simona Draghici (Corvallis: Plutarch Press, 2001). 
German edition used: Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die 
Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1933). 
T1919-24 Carl Schmitt, Der schatten Gottes. Introspektionen, Tagebücher 
und Briefe 1921 bis 1924, ed. Ernst Hüsmert u. Wolfgang H. 
Spindler Gerd Giesler (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014). 
T1925-29 Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, ed. Martin Tielke and 
Gerd Giesler (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2018). 
T1930-34 Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, ed. Gerd Giesler 
Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010). 
VA Carl Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-
1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2003). 
V&V Carl Schmitt, Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren: Ein Beitrag zur 
Auslegung der Weimarer Verfassung und zur Lehre von der 




NRSV Michael D. Coogan, Mark Z. Brettler, Carol A Newsom, ed., The 
New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version With 
the Apocrypha, Fully Revised Fourth Edition (Oxford: Oxford 




Introduction: Hobbes, Schmitt, Auctoritas, 
Religion and Law 
 
...the gods are not directly responsible 
for every fissure in the liver or for 
every song of a bird; since, manifestly, 
that would not be seemly or proper in a 
god and furthermore is impossible.
1 
 
1 The Problem of Authority in Hobbes and Schmitt  
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes writes that ‘auctoritas non veritas facit legem’ 
(authority, not truth makes the law).
2
 For Hobbes, it is the authority of the sovereign 
power (the summa potestas) that gives law its legitimacy not its relation to reason 
and truth. But is there a truth of authority? Is there a logic or science capable of 
explaining authority and its genesis? Can the mechanisms, techniques and practices 
that constitute authority be explained without destroying it, as Pascal alleged would 
be unavoidable.3 Hobbes’ ambition to develop a science or geometry of the ‘patterns 
of human action’ suggests that he thought understanding authority, its genesis and its 
operation would be possible. But moreover that only through such a rational 
explanation of politics would ‘the human race … enjoy such peace that … it seems 
unlikely that it would ever have to fight again.’
4
 
The main problem I’ve set out to study is that of political authority, its 
foundation, structure and genesis and, in particular, its relation to or reliance on 
religion. The Roman etymology connecting authority and auctoritas continues to 
assert an influence on the interpretation of the former, aligning it with concepts such 
as reputation, dignity or prestige.
5
 However, the possibility of distinguishing this 
                                                 
1
 Cicero, De divinatione, trans. W. A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library 154 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1923), bk I.LXII.118, 351. 
2
 Lev, 26.[22]. 
3
 Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24. 
4
 DC, ‘Epistle dedicatory’, 5. 
5
 Karl Galinsky, Augustan Culture: An Interpretive Introduction (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), 18. 
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sense of authority as auctoritas from alternatives such as legal power, rational 
persuasion or coercion remains contested.
6
 While the problematic nature of the 
concept in modern political thought provides the general impetus for this study, the 
specific foci of the thesis are the treatment of the concept in the works of Thomas 
Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. In milieux marked by crises of political legitimacy, civil 
unrest and war, both Hobbes and Schmitt strove to develop new theoretical 
foundations in support of their conservative visions of the authority of the state. The 
exhaustion of traditional means of legitimation, such as divine right or romantic 
ideals of community, demanded innovative alternatives. 
Writers preceding Hobbes, such as Jean Bodin, Justus Lipsius or John Selden, 
largely continued to appeal to Roman law, history, or classical sources for theoretical 
support.
7
 Hobbes breaks with this tradition and attempts to develop a novel form of 
civil science, influenced by Euclid’s geometry, Francis Bacon’s visions of science 
and Hobbes’ personal encounters with proponents of a new rationalism such as 
Galileo, Mersenne, Descartes and Gassendi. Similarly, Schmitt’s writings and those 
of contemporaries such as Max Weber struggle to adjust to the changed political and 
theoretical circumstances of the early twentieth-century. Conservatives of the 
nineteenth century such as Benjamin Disraeli or Otto von Bismark had thought that 
traditional forms of authority could continue to contain the political demands of the 
emerging democratic mass-politics. However, by the turn of the century the growing 
strength of political parties rendered such hopes untenable.  
Hobbes’ works make an ideal focus for a study of authority both because of 
his canonical status in the history of modern political thought and because his works 
arguably attempt to produce a unified and systematic theory of politics, religion and 
law, three domains entangled with the problem of authority. Hobbes’ political theory 
develops across a series of consecutive works each recapitulating and expanding on 
previous attempts, beginning with the ‘Discourse on Tacitus’ of 1620 and extending 
to the posthumously published Behemoth written around 1668. Questions of political 
authority are a central concern throughout this development, thus it provides a 
                                                 
6
 Leonard Krieger, ‘Authority’, in Dictionary of the History of Ideas; Studies of Selected Pivotal 
Ideas, ed. P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1968), 141–62; Giorgio Agamben, The 
Omnibus Homo Sacer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 240–2. 
7
 On the continuous importance of Roman law for European political thought and Jean Bodin in 
particular see Daniel Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 5 and 6. On John Selden see Richard Tuck, Philosophy and 
Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 208–14. 
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medium in which the difficulties of elaborating a theory of authority are 
progressively illustrated. Less studied elements of Hobbes’ civil science remain (i) 
his attempt to articulate a systematic and rational theory of natural religion and (ii) 
the relations between the covenant, authorisation and religious and educational 
practices and how (or if) they constitute a unified and effective basis for sovereign 
power.
8
 In part one, I attempt to address these through a close chronological 
investigation of Hobbes’ works, with particular attention to the role Hobbes assigns 
religion and the intertwining of religion and rationalism in Hobbes’ attempts to 
support the artifice of the commonwealth. 
The second focus of my study is the work of Carl Schmitt. I investigate 
Schmitt’s attempts to rearticulate politics, religion and authority amid the political 
crises of early twentieth-century Europe. The expansion of suffrage and advent of 
modern mass-democracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
transformed political expectations and theory. In these reshaped circumstances, 
Schmitt asserts a radical dependency between politics, authority and an ethos — 
‘there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of 
conviction’.
9
 In the reception of Schmitt’s political theory, a number of lacunae 
remain. My work aims to address some of these, by demonstrating (i) the 
significance of the Roman dictator and the doctrine of divine right for understanding 
the later works on the katechon and nomos, and (ii) the importance of acclamation to 
the structural and causal relations Schmitt asserts between authority and an ethos.  
                                                 
8
 Although there exists a considerable literature on Hobbes and authority, an account unifying the 
covenantal, ceremonial, authorisational and educational mechanisms is lacking. See for instance: 
Richard E. Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 95–127; Clifford Orwin, ‘On the Sovereign Authorization’, 
Political Theory 3, no. 1 (1 February 1975): 26–44; Raia Prokhovnik, ‘Hobbes’s Artifice as Social 
Construction’, Hobbes Studies 18, no. 1 (1 January 2005): 80–4; Maria L. Lukac De Stier, ‘Hobbes on 
Authority - De Cive and Leviathan: A Comparison’, Hobbes Studies 10, no. 1 (1 January 1997): 51; 
Edgar Straehle, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Secularization of Authority’, in The Sources of Secularism: 
Enlightenment and Beyond, ed. Anna Tomaszewska and Hasse Hämäläinen (Dordrecht: Springer 
International Publishing, 2017), 101–20; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Hobbes on Public Worship’, Nomos 48 
(2008): 31–53; Marin Terpstra, ‘The Political Theology of a Potestas Indirecta’, Religion, State and 
Society 41, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 133–51; Marcus Schultz-Bergin, ‘The Authority Dilemma: Eternal 
Salvation and Authorization in Hobbes’s Leviathan’, Hobbes Studies 29, no. 2 (2016): 148–67; 
Thomas Holden, ‘Hobbes on the Authority of Scripture’, Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 
8 (2019): 68–95; Michael J. Green, ‘Authorization and Political Authority in Hobbes’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 53, no. 1 (2015): 25–47; David Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the Authority of Law’, 
in Hobbes and the Law, ed. David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 186–209. 
9
 RCPF, 17. Translation modified. 
13 
The contention defended in this thesis is that concrete religious practices are 
centrally important (if in different ways) to Hobbes’ and Schmitt’s attempts to 
reinforce political authority. I argue that the key political practices for Hobbes’ are 
worship and the pedagogical methods of religious education, while for Schmitt they 
are ecclesiastial modes of office and acts of acclamation. 
The thesis is divided into two parts addressing the works of Hobbes and 
Schmitt respectively. In part one, I argue that authority constitutes a recurrent 
problem for Hobbes’ political theory. I demonstrate that across his works he 
elaborates a series of supplementary theoretical mechanisms each aiming to address 
shortcomings in his earlier theorisations. Hobbes’ strategy is initially motivated by 
his recognition of the ineffectiveness of the artificial power [potestas] given to the 
sovereign by the covenant. To address this ineffectiveness, Hobbes introduces a 
series of additional mechanisms of support: commanded worship, authorisation, a 
juridical and a pedagogical role for the sovereign. Although the ineffectiveness of the 
covenantal artifice of the sovereign is often recognised in the secondary literature, 
there remains no interpretation of Hobbes’ account of authority connecting the multi-
faceted theoretical supports.10
 
One reason for this lacunae in the secondary literature 
is the persistent neglect of Hobbes’ theory of religion. Although there has been a 
growth of interest in Hobbes’ theory of religion, Hobbes’ integration of religion and 
political theory remains ambiguous.
11
 By tracing the progressive development of 
Hobbes’ political theory with close attention to his discussion of religion, 
Christianity, Scripture and the history of the papacy, I identify the importance of 
                                                 
10
 Literature recognising the ineffectiveness of the covenant includes: David Johnston, The Rhetoric 
of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 45. On the difficulties see Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 68; Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 3, 39; Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of 
Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 235; A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of 
Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
151–53. However, there is also considerable literature that continues to focus on the contract alone as 
the legitimating source of authority: Richard E. Flathman, ‘Hobbes: Premier Theorist of Authority’, 
Hobbes Studies 10, no. 1 (1 January 1997): 3–22; Straehle, ‘Secularization’; Jeffrey R. Collins, The 
Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11–2; Michael Lobban, 
‘Thomas Hobbes and the Common Law’, in Hobbes and the Law, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 39–67. 
11
 This is demonstrated in the antithetical readings of Leviathan offered by Leo Strauss and Giorigio 
Agamben. Leo Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion and Related Writings (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011); Agamben, Omnibus, ‘Stasis: 2 Leviathan and Behemoth’, 265–92.  
14 
religion for Hobbes’ account of authority (and in the process, substantiate Hobbes’ 
critical stance towards Christianity identified by Strauss, Curley and others).
12
 
The key to my reading is the radicalised distinction between command (law) 
and counsel (advice) Hobbes develops in De Cive (1642). According to Hobbes, in a 
genuine command, the particular content of the commanded act remains radically 
unquestionable. To evaluate the content before compliance transforms a command 
into counsel. I show that Hobbes generalises this distinction, utilising it for a theory 
of natural religion (based in rites and practices) rivaling that of Edward Herbert, 
whose alternative is based in theological doctrine.
13
 I argue that with this distinction 
Hobbes brackets the particular content of religious acts and develops an account of 
civil or political worship which both demonstrates and cultivates power relations 
between individuals. In Leviathan, Hobbes introduces ‘authorisation’ but also 
expands political worship, to include a pedagogical role for the sovereign as 
‘supreme pastor’ or teacher.  
Chapter one first situates Hobbes in his intellectual milieu. After a brief 
discussion of Lipsius’ doctrine of reason of state and the Stuart monarchy’s attempts 
to revive the nobility, I turn to Hobbes’ theory of the commonwealth. I discuss 
certain difficulties and inadequacies of the contract constituting the sovereign, before 
demonstrating that in De Cive, Hobbes supplements this artificial-contractual power 
with a material power [potentia] constituted and supported through political worship 
[cultus]. While civil worship introduces a means of cultivating this power, it fails to 
account for the initial ‘seed’ of worship. I show that Hobbes’ introduction of 
authorisation in Leviathan aims to addresses this issue.  
In chapter two, I turn to Hobbes’ political use of religion. Focussing on 
Leviathan and the later works, Behemoth and Historia Ecclesiastica, I argue that 
Hobbes derives two additional forms of authority from religious sources. From his 
revisionist interpretation of Judeo-Christian history, Hobbes supports a juridical 
                                                 
12
 Edwin Curley, ‘“I Durst Not Write So Boldly” Or, How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political 
Treatise’, in Hobbes e Spinoza: scienza e politica: atti del convegno internazionale, Urbino, 14-17 
Ott., 1988, ed. Daniela Bostrenghi (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1992), 497–593; Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique 
of Religion and Related Writings. My reading is largely in agreement with Leo Strauss’ recently 
published manuscript. 
13
 Edward Herbert, The Antient Religion of the Gentiles and Causes of Their Errors Considered-By 
the Learned and Judicious Edward Ld’Herbert of Cherbury (London: John Nutt, 1705), 4–5. Edward 
Herbert’s Tractatus De Veritate was first published in 1627 but he reworked it repeatedly over the 
years. Revisions were published in 1645 and 1663. See also Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 40. 
15 
concept of authority resembling Erastus’s subordination of the Church to the 
sovereign as arbiter or judge. However, Hobbes also constructs a second pedagogical 
form of authority under the name of the ‘supreme pastor’. I show that the latter is 
derived from a general conception of natural religion which draws indiscriminately 
on pagan, Judaic and Christian practices and traditions as from a general 
anthropological model of religion. As I demonstrate, the ‘supreme pastor’ is given a 
‘divine right’ to control the internal beliefs of the subject, whichs conflicts with 
Hobbes’ insistence that sovereign command is limited to the outward performance of 
obedience. I conclude part one with a discussion of this tension in Hobbes’ limits on 
political influence, followed by some reflections on the significance of the diversity 
of mechanisms in Hobbes account. These political aspects of cultus are under-
represented in the secondary literature and my thesis aims to address this gap.  
The neglect of the role of cultus in Hobbes’ work is one aspect of a more 
general issue in the literature concerning the interpretation of Hobbes on religion and 
his use of religion in politics. In one tradition, Hobbes is explicitly described as a 
‘sincere, and relatively orthodox, Christian,’ to quote Martinich, or implicitly taken 
as a devout, if heterodox eschatologically minded millenarian.
14
 These are not 
entirely incompatible with off-hand descriptions of Hobbes as an ‘Erastian’.
15
 
However, an assumption of agnosticism or atheism underlies the more recent 
depictions of his civil religion as either Epicurean in origin or as representing a 
‘Judaicization of Christianity’.
16
 My thesis instead, takes the influence of Roman 
polytheistic conceptions of religion as a key influence on Hobbes. In particular, I 
read Hobbes on religion informed by John Scheid’s concept of orthopraxis rather 
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 This is clarified and discussed in detail in the section three 
‘Religion, Theology and Politics’ below. The guiding idea is that Hobbes’ 
conception of ‘natural religion’ and his use of religion in politics demonstrates an 
affinity with Cicero’s claim that ‘religion is the science of divine worship’.
18
 That is, 
a knowledge, skill or expertise in the practices of worship.
19
 
In part two, I turn to Carl Schmitt’s work. Several reasons justify this 
juxtaposition of Hobbes and Schmitt. The first is Schmitt’s long engagement with 
Hobbes’ political writings, one that stretches across much of his career. Hobbes is a 
common interlocutor, from early texts such as Dictatorship (1921), to the late work 
Political Theology II (1970) and the monograph on Hobbes, The Leviathan in the 
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (1938). A proximity between the two thinkers on the 
problem of authority is implied by Schmitt’s regular use of Hobbes’ remark: 
‘auctoritas non veritas facit legem’. Their concern with authority appears to stem 
from similar political contexts, marred by (civil) war, parliamentary disruption and 
general unrest. As John Tralau notes ‘for Hobbes and Schmitt, the overarching, 
perhaps overwhelming concern is the problem of war versus order’.
20
 However, 
Schmitt’s position on Hobbes’ political theory varied over his career, from 
championing of Hobbes’ decisionism in Political Theology to diagnosing Hobbes’ 
failure in Leviathan of the State. My study of authority is not a systematic 
comparison or contrast of Hobbes and Schmitt, nonetheless their proximity on 
authority throws into relief the nuances of their different positions. 
My analysis of Schmitt’s works is structured by his claim that distinct 
fundamental principles (monarchical, democratic etc) engender distinct systems of 
political forms and concepts, including modes of legitimation and authority. On the 
basis of this assumption, I distinguish between and treat successively Schmitt’s 
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‘monarchical writings’ (loosely spanning 1917-1923 and 1939-1960), his 
‘democratic writings’ (1923-32) and his ‘Nazi writings’ (1932-39). According to 
Schmitt, since each of the political institutions in these periods is based on a distinct 
political principle the resulting ‘structure and content’ must also be distinct.
21
 
Although this is occasionally noted in the secondary literature, it is seldom accorded 
the significance it would demand if it were true. A distinctive aspect of my study is 
an attentiveness to this structural partition of his political theory. As a result, I 
identify three distinct senses of authority in Schmitt’s writings: the commissary 
authority of the monarchical works (chapter three); the acclamative authority of the 
democratic works (chapter four); and the Führer-authority Schmitt sketches in the 
Nazi works (chapter four).  
Any work dealing with Schmitt’s political theory requires at least a marginal 
discussion of Schmitt’s conceptualisation of authority. However in English, there is 
no systematic treatment of Schmitt on authority.
22
 Renato Cristi’s polemical Carl 
Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism includes a chapter on ‘Freedom and 
Authority’, but is flawed by its forced and unpersuasive attempt to describe Schmitt 
as a ‘political liberal’.
23
 Dyzenhaus’ comparative study of Schmitt, Kelsen and Heller 
on Legality and Legitimacy is a valuable resource given the conceptual correlation 
between legitimacy and authority.
24
 Nonetheless, his goal is primarily to defend 
Heller against Schmitt. Another comparative study, Andreas Kalyvas’s Democracy 
and the Politics of the Extraordinary, while a regular point of reference in my 
chapter four, is only concerned with the democratic authority based on the pouvoir 
constituant.
25
 More literary treatments of Schmitt on authority (and representation) 
focus on his late work Hamlet or Hecuba and fail to adequately take account of 
Schmitt’s early text Dictatorship.
26
 As I argue in chapter three, Schmitt’s account, in 
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this early text, of a historical and theoretical break in the conditions of possibility of 
the commissary dictator marking the shift to the sovereign dictator is one 
manifestation of the structural rupture between monarchical authority and its 
democratic counterpart.  
 In chapter three, I demonstrate that the monarchical texts are unified by an 
attempt to preserve a specifically ‘commissarial’ conception of limited authority as 
an alternative to the legal-rational alternative offered in Max Weber’s depiction of 
modern bureaucracy. For Schmitt, this is an authority derived from two elements: the 
force of necessity (the ‘power [Macht] of the facts’) and a presupposed (and 
essentially transcendent) social order or hierarchy, ostensibly independent of political 
authority. Schmitt insists that the personal form of office, in which these are 
combined, is distinct from the mechanistic and procedurally determined alternative 
of the legal-rational office. I trace the chronological elaboration of this concept of 
authority through Dictatorship, Political Theology, Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form and Nomos of the Earth. In the process I highlight a number of difficulties and 
ambiguities in Schmitt’s theorisations. One notable corollary is that this 
chronological account demonstrates conclusively that for Schmitt himself, the 
concept of the katechon represents the safeguard against the charge embodied in 
Dostoevsky’s ‘Grand Inquisitor’. That is, that the worldly practices of the Catholic 
Church represent an alliance with the Antichrist.
27
  
In chapter four, on the subject of democratic authority, my analysis of 
Schmitt’s texts between 1923-1932 largely confirms the presupposition of a distinct 
political structure. I argue that Schmitt’s concerns with authority are inextricable 
from this critical position on the supposed abilities or capacities of the collective 
democratic subject. Substantiating but also expanding on Bockenförde’s claim that 
the friend/enemy distinction is the ‘key to understanding’ Schmitt’s Constitutional 
Theory, I argue that the decision on the friend/enemy constitutes the very capacities 
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of the collective political entity itself.
28
 In addition, I show that the ability to make a 
decision on the friend/enemy, to assent or reject, also forms the operative principle of 
acclamation, which in the democratic works is the ultimate source of political 
authority/power [Gewalt]. Precisely how acclamation works to produce authority or 
legitimacy is seldom discussed.
29
 While Herrero and Kelly (respectively) assert that 
it functions as a form of legalisation or consent on the model of a contract, I argue 
that Schmitt implicitly relies on an energetic/enthusiastic model adopted from 
Georges Sorel’s works.
30
 My thesis substantiates and develops Heinrich Meier’s 




On the works of the Nazi period, I argue that Schmitt attempts to construct a 
third political form, which replaces acclamation with the oath of allegiance, and 
thereby immanentises aspects of his monarchical works. The works in this period 
thus represent a partial reversion to an earlier position, and can thus be distinguished 
from the democratic writings, at least by the resulting political form advocated. I 
argue that, rather than a ‘break’ between the democratic and Nazi writings, there is a 
shift of focus. The general political framework of the democratic works remains 
intact, but Schmitt takes up and develops a political form, which in Constitutional 
Theory, he had derogated as a degenerate radicalisation of the identity principle.  
In outline, in chapter three, I trace the development of Schmitt’s conception 
of ‘commissary authority’ from its origin in the ‘commissary dictator’ of 
Dictatorship. I argue that Schmitt repeatedly rearticulates and develops this structure 
of authority across his monarchical writings through a number of politico-religious 
figures: the Roman dictator, the military general, the pope, the judge, the Catholic 
priest, the great orator and the katechon. I show that this form of authority is 
constituted from two elements: the commission or task and an independent social 
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hierarchy. Rejecting Weber’s typology of Herrschaft and progressive narrative of the 
development of bureaucracy, Schmitt develops an alternative based on a personalist 
concept of the office. This chapter charts Schmitt’s strategies and reformulations of 
‘commissary authority’, drawing attention to his use of and parallels with structures 
and concepts common to traditional divine right doctrine.  
In chapter four, I focus on Schmitts works between 1923-1939 and his 
attempts to theorise a form of democratic authority. I argue that through a revisionist 
and antiliberal re-interpretation of ‘democracy’, Schmitt elaborates a concept of 
authority based on the act of popular acclamation. In his works prior to 1933 this 
concept is fundamental to Schmitt’s adoption of Sieyès’ pouvoir constituant. I argue 
that prior to 1933 Schmitt’s political theory, utilising a Hegelian Marxist conception 
of negation and Georges Sorel’s vitalism, attempts to reformulate an active 
alternative to the conservative doctrine of the Volksgeist, represented in his 
‘intensified’ concept of the political as a decision on the enemy. However, after 1933 
Schmitt discards the acclamatory aspects of this vision of democracy for the 
Führerprinzip, legitimated by the personal oath. I argue that this marks a return to 
the theoretical structure of his monarchical works (if in an immanentised form). 
Finally I conclude with a summary account of the dissertation and briefly remarks on 
the possible significance of the results of my investigation. 
The bulk of the study consists of a close investigation of the primary texts, 
tracing the shifts and changes in structure within the iterations of their political 
theories, with some references to contemporaneous alternatives for contextualisation. 
Methodological inspiration has been drawn from multiple sources: the methods of 
conceptual history developed by Reinhardt Koselleck, partly inspired by Schmitt’s 
own work;
32
 the genealogical and archaeological methods of Foucault and 
Agamben;
33
 Heinrich Meier’s close readings of each edition of The Concept of the 
Political;
34
 and Quentin Skinner and Deborah Baumgold’s attention to the shifts 
between iterations of Hobbes’ political theory.
35
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There is already some work on the subject of ‘Hobbes and Schmitt’. Johan 
Tralau’s recent edited volume is perhaps the most substantial simultaneous 
engagement with Hobbes and Schmitt.
36
 There are also a few significant essays by 
Étienne Balibar, Horst Bredekamp, Carlo Altini, John McCormick and others.
37
 By 
focussing on the problem of authority, my study centres on a form of political crisis 
that both experienced concretely and to which each responded with theoretical 
inventions. Both Hobbes and Schmitt lived through a cycle of political 
transformation resembling the classical sequence, ancien regime - revolution - 
restoration, initiated by a crisis in authority. In Hobbes’ case, this consisted of a 
sequence initiated by the instability and weakened authority of King Charles I 
resulting in Civil War; the establishment of the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell and 
the New Model Army; the death of Oliver Cromwell and the restoration of the Stuart 
monarchy under Charles II. For Schmitt, there is a corresponding sequence running 
from the instability and failing legitimacy of the democratic Weimar parliament; the 
1933 establishment of the Third Riech under Adolf Hitler; and on the death of Hitler 
the re-establishment (in the West) of a liberal-parliamentary constitution. Both were 
confronted with the question of accommodation to a regime change they had earlier 
opposed. Hobbes fled to Paris fearing reprisals from Cromwell for public views 
supporting the Stuart monarchy. Only to return after he had made a case for the duty 
to accommodate oneself to the de facto holder of power. In parallel, prior to 1933, 
Schmitt argued vocally that the Nazi party should be banned. After they came to 
power, he quickly adjusted to accommodate and support the new regime. For both 
Hobbes and Schmitt, the restoration demanded a second, and perhaps even more 
difficult, accommodation.  
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Before turning to Hobbes’ and Schmitt’s works a few clarifications of 
concepts central to the thesis are required. Firstly, the concept of authority itself 
requires some preliminary clarification. Secondly, I need to address the specificity of 
religion, theology and politics in the works of Hobbes and Schmitt and thirdly, I 
discuss briefly the meaning of ‘law’ 
 
2 Authority, Auctoritas and Power 
Given the central position of authority to my study, some clarification of the history 
and debate concerning the concept is necessary. The etymological root of authority 
and its European cognates autorité and Autorität is the Roman term auctoritas. In 
Republican Rome one referent of the term was the specific power of rule possessed 
by the senate. While there was no direct equivalent in the Greek lexicon, there are a 
number of synonymous terms overlapping in different ways such as kratos (rule), 
basileus (king), axíōmai, exousíā, hēgemṓn, kúrios, arkhḗ (origin, command).38 The 
Greek term basileus (dating from the Homeric and Geometric period of Greek 
history) may represent one of the earliest conceptions of political authority and 
shares various aspects with the Roman auctoritas, it based on physical and martial 
power (kratos), wisdom at council (euboulia) and a reputation for justice (themis).
39
 
Nevertheless, in more recent debate the Roman auctoritas is often treated as the 
original source for the specificity of the concept.  
A canonical source on the earliest meanings of the term is Benveniste’s 
research on the prehistory of Indo-European vocabulary. He traces the root of 
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auctoritas to augeo, a term meaning increase or augment.
40
 However, he also 
connects the term with a range of related concepts: auctor (author), augur (divine), 
augustus (a title), and auxilium (auxiliary) and specifically writes that auctoritas 
belongs to both the ‘spheres of politics and religion’.
41
 The political use of the term 
auctoritas to mark the specific power of the senate appears to have arisen in the early 
period of the Roman Republic, in part to distinguish the senate’s power from the 
imperium possessed by the kings of the earlier period (the latter term adopted from 
the Etruscans).
42
 As Nippel notes, auctoritas had two spheres of use: (i) the 
auctoritas patris and auctoritas tutoris referring to the authority of the father or 
guardian of a minor, and (ii) the auctoritas patrum referring to the authority of the 
senate (the fathers of the city).
43
 Nevertheless, as Agamben points out, these are 




In discourse on the political significance of auctoritas, the dominant 
conception of the term is derived from the late Republic where it is often 
distinguished from two alternative senses of power: potestas and potentia. For 
instance, in Cicero’s On the Republic, he articulates the political structure by 
allocating auctoritas to the senate, potestas to the magistrates and potentia or libertas 
to the people.
45
 In addition, a conceptual opposition between auctoritas and potestas 
was confirmed with the discovery of new fragments of a Latin copy of Caesar 
Augustus’ Res Gestae in the 1920s.
46
 The Latin fragments of the Res Gestae proved 
that Augustus considered his political power to be founded on auctoritas rather than 
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dignitas, as earlier translations from Greek versions of the text presumed.
47
 In 
Augustus’ Res Gestae he specifically juxtaposes his auctoritas to the potestas of the 
regular office. Referring to his successes in restoring peace and taking control of the 
republic, Augustus recites a list of the honors offered by the senate and the people, 
‘in recognition of my valour, my clemency, my justice and my piety. After that time 
I took precedence over all in auctoritas, but of potestas I possessed no more than 
those who were my colleagues in any magistracy.’
48
 In the reception of the term, this 
passage forms a key support for the sense that authority in Rome referred to one’s 
‘social and political standing’ and ‘impressiveness in character and judgment’ rather 
than any official post which was merely a form of potestas.
49
 Further, although the 
debate assumes dignitas and auctoritas are not equivalent, in Cicero’s various 
writings the terms are clearly closely associated.
50
  
The broad legacy of the Roman concept auctoritas is a series of conceptual 
antitheses distinguishing a supposedly ‘genuine’ sense of authority captured by 
auctoritas, from alternative modes of influence: including rational persuasion (ratio), 
legally or formally determined office (potestas) and coercive force or power 
(potentia). However, each of these has been contested in various ways. For example, 
Cicero’s discussion of the auctoritas of legal argument invokes an economy of 
auctoritas in the art of persuasion. Authority, persuasiveness, honour and dignity 
form a kind of nexus in the art of public speaking.
51
 The qualities of the individual 
enhance their effectiveness in persuasion and argument and hence their influence and 
auctoritas.  
Preserving the distinction between auctoritas and potestas was made possible 
by the distinctive dual juridical context of Roman law. The Romans recognised both 
a ius civile, a set of (positive) legal regulations applying only to Roman citizens and 
the ius gentium, a precursor to theories of natural law/right, which applied to all other 
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peoples and was based on common principles.
52
 While potestas was native to the ius 
civile, which regulated the civil and religious conduct of citizens, auctoritas could 
stand beyond the ius civile, yet, remain within the sphere of ius gentium. Thus the 
authority of the senate could stand outside the legally determined offices of the ius 
civile. 
In the juridical contexts of the Middle Ages, this distinction became difficult 
to maintain. The disappearance of Roman Law and the dominance of customary law 
in Germanic and Anglo-saxon territories meant they lacked the framework to 
recognise auctoritas.
53
 It was often acknowledged that the king possessed auctoritas 
but his authority could not exceed the common law framework. In the early 
thirteenth century Henry of Bracton’s use of auctoritas is partly consistent with the 
Roman tradition, linking auctoritas to the roles of tutor and guarantor.
54
 However, 
although he accords auctoritas to the king, he insists that the king remains ‘bridled’ 
to the common law (essentially civil law).
55
 In a similar manner, John of Salisbury 
writes that ‘the authority of the prince [principet autoritas]’ is determined by the law, 
which he is obligated to submit to.
56
 In addition, in the Church of the Middle Ages, 
‘auctoritas and potestas came to be used interchangeably.’
57
 In the Christian Empire, 
auctoritas ostensibly belonged to the Emperor, and potestas to the Pope. Despite this, 




In the Middle Ages the antithesis of authority and reason was implicitly 
contested in the very concept of the auctores, the idea that texts by classical authors 
carried a certain weight precisely because their authors were considered ‘masters of 
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right thinking and of right expression’.
59
 Similarly, the authority of philosophy or the 




In the modern era, the authority granted by divine right continued to blur 
together the three terms, auctoritas, potestas and ratio. We find this in Edward 
Coke’s assertion that the common law was the immemorial embodiment of ‘natural 
reason’.
61
 But also, in later centuries the opposition between revolutionary politics 
inspired by Rousseau’s ‘general will’ and counter-revolutionary thought concerned 
the relation between reason and authority. The counter-revolutionaries insisted on a 
mystification of the rational element. For instance, in Joseph de Maistre’s works the 
authority of the sovereign comes directly from God. It is absolute within the state, 
but limited by the unwritten constitution of the nation.
62
 It is a divine gift that 
appears as a ‘man invested with an indefinable power: he speaks and makes himself 
obeyed’.
63
 Appealing to Providence, Maistre mystifies authority as an ‘infallible 
instinct’ given to the founders of nations.
64
 This mystified conception of authority 
continues to guide conservative thought into the nineteenth century. Donoso Cortés’ 
describes the Catholic Church as a ‘sublime, infallible authority’ from which is 
derived all human authority (familial authority and political authority) as well as the 
criteria of the sciences, affections and human actions. In this respect, ‘Catholicity is a 




However, an alternative debate on authority arises out of the liberal thought 
of the same period. Mill and Guizot as well as radical leftists such as Mikhail 
Bakunin and Friedrich Engels attempt to distinguish the legitimate influence of 
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science from traditional authority.
66
 This rational form of authority was implicitly 
rejected by Roman historian Theodore Mommsen’s claim that auctoritas referred to 
an instruction that is ‘more than advice and less than command, it is advice that one 
cannot escape following’.
67
 Developing Mommsen’s definition, Hannah Arendt 
suggested that genuinely political authority forms a tripartite structure with tradition 
and religion and develops out of a foundational event. Arendt contrasts the Roman 
foundation with the philosophical (rational) politics of Ancient Greece: ‘[w]here 
arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance’.
68
 Instead, Arendt bases political 
authority on the religious memorialisation of the act of foundation. Due to the 
influence of Arendt’s essay, ‘What is Authority?’ (1954), the opposition between 
authority and rational persuasion is often taken as definitive. However, Max Weber’s 
taxonomy of Herrschaft into the ideal types, traditional authority, charismatic 
authority and legal-rational authority, rejects this antithesis, as does Alexandre 
Kojève’s manuscript of 1942 La notion d’autorité, (the latter was unpublished until 
recently).
69
 Kojeve introduced a quadripartite analysis linking types of authority with 
their respective philosophical traditions: master/slave (Hegel), leader/band 
(Aristotle), judge/judged (Plato) and father/child (Scholastic-Theological). He 




More recently, the antithesis between authority and force has become the 
central point of debate in the later twentieth century. In the Frankfurt School studies 
of authority, the intertwining of force and authority is implicit in their 
pathologisation of the ‘authoritarian personality’.
71
 In this vein, Leonard Krieger’s 
encyclopedia entry on authority also speaks of fluctuations in the term across history 
as it oscillates between the poles of voluntary compliance and legitimate coercion.
72
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More radically, Michel Foucault attempted to ‘dispense with the psycho-sociological 
notion of authority’ altogether.
73
 The canonical examples of authority he recoded as 
relations of power [pouvoir]. The concept of authority was displaced by ‘disciplinary 
power’, extending from the power of ‘parents over children’, to the ‘administration 
over the ways people live’ and on to ‘pastoral power’.
74
 Critically developing 
Foucault, Agamben’s recent work also rejects the independence of authority and 
force, describing instead two concepts held together in a dynamic machinic 
opposition which maintains their effectiveness.
75
 In fact, as I demonstrate in chapter 
two, Hobbes’ work foreshadows aspects of Foucault insofar as he undermines the 
distinction between authority and power, through an expansive conception of 
potentia, as force, might or ability and associating it with religion and worship.  
Despite the difficulties of definitively distinguishing authority from 
imperatives based on coercion, reason and law, there remains something captivating 
about the Roman concept auctoritas. It seems to resist assimilation to the category of 
power (as well as reason, or law). Or rather something specific about its operation 
and the experience of authority is lost in this displacement by ‘power relations’. 
Throughout my research, I have been guided by an intuition that authority remains 
ineradicable. As Robert Michels, Jo Freeman and others have argued, in ‘political’ 
contexts, whether parties, communities or nations, attempts to eliminate authority 
seem predetermined to fail.
76
 If authority is unavoidable, then a scientific 
understanding of its bases, its modes of operation and its effects appears the most 
likely way of managing its negative aspects. Can we imagine a legitimate form of 
political authority today? Would this be distinct from the technocratic visions of 
society that appear to accompany attempts to rationalise politics?  
In the twentieth century, liberal visions of politics attempted to displace 
questions of authority with legalistic models: written constitutions, international 
agreements and declarations of (universal) human rights. However, wider recognition 
of the arbitrary nature of particular declarations of rights or political constitutions 
                                                 
73
 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973--1974 (New York: 
Macmillan, 2008), 40. 
74
 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 
1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 2002), 327–35. ‘The Subject and Power’ 
75
 Agamben, Omnibus, 240–2. 
76
 Robert Michels, Political Parties A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, trans. Eden &. Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst’s International Library Co., 1915); Jo 
Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 17 (1972): 151–64. 
29 
and their inadequacy to their universalist aspirations, has resulted in a demand for 
more participatory models of politics. But, in the interwar period similar demands for 
participation promoted the rise of authoritarian politics across Europe.
77
  
The Roman concept auctoritas appears to capture something of the specific 
social and reputational aspects of authority and their connection with religious ritual 
and practices. It is for this reason that the Roman concept auctoritas frames my 
research on Hobbes and Schmitt on authority.  
 
3 Religion, Theology and Politics 
Throughout its history, theories of political authority are intertwined with religious 
concepts and themes: from the augury of Rome, to the divine right of the Middle 
ages and to the fascist ‘sacralisation of politics’ in the early twentieth century.
78
 
Before turning to Hobbes’ and Schmitt’s political theory, this intertwining prompts 
some clarification of the term ‘religion’ and its relation to theology and politics. The 
Roman practices of civil religion are of particular interest for two reasons. Firstly, the 
etymology connecting auctoritas and augury and the importance of practices of 
divination in supporting the political decisions of the senate in Rome entails an 
original intertwining of auctoritas and practices of ‘religion’. Secondly, it is my 
contention that Hobbes’ conception of religion is based partly on a model of 
polytheistic civil religion derived from classical Roman sources. On this point, 
Cicero’s definition of religion as ‘the science of divine worship’ could equally 
describe Hobbes’ attempt, in De Cive, to provide a rational explanation of civil 
worship as a form of signification (discussed in detail in chapter one).
79
 In fact the 
formal conception of obedience (simple obedience) that Hobbes develops bears a 
resemblance to the formalistic rigour required of Roman religious practices. Thus I 
suggest that a proper interpretation of Hobbes on religion, which has repercussions 
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for understanding his account of political power, requires reversing the cumulative 
effects of the late seventeenth century theories of ‘natural religion’ developed by 
Edward Herbert, James Toland and others.
80
  
The primary effect of seventeenth century theories of natural religion was to 
centre the general anthropological category of religion on doctrine rather than 
practices such as liturgy, ritual participation and worship. Herbert for instance, 
focused on identifying ‘five undeniable propositions’ that were universally accepted 
by all ‘religions’.
81
 However, as Talal Asad demonstrates, this focus implicitly took 
the particular Post-reformation Protestant vision of Christianity (with its emphasis on 
adherence to scripture, doctrinal fidelity, beliefs and theology) as a model for 
‘religion’ in general.
82
 This represented a considerable redefinition of the Roman 
term religio, which in this period often continued to refer to the formulaic and 
practical aspects of participation rather than ‘inner belief’.
83
 But also, this ignored the 
broader range of possible relations to the ‘divine’ that could perhaps be included 
under such a category as ‘religion’, such as the various duties and activities required 
in polytheistic cultures. The paradox of this redefinition was that the various civil 
and political practices classed as religio in polytheistic Rome, which could include 
sporting events, theatre, divination, augury, and the distribution of civil offices and 
tasks, no longer fit under the category of ‘religion’.  
Hobbes stands on the threshold of this conceptual shift to doctrine. Herbert’s 
works span the period from 1624 to 1648 and Toland’s consolidation of this 
redefinition occurred only after Hobbes’ death. As I demonstrate in chapter two, 
Hobbes appears quite resistant to the shift, derogating theology and the emphasis on 
doctrine. Instead, he insists that the truth of religion lies in ‘keeping of the Feasts and 
Fasts’.
84
 With respect to doctrine, Hobbes was satisfied with the most minimal single 
proposition, ‘Jesus is the Christ’. The term ‘Christ’ meant ‘the anointed’, but as 
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Hobbes makes clear, alluding to the practice described in the Old Testament by 
which the kings of the Israelites were anointed, this proposition means only that 
Jesus was the ‘king which God had before promised’. This ostensibly political 
proposition is ‘the only necessary article of faith’.
85
 In a similar manner, Cicero 
reduced doctrine to the basic claim that there exists an ‘excellent and eternal Being, 
who deserves the respect and homage of men’.
86
 
The historiography of Roman religion is mirrored in the reception of Hobbes 
on religion. Established as a distinct field of study in the nineteenth century, the early 
‘historians of Roman religion had little or no appreciation for polytheism’ and treated 
Roman religion as a deformed monotheism or ‘primitive’ precursor to Christianity.
87
 
With its emphasis on formalism, ritual observance, civil duties and external practice, 
Roman religion was interpreted as dry and prosaic, an empty husk that had 
degenerated and lost its interiority.
88
 However, as Beard and North note, ‘many of 
our familiar categories of thinking about religion and religious experience simply 
cannot be usefully applied’ to Roman religion.
89
 For example, Wissowa’s classic 
study of 1902, Religion und Kultus der Römer, makes free use of concepts such as 
‘tolerance’, ‘divine right ', ‘religious feeling’, exhibiting no critical awareness of the 
colouration they impose.
90
 The apparently self-evident ‘idea of “personal belief” … 
provides a strikingly inappropriate model for understanding the religious experience 
of early Rome.’
91
 As a result Roman religion appeared as something rather 
irreligious and impious. In recent decades, historians employing a broader sense of 
‘religion’ have developed an account of Roman religion as an orthopraxis rather than 
an orthodoxy. For Scheid and Linder, for instance, Roman religion is essentially an 
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obligatory practice directly tied to citizenship and political life of Rome. In addition, 
it had a distinctively pragmatic aspect by which it was expected to be effective.
92
  
The reception of Hobbes on religion exhibits a similar incomprehension. For 
contemporary readers, Hobbes’ minimalist doctrine, his rejection of Protestant 
enthusiasm and lack of concern for the particular content of doctrine or theology 
seems to turn Christianity into something irreligious and prosaic. In Ronald Beiner’s 
analysis of Hobbes’ civil religion, Hobbes’ ambivalence to the Christian experience 
of religion leads him to describe it as a ‘judaicization’ of Christianity. 
93
 Instead, I 
suggest that the Roman precursors are a better fit. Certainly, Hobbes adopts aspects 
of Judaic tradition, but his overarching model for ‘religion’ resembles the Roman 
integration of religion and politics in the form of cultic participation. Springborg and 
Paganini have pointed to the influence of Epicureanism on Hobbes’ theory of 
religion, connecting it with his friendship with Pierre Gassendi and the rediscovery 
of Lucretius’ de rerum natura.
94
 However, it seems likely that Cicero’s writings on 
religion were also a significant influence, given that Hobbes’ education and youth 
was spent immersed in Ancient histories and philosophy. Hobbes specifically refers 
to a number of Roman practices such as augury and haruspicy in his comments on 
religion in Leviathan and makes criticisms similar to those of Cicero in De 
divinatione.95 Thus, in my analysis of Hobbes’ political use of religion in support of 
authority, I remain open to a broader sense of ‘religion’ informed by recent studies 
on religion in Rome and the judeo-Christian tradition.
96
 Hobbes’ integration of 
religious practices in the commonwealth is reminiscent of the intertwining of religion 
with political and civil concerns in Rome. 
While Hobbes’ broad conception of religion is not shared by Schmitt, he does 
assert a similar interrelation between politics and religion. This includes an aspect of 
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external performance and rejects the individualist internalisation of religion 
characteristic of Protestantism. But unlike Hobbes, Schmitt does not reject theology. 
Rather, he treats theology as a kind of laboratory of institutional forms. The 
intertwining of religion and politics occurs as ‘political theology’. This is discussed 
in more detail in chapter three, however broadly, Schmitt’s conception of religion 
includes both doctrine and practices (theology and ecclesiology) developed through 
history and handed down through tradition. It is the workshop in which the general 
forms and principles of collective human activity are elaborated. Thus religion and 
politics are historically as well as logically correlated. Rather than subordinating the 
Church to political purposes, Schmitt demands that Christian goals orient political 
activity. For Schmitt, the essential character of religion is juridical and ideological. It 
is not irrational but exhibits a ‘specific juridical logic [juristischer Logik]’, a 
‘rationalism’ that ‘morally encompasses the psychological and sociological nature of 
man.’
97
 That is, there is a specific affinity between religion and law and right. 
 
4 Law and Recht 
As Hobbes’ claim that ‘auctoritas non veritas facit legem’ implies, at stake in 
questions of authority is often the foundation of law and legality or, for Schmitt, the 
distinction between legality and legitimacy. Thus, it is necessary to clarify briefly 
some of the German legal terminology used by Schmitt. For Schmitt, authority and 
legitimacy are matters of Recht (right, droit) rather than Gesetz (law, loi). In at least a 
weak sense, the German terms Recht and Gesetz preserve a distinction between two 
conceptions of law largely absent in English.
98
 In contrast to the term Gesetz, which 
connotes rules and regulations in the sense of positive law (law as an explicitly 
posited product of human activity), the term Recht, which corresponds roughly to the 
Latin jus, or French droit implies a relationship to what is right, meaning correct or 
just. Recht asserts a proximity to divine law or natural right/law, whereas Gesetz 
admits a certain arbitrariness.
99
 This is reflected in German term for justice, 
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Gerechtigkeit. The ‘juristische’ nature of the Church, refers to its claim to be an 
administrator of Recht, or justice.  
Schmitt’s insistence on Recht stands in contrast with the legal positivism of 
his contemporary Hans Kelsen, who equated law with a hierarchical system of 
‘norms’ (i.e. rules and procedures, essentially Gesetze) resting ultimately on a 
Grundnorm.
100
 Hobbes’ conception of law as command, determined wholly by the 
will of the sovereign, the ‘legislator in all commonwealths’, thus, appears closer to 
Kelsen than Schmitt.
101
 However, Hobbes was aware that such a positive law 
required support. Although the sovereign is given the ‘right’ to make law by the 
contract, this right is undermined by the fragility of ‘mere words’. As I demonstrate 
in part one, throughout his political writings, it is precisely the problem of giving 
legitimacy, authority or ‘effectiveness’ to such a right, that Hobbes struggles to 
solve. A series of theoretical apparatuses — worship, authorisation, pedagogy — are 
applied in order to bolster the artificial power of the sovereign. This struggle to 
theorise the legitimacy and authority underlying the law unites the work of Hobbes 
and Schmitt, and it is to this topic that I turn to now. 
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Part I: Thomas Hobbes 
36 
Chapter 1: Worship, Potentia and 
Authorisation 
 
And at this day, in this part of the world, 
private duels are and always will be 
honourable, though unlawful, till such time 
as there shall be honour ordained for them 






In Hobbes’ lifetime the Stuart monarchy of seventeenth-century England was plagued by 
a crisis of authority.
2
 King James’ attempts to buttress the doctrine of divine right had 
been largely unsuccessful and there was a growing political cynicism linked to the 
reception of works influenced by Botero's Della ragion di stato.
3
 In this political and 
intellectual context, Hobbes’ political writings pioneered a new systematic theory of the 
modern state. Across his works we can isolate four distinct apparatuses that support 
political power: the contract, political worship, authorisation and education. None of 
these is wholly congruent with the Roman concept of auctoritas. In fact, as Luc Foisneau 
recognised, Hobbes largely displaces the classical concept auctoritas by reference to the 
general category power [pouvoir].
4
 The reception of Hobbes’ political writings remains 
plagued by debate over the ultimate source of the political authority and legitimacy of the 
commonwealth. While the dominant interpretations place the most weight on the contract 
or authorisation, in contrast, I demonstrate, through attentiveness to the role of religion, 
that both worship and education are of equal if not greater significance for the actual 
effectiveness (and hence legitimacy) of the artifice of the sovereign, since only they 
motivate obedience in practice.  
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Hobbes’ political works are often divided into three periods.
5
 There are the 
youthful ‘humanist’ works on rhetoric and his ‘Discourse on Tacitus.’ A middle period is 
marked by his reading of Euclid’s Elements and his attempt to formulate political theory 
as a new scientia civilis. This includes Elements of Law and De Cive. Finally, a third 
period includes Leviathan, Behemoth, and Historia Ecclesiastica, in which Hobbes 
returns to a partial embrace of rhetoric and eloquence as necessary supports for science. 
This first chapter traces themes of power and legitimation across all three periods. I start 
with his early interest in Tacitus’s Annals and move on to his attempts to formulate a 
science of politics in De Cive and the role of authorisation in Leviathan. In chapter two, I 
focus largely on the third period and Hobbes’ use of religion as a model for political 
pedagogy. 
In this chapter, I provide a reconstruction and interpretation of Hobbes’ political 
writings centered on his account of worship in order to demonstrate its importance in the 
broader structure of power in his account of the modern state. In particular, I argue that 
Hobbes’ political writings are marked by a struggle to articulate the relation between the 
covenantal-legal potestas and the material potentia of the sovereign. The dualism 
between (i) the artifice of legal power, constituted by the covenant and (ii) the natural 
capacities, strengths and material powers of the commonwealth, is fundamental to the 
structure of the Hobbesian commonwealth. However, these two aspects must also be 
united in the sovereign. In the following, I argue that Hobbes makes two attempts to 
conjoin these spheres. The first occurs in De Cive, where Hobbes develops a distinctive 
account of worship as a mode of signification capable of generating material power. The 
second is given in Leviathan, where worship is supplemented with a theory of 
authorisation. Through these measures Hobbes reconfigures the Roman tripartite schema 
auctoritas/potestas/potentia or at least its early modern reception, exemplified in the 
works Justus Lipsius.
6
 In this respect, I argue that Hobbes’ works can be interpreted as an 
attempt to develop a new conception of authority. Against the prominent reading of 
Hobbes, I claim that this is not an authority arising out of the contract itself, the latter 
being productive of mere potestas.
7
 Luc Foisneau is correct that Hobbes’ equation 
‘Potestas sive Authoritas’, in the introduction of the Latin Leviathan, ‘reflects a desire to 
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break with the Roman tradition of an essential distinction’.
8
 Nevertheless, eradicating 
auctoritas as a distinct concept, Hobbes is forced to extend potentia to those ‘psycho-
sociological’ aspects of authority that would much later be vilified by Foucault.
9
  
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, in order to 
contextualise Hobbes’ political writings against the intellectual currents and crises of 
early seventeenth-century England, I provide a brief account of two alternative models of 
authority: the authority native to the doctrine of reason of state exemplified in Justus 
Lipsius’ Politica and the authority of the chivalric ethic of divine right advocated by the 
Stuart monarchy. In the second section, on the basis of a dualist reading of Hobbes’ 
political theory, I argue that while the contract establishes the artifice of the sovereign 
potestas, it is inadequate as a source of authority. In the third section, I explicate Hobbes’ 
theory of worship, in order to demonstrate its significance to Hobbes’ political theory and 
draw out its parallels with the Roman conception of auctoritas. Modelled on a radical 
distinction between command and counsel, Hobbes attempts to produce a general 
scientific theory of worship that accounts both for its universal dimension and its capacity 
to increase material power. However, despite its capacity to magnify and cultivate power, 
worship requires an initial seed. In the fourth section, I demonstrate that authorisation, 
introduced only in Leviathan, meets these requirements. On the model of theatrical 
performance, Hobbes depicts the personal artifice of the sovereign as an object of 
worship and locus of material power. In my concluding remarks, I reflect on the 
significance of this Hobbesian structure and its relation to the Roman concept of 
authority and its subsequent forms. 
The texts of primary interest to this chapter are: the manuscript Elements of Law, 
Natural and Politic, written in English around 1639; the two editions of De Cive (1642 
and 1647) written in Latin; the two editions of Leviathan, the first published in English in 
1651 and the second, a Latin translation produced by Hobbes, published in 1661. The 
Latin texts offer a means of clarifying the different senses of ‘power’ used by Hobbes and 
my analysis is attentive to his particular choice of terms. To avoid excessive use of Latin, 
I use the term ‘material power’ in place of potentia, a term Hobbes uses to capture a 
broad range of capacities and faculties extending from physical force to wealth, 
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 Where the relevant Latin term would be potestas or imperium, 
reflecting the artifice of potestas in Hobbes’ account, I use ‘artificial power’. 
 
1 Chivalry or Deceit: Two Visions of Early Modern 
Authority 
There were two alternative doctrines of authority prevalent in early modern England: 
reason of state and divine right. The former, which takes its name from Giovanni 
Botero’s Della Ragion di Stato and developed out of Niccolò Machiavelli’s writings, 
suggests that in political concerns the preservation and strength of the state should be 
prioritised over all moral or ethical concerns. The latter, in contrast, bases monarchical 
authority on a providential gift from God.
11
 Emblematic of these two positions are the 
Roman figures Tacitus and Augustus. The late sixteenth-century interest in the cynical 
‘court-politics’ of Tacitus was typical of theorists of reason of state, while the early Stuart 
Kings, following a tradition with medieval roots throughout Europe, took up Caesar and 




(i) Lipsius’ Auctoritas and Reason of State 
Hobbes’ early essay ‘A Discourse on the Beginning of Tacitus’ was likely inspired by 
Justus Lipsius’s Politica and its influence within Hobbes’ intellectual circle.
13
 In the 
introduction to his 1629 translation of Thucydides, Hobbes speaks approvingly of 
Lipsius, who was an influential source on Tacitus.
14
 Lipsius’ Politica had a particular 
                                                 
10
 EL, 8.5. 
11
See Figgis, Divine Right. 
12
 Paulina Kewes, ‘Roman History, Essex, and Late Elizabethan Political Culture’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Age of Shakespeare, ed. Malcolm Smuts, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
251–69; Freyja Cox Jensen, Reading the Roman Republic in Early Modern England (Leiden: Brill, 2012); 
Malcolm Smuts, ‘Court Centered Politics and the Uses of Roman Historians’, in Culture and Politics in 
Early Stuart England, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 21–44. 
Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, vol. 1500 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995), chap. 1. 
13
 3D, xii, xii fn1. Hobbes’ authorship of the text is contested, but accepted by many such as Skinner and 
Tuck. 
14
 EW, 8, xxxi. See Christopher Brooke, ‘Justus Lipsius and the Post-Machiavellian Prince’, in Philosophic 
Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought From Lipsius to Rousseau, ed. Christopher Brooke (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 12. 
40 
currency among Robert Devereux’s Essex circle, which included Francis Bacon and Ben 
Jonson, two acquaintances of Hobbes. 
In broad terms, Lipsius advocates for a well-ordered monarchy and is concerned 
with protecting imperium and commercio, two basic elements of ‘civil life in society’.
15
 
On the relation between imperium and law, Lipsius subordinates the prince to the 
customs and laws of nations [mos sive lex gentium], but he notes that the prince submits 
‘only at his pleasure to the law’.
16
 The only limit on the rights [iure] of imperium 
possessed by the prince is in matters of religion.
17
 Lipsius offers a detailed discussion of 
three ‘ways’ [via] to authority [auctoritas].
18
 He defines auctoritas as a ‘reverent opinion 
of the king [rex] and his government [statu] impressed upon his subjects or also on 
foreigners’.
19
 He maintains a strict separation between authority and legal office, treating 
it as a socially determined reputation, equated with virtue or majesty and threatened as 
much by contempt as by rebellion. Lipsius treats auctoritas as one of a number of virtues 
(including justice and clemency), which, alongside strength [vis], are essential supports to 
imperium and therefore to the peace and stability of a regime.  
The three ways to auctoritas are character [forma imperii], power [potentia 
imperii] and conduct [moribus imperantis]. In the first, he includes ‘stern character’, 
required to instill fear of punishment, constancy in practices and laws and a small 
(limited) government apparatus.
20
 The second way to auctoritas is material power 
[potentiam]. In a phrase with clear echoes in Hobbes’ later writings, Lipsius notes that 
‘[i]f everything else is there, but power [potentia] isn’t, of what use is it? Know that 
majesty without force [viribus] is hardly stable.’
21
 Under this category of power 
[potentia], he includes riches, arms, planning, alliances and fortune, foreshadowing 
Hobbes’ use of the category. In the third way, Lipsius includes the reputation and esteem 
of the people, independent of how it is achieved. That is, deceit is not only permitted but 
advised where necessary and he offers a tripartite taxonomy of light [levis], middle 
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[media] and grave [magna] deceit, defining situations where each is required.
22
 In the 
final category, grave deceit, Lipsius includes perfidiam and injustice. The former refers to 
breach of treaties (i.e. covenants and contracts) and oaths, while the latter refers to acting 
‘against rights and law’ [contra iura et leges] in order to further one’s own interests. The 
examples cited include the treacherous elimination of political enemies through secret or 
deceptive means.
23
 For Lipsius, even grave deceit is permissible in circumstances of 
‘necessity’. In support, he cites Seneca: ‘He is not wicked who acts wickedly 
involuntarily’.
24
 Lipsius demonstrates little interest in legal forms of the state; instead, it 
is only technique, the art of rule, that is important to the sovereign. All deceit, even with 
malice, can be justified in some circumstances and not just against external enemies but 
also one’s own people. The visibility of the prince demanded the prioritisation of the 




Hobbes explores a number of similar themes in ‘A Discourse on the Beginning of 
Tacitus’, a commentary on the first forty lines of Tacitus’s Annales. The topic furnishes 
Hobbes with an historical pretext to discuss the complexities of the foundation and 
reproduction of political authority.
26
 Tacitus’ introduction offers a condensed narrative of 
the origins of Rome, its transformation into an empire under Augustus and the problems 
of succession that plague Augustus’s legacy. The central problem of the text is how a 
government ‘which is gotten violently may be afterwards possessed quietly’. Citing 
Roman consuls Cinna and Sulla, Hobbes notes that it is not merely because their power 
was attained by ‘violence and force’ that it was short-lived.
27
 Rather Hobbes identifies 
appearances, such as titles, reputation and honour as key to the maintenance of 
government power. He includes a range of phenomena: the role of titles and words along 
with the effects of ‘seeming things’ [appearances] on the multitude;
28
 the choice of titles 
that would rub subjects’ wounds;
29
 the hope that nourishes imaginations;
30
 the 
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management of men’s desires and ambitions through the limitation of what appears 
possible;
31
 the ‘shadows’ of reputation and honour, the neglect of which can have ‘real 
and substantial damage’;
32
 but also the control of religion by which the ‘yoke’ of 
government is made bearable.
33
 These phenomena are subsumed under the category of 




The set overlaps significantly with Lipsius’ ‘ways to auctoritas’, suggesting that 
Hobbes considered auctoritas a kind of power over minds and wills. In contrast to 
Lipsius, Hobbes offers a much weaker advocacy for deceit, referring only to the need for 
‘dissimulation’.
35
 Hobbes does not endorse outright deceit and injustice, and limits 
dissimulation to a stoic conception of diplomatic self-mastery. The chief ‘Art of 




Hobbes’ hesitation with respect to open deceit and deception may be due to the 
destabilising effects, evident in the spread of propaganda since the outbreak of the Thirty 
Year’s War, produced by generalising the doctrine of reason of state as a model of 
politics. The Thirty Years’ War was accompanied by ‘a flood of pamphlets, newsletters, 
and broadsheets, both informative and polemical’, primarily in continental Europe, 
although England was not immune.
37
 The pamphlet propaganda often took the form of 
‘transparent fictions’ of diplomatic documents, factual reports or minutes of secret 
meetings. Thomas Scott’s Vox Populi: Or, News from Spayne (1620) presented itself as 
the minutes of a meeting of the Spanish Council of State setting out their policies toward 
England.
38
 One of the most sophisticated examples of the 1620s propaganda was the 
trilogy of pamphlets known as the Altera Secretissima instructio.
39
 Each of the texts 
interweaves a rich blend of fact and fiction to present a cynical image of the unveiling of 
an arcana imperii. In the 1620s Hobbes completed a partial translation of the third Altera 
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Secretissima attesting to his familiarity with the literature.
40
 However, Hobbes appears to 
have rejected this conception of international politics for a scientia civilis based on 
universal precepts and general law that might avoid such ‘controversies and dispute’. In 
the opening epistle of Elements, Hobbes identifies his aim to develop, from a foundation 
of laws of nature, an infallible doctrine of rules to be applied to both international and 





(ii) Stuart Chivalry: Charles, Augustus and the Reform of the 
Nobility 
One response to the Tacitist cynicism of reason of state was the Stuart attempt to 
rejuvenate traditional conceptions of honour among the English nobility.
42
 During 
Hobbes’ lifetime the Stuart Kings James I/VI and Charles I both attempted to strengthen 
the authority of the monarchy through renovation of the traditional mechanisms of 
monarchical support. This included a patchwork of ideological and practical methods 
including the reassertion of divine right, appeals to the image of the imperium of Roman 
emperors Caesar and Augustus, Laudian reforms of Church ceremony and reform and 
policing of titles of the English honours system. Especially contentious were the Stuart 
attempts to reform the honours system of the nobility, that is, the system of titles, 
dignities and associated heraldry, privileges, and rules of precedence which governed the 
gentry.  
The crisis of the honours system offers a possible motivation for Hobbes’ specific 
concern with matters of ceremony, worship, status and prestige in De Cive and Leviathan. 
The rules of precedence governed seating arrangements at state ceremonial events which 
constituted one of the only visible manifestations of rank and nobility in English politics. 
Since the dignities and honours of the nobility flowed from the divine right of the 
Monarch, the ‘fount of honour’, the disruptions in ceremonial participation reflected on 
the divine right of the King. 
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To facilitate the economic exploitation of the system of nobility, via the sale of 
titles and honours, the Stuarts had transformed it into a formal system of legally 
determined titles. In previous centuries the nobility was based largely on informal 
systems of reputation and ‘manner of life’, attested by ‘common renown and the reports 
of worthy and noble men’.
43
 Its representative forms, such as heraldry, developed into a 
specialised field of knowledge which were ‘often endowed with semi-mystical 
overtones’.
44
 James I, who often modelled his authority on Augustus and hence implicitly 
on auctoritas, disrupted the logic of social reputation through substantial reforms, most 
notably the introduction of a new title the ‘baronetcy’.
45
 The extent of sale of offices led 
to public cries of ‘temporal simony’.
46
 However, a surprising source of disruption arose 
in matters of precedence, the internal ranking system between titles which governed the 
physical placement and presence of individuals (particularly sons and daughters) on 
ceremonial occasions. That is, it determined the proximity of each individual to royalty 
and displayed, through a finely graduated spatial system, a material representation of 
their eminence. It was crucial to the social significance of titles and the primary material 
manifestation of what had otherwise been reduced to an ephemeral legal award. The 
disputes prompted some to boycott public events and ceremonies entirely, due to the 
chance that honour might be slighted by misplacement in the ranking. Edwin Sandys’s 
memorandum of 1614 went so far as to discourage noble families from attending public 
assemblies on these grounds.
47
 The crisis reinforces the sense that connecting legality and 
legitimacy is often a sphere of public performance or participation. Hobbes’ attention to 
the interpretation of acts of worship and ceremony attests to his recognition of their 
significance in bridging between the sphere of mere legality and that of effective social 
legitimacy.  
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How does Hobbes respond to these two alternatives? In form and content, 
Hobbes’ Elements and De Cive break with the Lipsius’ sententiae. There is a stark 
contrast between the latter’s compilations of the auctores and Hobbes’ attempts at a 
science of politics on the model of geometry. Secondly, while Hobbes was dismissive of 
the doctrine of divine right defended by the Stuarts, his work nonetheless aims to respond 
to and contain the ‘noble revolt’ embodied in the English Civil War.
48
 In the following I 
trace his attempts to connect legality and materiality with a demystified and scientific 
account of two supplements: worship and authorisation. 
 
2 The Artifice of the Contract 
In Hobbes’ political theory, a number of theoretical mechanisms combine to establish the 
sovereign power. An important one of these is the agreement or covenant.
49
 With the aim 
of self-preservation and the ‘preservation of peace, and security’, men, though an 
agreement with each other, a ‘covenant’, establish a union to be governed by a ‘sovereign 
power [summa potestas]’ with various rights, including the rights to legislate and execute 
law, to punish crime and to declare war. They submit their wills to an individual or group 
and by agreement obligate themselves not to resist the sovereign.
50
 However, as Hobbes 
admits, such agreements are ‘but words’ and lack the capacity to effectively produce 
obedience.
51
 Despite the weak sense of obligation produced by an agreement, the 
dominant, ‘contractualist’, reading treats the contract alone as constitutive of an effective 
sovereign power.
52
 However, there is an alternative tradition of commentary which 
rejects the sufficiency of contract and proposes a reading in which ‘Hobbes’ argument 
moves simultaneously along two lines, which intersect in his doctrine of sovereignty’.
53
 
While the foundations of the agreement are ostensibly ‘democratic’ in the sense that they 
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arise from the populace and are based on premises of equality and intellectual 
associations connecting consent, unanimity and right, the second line runs against this 
aspect of the agreement by appealing to justifications ‘from above’, a ‘divine right’ to 
mould the opinions of the multitude. As Johnston notes, ‘Hobbes recognised that the 
sovereign must have not only the right but also the [material] power, to enforce his 
decisions'.
54
 Contractualist readings do not deny the need for a material power of 
sovereignty, but its generation is not problematised. It is treated as either a pre-existent 
given capacity of the sovereign or something magically conjured with the 
contractual/legal rights of sovereignty. As I demonstrate in the following this difficulty 
arises from the radical dualism that structures much of Hobbes’ political theory: artifice 
and nature, potestas and potentia, right and power.  
The difficulty for a contractualist reading emerges from Hobbes’ conception of 
law. Contrary to common law theorists such as Edward Coke, who claim the law 
possesses its own legitimating truth or rationality, Hobbes insists that law was an artifice 
determined by the command of the sovereign: ‘auctoritas non veritas facit legem’ 
(authority not truth makes law).
55
 The contractualist reading of Hobbes depicts consent 
and the covenant as the solution to the problem of legitimation and authority of the 
sovereign. The contract is assumed to provide the fundamental legitimation and 
imperative force to the sovereign. However, this account overlooks the very fragility of 
the contract. Before turning to worship, I argue that Hobbes understood the artificial 
power of the sovereign produced by this agreement as inherently fragile, weak and prone 
to disobedience. 
There is no detailed account of the distinction between artifice and nature in 
Hobbes’ works. For Hobbes, artifice and the artificial do not simply refer to man-made 
objects.
56
 Machines and automata are described as having an ‘artificial life’, in which the 
heart is replaced by a spring, and the nerves with strings. Nonetheless, Hobbes notes with 
respect to machines and automata that ‘art goes yet further’ and describes artifice as an 
imitation of God, in which man’s role is not only to act as artificer, but also take the role 
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 In the commonwealth, ‘equity and laws’ embody an ‘artificial reason and 
will’.
58
 Against Oakeshott, who takes the human will as identifying the artificial, I claim 
it is the application of human reason and intelligence that marks the artificial from the 
natural.
59
 In artifice, man works on himself guided by the use of reason; he works on his 
natural faculties, unifying and systematising, forming it into a systematic, coherent body 
of content. In the domain of language, ambiguous natural signs are replaced by a 
systematic unity centered on the sovereign. In law, contested moral rules are formed into 
a coherent body of written content. In the state, the natural family is systematically 
structured in a new artificial form: the commonwealth. As Hobbes notes, it is the unity of 
the ‘reason of this our artificial man’ which guarantees that ‘there cannot easily arise any 
contradiction in the laws; and when there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation 
and alteration, to take it away.’
60
 The natural by contrast is that which is given in material 
reality in its contingent and unsystematic form. Although the artificial is derived from the 
natural, it is a work performed ‘out of nothing by human wit’.
61
 A fiction like the Roman 
law concept of a persona.
62
 The consequence of the break with nature is that artifice 
exists only as an intellectual or mental entity. Whether in written or spoken form it 
depends wholly on reason and human intellect for its existence.
63
 Hence, it lacks the 
solidity of nature. 
The distinction between artifice and nature is correlated with that between 
artificial power [potestas] and material power [potentia].
64
 Throughout De Cive and the 
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Latin Leviathan, Hobbes systematically associates the legal rights and the contract with 
the term potestas, whereas potentia is associated with a broad category of natural 
faculties. This is an expanded conception of the natural including strength of body, 
beauty, riches and reputation.
65
 For contractualist readings of Hobbes, the dualism of 
artifice and nature poses a substantial problem that is seldom dealt with robustly. 
Specifically, how does the contractual agreement produce an effective transfer of natural 
right? In Hobbes’ deflationary redescription of natural rights, he renders them 
indistinguishable from a capacity to use one’s faculties: ‘Right is the liberty each man has 
of using his natural faculties in accordance with right reason’.
66
 As Feuerbach recognised 
in his commentary on Hobbes, such a natural right ‘has the same effect as if there were 
no right at all.’
67
 However, the power (in that equivocal sense of right and strength) of the 
sovereign is constituted by the transfer of this right (essentially a capacity) to one 
individual.  
Hobbes understood that this transfer was not at all straightforward.
68
 In Elements, 
he is careful to note that this transfer cannot really occur. He qualifies it: ‘it is impossible 
for any man really to transfer his own strength to another’.
69
 If the sovereign is to possess 
a ‘real strength,’ a material potentia, the origin of such strength must be explained. In De 
Cive there is a similar qualification. Hobbes notes that ‘no one can naturally [naturali 
modo] transfer his power [potentia] to another’, suggesting it is instead an ‘artificial 
transfer’.
70
 It is merely a fiction of a transfer. Was it solved in Leviathan by 
authorisation? In Leviathan, the equivalent passage is: ‘The only way to erect such a 
common power [potentiam]... is to confer all their power [potentiam] and strength [vim] 
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men.’
71
 The qualification of artificiality has been 
eliminated. However, it has merely been elided in the terminological shift from ‘transfer’ 
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to ‘confer’. Coles’s early eighteenth-century dictionary lists transfer simply as ‘to carry 
over’ suggesting a materialist interpretation, whereas ‘confer’ is unmistakably connected 
to the domain of speech, discourse and reason.
72
 In De Cive, Hobbes describes the 
process as the formation of a ‘union’ by which man obligates himself by agreement to 
submit his will to the will of the other. However, because Hobbes’ understanding of the 
will is largely mechanistic, this act of submission is not straightforward. As Hobbes 
notes, ‘the will itself, it is true, is not voluntary.’
73  
In his elaboration of mental activity, Hobbes describes decision-making or 
‘deliberation’ as an ‘alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears’.
74
 This 
oscillation, like an apparatus, merely settles on a particular appetite or aversion and this 
final inclination ‘we call the will, the act (not the faculty) of willing.’ The ‘will’ is simply 
the final dominant inclination, according to Hobbes. In addition, there is nothing 
specifically human about the will. Beasts also deliberate and thus also have a will.
75
 In 
his debate with Bramhall on liberty and necessity, Hobbes’ account of the will was a 
predominant theme. The root of Hobbes’ understanding of the will appears to be his 
insistence that ‘nothing takes beginning from itself.’ The ‘cause of the will is not the will 
itself’.
76
 As Tuck notes, Hobbes’ account of man and the self ‘ruled out any orthodox 
notion of free will: there was nothing that could be free and alter an agent’s perceptions 
and actions in the orthodox way.’
77
 As a result, the union of individuals by agreement and 
the subsequent obligation to submit his will remains precariously dependent on the 
oscillation of appetites. One such appetite may include an inclination toward fidelity to 
this obligation, but in the moment of deliberation the individual cannot control the 
aversions, appetites, hopes and fears in oscillation nor which of the alternatives may be 




If the transfer is based on a spoken promise or agreement, then there are two 
further difficulties. Firstly, Hobbes regularly denigrates such agreements, mere ‘words 
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and promises’, as lacking the material force required to ensure fulfillment.
79
 But 
secondly, according to Hobbes’ theory of language, in the state of nature one cannot even 
be sure of what is promised in such agreements. Contrary to the natural theories of 
language popularised by Gassendi’s revival of Epicurean philosophy, Hobbes’ 
disjuncture between the state of nature and political society is correlated with a break 
between the unsystematic and ambiguous use of signs for communication in nature and 
an instituted system of ‘language’ in the commonwealth.
80
 The former fails to constitute a 
‘language’ free of ambiguity and hence introduces uncertainty into any promise of 
agreement to transfer rights.
81
 Thus the agreement remains unclear, ambiguous and 
without significant force of obligation. 
Despite this, Hobbes explicitly describes the sovereign as holder and unifier of the 
covenantal-legal and the sum of material power transferred from the individual subjects:  
 
For the power [potentia] of the citizens is the power [potentia] of the 
commonwealth, that is, his power [potentia] who holds the 
sovereignty [summum . . . habet imperium] in the commonwealth.82  
 
In the English manuscript, Elements of Law, Hobbes takes great care to distinguish 
between ‘power’ and ‘right’ of the sovereign. This pair is then reformulated in the Latin 
De Cive as potentia and potestas.
83
 In De Cive, the former category includes virtue, force, 
knowledge, beauty, friends, and wealth.
84
 Additionally, all capacities of ambitious and 
disruptive individuals, who lack the legitimation of contract, and factions, armies, or 
external political groups distinct from the contractually recognised sovereign and its 
subordinate administrators are referred to as material power and never artificial power. 
Finally, God’s powers, traditionally labelled ‘omnipotence’, are also described as 
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 Instead of the tripartite structure of the Roman categories, potentia, 
potestas, and auctoritas, Hobbes insists on a duality of material power and artificial 
power, in which the former is connected to the realm of nature and causality and the latter 
to the artificial fictions of imagination.
86
 
In De Corpore of 1655, Hobbes identifies the pair of terms potentia [material 
power] and actu [act] with cause and effect, emphasising their synonymity with the 
physical laws of nature.
87
 The material power to produce some effect is equated with the 
possession, by an agent, of all those accidents which are necessarily requisite to produce 
the effect. Hobbes continues by relating distinct types of potentia to Aristotle’s four 
causes. The distinction between cause and potentia is merely temporal. A cause refers 
solely to the past, ‘effects already produced’, while potentia refers to effects produced in 
the future.
88
 Hobbes relates the potentia agentis (of the agent or active party) to the 
‘efficient cause’, and the potentia patientis (of the patient or passive party) to the 
‘material cause’. The conjunction of potentia agentis and potentia patientis is a potentia 
plena (plenary power or full power). Turning to the scholastic problem of the relation 
between potentiality (as what is possible) and actuality, he denies the existence of a 
modal difference between the two and considers it only a matter of time, claiming that: 
 
Every Act therefore which is Possible shall at some time be 
produced; for if it shall never be produced, then those things shall 
never concurre which are requisite for the production of it; 




If an act or event possesses potentia plena, then it is merely a matter of time until it will 
occur. Otherwise, it would not in fact have possessed potentia plena. Contingency is 
reduced to an effect of incomplete knowledge. Hobbes writes: ‘we call them Contingent 
because we doe not yet know whether they be true or false.’
90
 In his account of worship, 
discussed below, the necessity of the relation between potentia and effect provides the 
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metaphysical basis for Hobbes’ claim that worship can generate or magnify material 
power. 
 The artificial power, potestas, attributed to the sovereign by the agreement, in 
contrast to material powers, is pure invention. It exists in the sphere of discourse alone. 
Hobbes writes ‘that power [Potestatem] without arms and resources gathered in the hand 
of one person is only a word, of no importance, either for peace or for the defense of the 
citizens.’
91
 Although the sovereign is accorded a series of further powers or rights, 
including the ‘the sword of justice’ (the right to police civil law), ‘the sword of war’ (the 
right to declare war and form armies) and the right to administer educational and 
government office, it is important to note that these are also artificial powers.
92
 The 
‘sword of justice’ is merely a promise dependent on the mysterious transfer of natural 
rights for its material power.
93
 The civil law and the sovereign right to determine it are 
entirely artificial. As such, they are subject to a mutability and fragility unlike nature. 
There is a peculiar literalism or meticulousness (i.e. an idealism) to the artifice 
established by the contract, which is captured in Hobbes’ remarks on democratic 
sovereigns and the possibility of sovereign dissolution.
94
 Hobbes notes that in order for 
sovereignty to remain in the hands of the people, it is imperative that the people establish 
a schedule of regular meetings before disbanding.
95
 That is, the necessary, foundational 
guarantee of democratic sovereignty is a timetable. To treat the artificial sovereign as 
already possessing the effective power to execute law would be analogous to expecting 
trains to run on time merely because one has written down a timetable specifying the 
precise times of departure and arrival. The corollary of constitution by unanimous 
agreement is that, once established, explicitly in writing or through a vocal declaration of 
all, the artificial sovereignty exists independently of fluctuations in material support. 
Discussing the possibility that sovereignty could be ‘abolished by simultaneous consent 
of all subjects’, the decisive point is that Hobbes denies the possibility only on the basis 
of the unlikeliness of the event, not in principle.
96
 ‘By no stretch of the imagination could 
it ever happen that all the citizens together would unite in conspiracy against the 
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sovereign, without one exception.’
97
 That is, Hobbes admits that unanimity would void 
the previous agreement, dissolving the artificial power of the sovereign.
98
 This reflects 
the idea that this artificial power is part of a timeless, coherent logical system largely 
divorced from materiality. As a result, artificial sovereignty remains even without 
effective force. This is exactly what occurs in times of sedition, in which Hobbes admits 
two sovereigns may co-exist while being unable to exercise effective command.
99
 In 
these examples, Hobbes takes as a model for the legal artifice not merely the idea of a 
concrete text or written document, but the concept of a coherent body of precepts unified 
in the sovereign, like the bookkeeper of a great accounting ledger. 
Still, there is a puzzle concerning sovereign potentia. The ineffectiveness of 
artificial power haunts chapter six of De Cive. A detailed account of the legal rights 
accorded to the sovereign by contract, the chapter also documents the fundamental lack 
of material power of the sovereign. Given Hobbes’ qualifications of the artificial nature 
of the transfer, at this stage in Hobbes’ exposition, the sovereign possesses only an 
artificial covenantal-legal right to power. The ambiguity of the English term power 
obscures this problem. However, in both De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes spends 
considerable effort on the question of material power, independently from artificial 
power. In fact, Hobbes seems to struggle across the works to explain precisely how the 
material power of the sovereign, the aggregate of the material powers of the individual 
subjects, comes to be possessed by the sovereign.
100
 Hobbes’ difficulty is the obverse of 
the critique of power in Étienne de La Boétie’s Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. La 
Boétie ‘unveils’ the empty material power of the sovereign.
101
 Against the doctrine of 
divine right which presupposes the innate superior power of the sovereign, La Boétie 
writes that all his power [puissance] is derivative of the people. If the people simply 
cease to obey, the material power of the sovereign will evaporate.
102
 The crucial point is 
that Hobbes agrees with La Boétie that the material puissance is only artificially 
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possessed by the sovereign and remains inherently fragile and is threatened by 
disobedience. But for Hobbes, contra La Boétie, this is precisely why obedience is so 
important. Here, Hobbes’ account of worship and honouring is an important part of his 
scientia civilis, which provides a rational ground for unquestioned obedience.
103
  
Reading chapter six of De Cive with La Boétie’s unveiling in mind, it appears 
structured as a series of failures in the effective power of the artifice of the sovereign. 
After each failure a supplementary power is accorded to the sovereign, but it is also 
merely artifice and Hobbes highlights precisely when its ineffectiveness is demonstrated. 
In each case, the failure stems from the insufficiency of an agreement to constitute an 
effective material power. However, the series of supplements never reaches beyond the 
space of artifice and constitutes an intractable puzzle in Hobbes’ account of power. 
Indicating the shift to the sphere of discourse or artifice Hobbes opens the chapter 
with the statement that ‘[w]e must now see which of the many things proposed, discussed 
and decided in a group of men...are necessary to peace and common defence.’
104
 Hobbes 
identifies the problem: although ‘security is the end’ for which the commonwealth is 
designed, ‘security cannot be achieved merely by... making an agreement with others, 
verbally or in writing, not to kill, not to steal etc, and to observe other laws of this 
kind.’
105
 One can establish by agreement an artifice consisting of a set of laws, a written 
document, for instance. Despite that, insofar as it is only an artifice, these laws, unlike the 
laws of nature, have no effective force. As an imaginary artifice, one can simply act 
against the law. Hobbes proposes to augment this artifice of law with ‘penalties’.
106
 
These should be set sufficiently high to constitute a threat. And with penalties must come 
the ‘right of punishment’, the ‘right of the Sword of justice’. But again this is produced 
merely by words or agreement and is thus only an artificial power, lacking any material 
force in itself. Hobbes is aware of this inadequacy since he notes it has one essential flaw: 
although men ‘generally keep this kind of agreement well enough’, its effective limit is 
reached when ‘they or those close to them are to be punished’.
107
  
 The artifice operates only in the space of mental ‘recognition’ and fails to be 
authoritative where it conflicts with the particular interests of the subject. It is precisely at 
this moment that Tuck’s question appears most pertinent: ‘what can motivate someone in 
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the state of nature into being the first person to’ subject his will to the will of another.
108
 
There is no police force pre-existing the contract. There are only individuals in the state 
of nature.  
Hobbes supplements this right with the right to ‘arm, muster and unite’ the 
people: the ‘sword of war’.
109
 Only such a right, Hobbes notes, is sufficient ‘to punish 
anyone who disobeys’, thus rectifying the inadequacy of the ‘right of the sword of 
justice’. Hobbes implies here that disobedience — refusing to execute the sovereign’s 
commands in accordance with the sword of justice — ejects the subject from the artifice 
of the commonwealth, returning them to a state of nature and war.
110
 The disobedient 
subject faces the commonwealth as a natural enemy. Hence the sword of war is the 
remedy.
111
 But again, the decisive point is that this right to punish disobedience is only 
‘recognised’ to have been ‘transferred’ by the agreement between men.
112
 It exists only as 
an artifice, a written or spoken promise.
113
 The edifice of agreements continues to grow. 
Further supplements are applied: the artificial power to judge and the artificial power of 
execution.
114
 This is followed by the right to determine civil laws, the responsibility to 
promulgate them and the right to appoint ministers and subordinate officials.
115
 But this 
all exists only in discourse. It is a fantasy of proposals and discussion points. In 
particular, this fantastical construction faces at least one point of resistance, ‘fools, 
madmen or children’, who according to Hobbes, lack the capacity of reason. 
One expects that Hobbes will introduce some material element [potentia]. But 
instead Hobbes completes the circle with the right ‘to decide which opinions and 
doctrines are inimical to peace and to forbid their being taught’. However, the contact 
itself is an agreement hence determined by one’s opinion.
116
 Thus Hobbes assigns the 
sovereign the right to form the opinions that will inspire the multitude to agree to a 
covenant establishing the sovereign. But in De Cive the ground of this right is the 
covenant itself, introducing a circularity. The entire system of artificial powers [potestas] 
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thus lies not on agreement, but opinion.
117
 In Leviathan, this right to educate the opinions 
of people is explicitly developed under the heading of the ‘supreme pastor’ now a divine 
right. This is discussed in more detail in chapter two. But importantly, it is not just any 
opinion, but an opinion concerning the causal relations between actions [doing or not 
doing] and their consequences, that is, an opinion concerning material powers [potentia]. 
Thus the effectiveness of the artificial power of the sovereign is purely a matter of 
opinion. At this point in De Cive, Hobbes specifically defines a new concept ‘simple 
obedience’ and for the first time in the chapter shifts to the question of the material power 
[potentia] of the sovereign.
118
 Hobbes thus recalls La Boétie, for whom the decisive 
guarantee of the effective material power of the sovereign is not a social contract or 
agreement, but ‘obedience’. Hobbes clarifies this explicitly: 
 
The obligation to offer it [simple obedience] does not arise directly 
from the agreement by which we transferred every right to the 
commonwealth, but indirectly, i.e. from the fact that the right [ius] 
of Government [Imperium] would be useless [frustra] without 
obedience, and consequently no commonwealth would have been 




The obligation for obedience is thus distinct from the agreement and not simply derived 
from it. Despite this relative independence it remains decisive for the very constitution of 
the commonwealth.
120
 Silverthorne translates frustra as meaningless, but the term could 




Hobbes’ previous chapter on the ‘causes and generation of a commonwealth’ had 
already pointed in this direction. The chapter ostensibly describes the formation of the 
commonwealth as a ‘union’ distinct from a temporary ‘association’.
122
 The 
commonwealth is constituted when each individual of an assembly ‘obligates himself, by 
agreement with each of the rest, not to resist the will’ of the sovereign. But again the 
problem is that the will is not under our voluntary control.
123
 In the passage, Hobbes 
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abruptly breaks with the logic of agreement and unanimity of the foregoing and remarks 
mid-paragraph:  
 
Nevertheless a man [singular] who subjects his will to the will of 
another transfers to that other the Right [Ius] to his strength and 
resources, so that when others have done the same, the recipient of 
their submissions may be able to use the fear they inspire to bring 




A number of points within this passage merit attention. Firstly, there is no mention of 
obligation or agreement; the union is effected purely through the combined force of a few 
individuals. Secondly, Hobbes states that it is now a matter of ‘bringing the wills of 
individuals to unity and concord’. This is surprising, as it is usually the agreement that is 
accorded that capacity. Finally, only here is the aspect of fear, which mere agreements 
lack, added to the sovereign. But throughout, the text is haunted by its inability to answer 
the question ‘why obey?’ 
In summary, the Hobbesian sovereign consists of two aspects: (i) a fantastical 
edifice of agreed rights and artificial powers lacking any effective material basis except 
that provided by opinion, and (ii) an aggregate material power produced through ‘simple 




3 Worship and Potentia 
In assessments of the causes of the English Civil War, it is common to cite the collapse of 
king Charle’s ‘authority’.
126
 But what precisely collapsed? For Hobbes, the formal 
pedantry and idealism of the artifice of sovereignty suggests it should persist 
independently of the sovereign’s actual support. Only a second unanimous decision by 
the population could formally dissolve the right, the potestas, established by agreement. 
Thus any breakdown of sovereignty in this period must refer to something else. That is, 
for Hobbes, the crisis was not a matter of ‘right’ but of a weakening of material support 
from the nobility. This was most evident in the Bishops’ war but also in their non-
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participation in state ceremony due to the controversies of precedence. It is notable then 
that Hobbes is particularly concerned with questions of obedience in the latter context.
127
 
Further, as I demonstrate in the following, he approaches obedience through a radical 
formulation of the distinction between command and counsel.
128
  
In De Cive, Hobbes defines command by radicalising unquestioned obedience. A 
command is an imperative obeyed entirely without reference to its particular content.
129
 
Although irreconcilable with the fundamental right to self-preservation, in De Cive, 
Hobbes overlooks this difficulty and insists that a command is obeyed simply because it 
is spoken by one who can command. Instead of the content, Hobbes identifies commands 
by the relations of material power [potentia] between the participants. The obvious 
precedent is God’s unfathomable commands to Job. Referring to Job, Hobbes writes 
‘[p]ower irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly in whomsoever it be found.’ 
The God of Job is taken as a model for the sovereign’s relation to law. The originary 
ground for the good, or right and wrong, is not beyond God, but instead is God’s 
omnipotent power itself.
130
 Counsel, by contrast, is defined by reference to the particular 
content, judged by the performer to be expedient. To consider the content of an 
instruction before participation is to reduce a command to advice or counsel. This 
account is specific to De Cive. In later works, including Leviathan, Hobbes eschews this 




The distinction between command and counsel was not in itself unusual. Suarez, 
Grotius or Bodin all make a similar distinction. However, Hobbes’ treatment in De Cive 
utilises a specific formalism absent from other works. Suarez’s De Legibus emphasises 
moral questions of command, and the ‘act of judgement’ by the lawgiver, which ensures 
their rational and prudent nature.
132
 Whereas Bodin, who comes closest to Hobbes and 
may have influenced De Cive, writes of a ‘great difference between counsel and 
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 He emphasises the power [puissance] of the sovereign, yet he does not 
entirely ignore the particular content blurring the distinction by connecting law and 
counsel. ‘The prince should be guided by the advice of his council in small matters as 
well as great. Nothing gives more authority to the laws or to the commands of the prince, 




Hobbes, by contrast, writes that ‘advice is an instruction or precept [praeceptum] 
in which the reason for following it is drawn from the matter itself. But a command is an 
instruction in which the reason for following it is drawn from the will of the 
instructor….’ and ‘the instructions of all powerful people [potentiam] to those who are 
unable to offer resistance’ are to be obeyed.
135
 The relations of power between the 
participants and not the content, define the command. If a subject judges the content, they 
thereby mistake the command for advice. He returns to this criterion at various points in 
De Cive, for instance, of God’s command to Adam and Eve to eschew the fruit of the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil, that ‘God required utterly simple obedience to his 
precepts’ since there was nothing in the ‘nature’ of the act by which it ‘could be morally 
bad, i.e. a sin.’
136
 
 Arguably, the changes made in Leviathan result from Hobbes’ recognition that 
radically unquestioned obedience conflicts with the motive of self-preservation, 
foundational for the constitution of the commonwealth.
137
 The limit point of Hobbes’ 
formal conception of unquestioned command is thus the command of self-destruction 
(suicide). As Sreedhar notes, ‘Hobbes is quite clear that the right of self-defense entails 
the right to private judgment of deadly threats’.
138
 However, such a judgement is 
specifically precluded in Hobbes’ account of command, thus demonstrating a 
fundamental incoherence in his system.
139
 In De Cive, Hobbes actually does discuss this 
issue with respect to contracts. Where life and death are at stake, we cannot be ‘obligated 
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 The breakdown arises from a particular content, an exception, that 
escapes and disrupts the formal system supposed to contain it. In fact, even in Hobbes’ 
definition of simple obedience, he offers a weakened definition, obedience that ‘may 
sometimes rightly be refused for various reasons’.
141
 However, despite this weakened 
position, as demonstrated in the following, this formalist model underlies Hobbes’ 
account of worship and ceremony. 
142
  
In chapter fifteen of De Cive, ‘The Kingdom of God by Nature’, Hobbes utilises 
the command/counsel distinction to isolate a formally determined domain of worship that 
‘signifies’ independently from its particular content.
143
 Hobbes brackets the propositional 
content of doctrine and focuses on the performance of religious acts.
144
 To overcome the 
cultural variation implied by the variety of religions, he identifies a formal register of 
signification embodied in ritual performance. In this register the structural relations of 
material power [potentia] are signified in acts of worship. Hobbes notes that any action 
(or speech) can signify in two distinct registers. In a semantic register, actions signify 
according to the culturally mediated content of the act. For instance, in prayer, the words 
relay a particular content, a set of desires, concerns or wishes, according to the particular 
language in which they are spoken and the local customs determining the horizons of 
those concerns. But in a second register, actions signify independently of their particular 
content. By merely engaging in prayer as such, I signify in a general manner my 
recognition of God and of God’s omnipotence. Zarka describes this second register as 
‘semiological’ because in it the ‘effects of a man’s power [puissance]’ (material power) 
are treated as a problem of ‘signs’ rather than a ‘physics’. 
145
 However, given the 
connection between potentia and cause and effect, for Hobbes, understanding the 
operation of worship in terms of a physics or natural science of signs seems quite 
reasonable. The act of prayer can thus be divided into two distinct components. The first 
component, like counsel, relies on the specific content of prayer and operates in the 
semantic register, mediated by a particular culture and language. The second, like 
obedience to command, rests on the general act of prayer as such and operates according 
to a natural law of signs. It demonstrates recognition of the relations of material power 
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and natural causes. An act of unquestioned obedience, thus, signifies in the second 
register of ‘natural signs’, in a manner indifferent to the particular details of the act. 
The attention to cultural variation can be partly explained by a growing 
confrontation with cultural difference, exemplified by Montaigne’s essay on cannibals 
published in 1590.
146
 It is likely that Hobbes became familiar with Montaigne's writings 
in the 1640s in Paris.
147
 Hobbes is clearly aware of the broad variations in practices. He 
remarks that there are ‘terms and actions which for some people imply honour, for others 
insult, for others neither’.
148
 He cites examples including ‘bearing the head in greeting’, 
‘killing a personal enemy’ or ‘standard forms of ceremonies’ as signs which, depending 
on the ‘custom of a place’ or the ‘rules of the civil laws’, may be held ‘in honour by some 
and contempt’ by others. Language and speech, which signify only by convention, are 
included in this category.
149 
To produce a science of politics based on universal precepts 
requires bracketing particular national or cultural practices.
150
 The second register of 
signs based in nature and modelled on laws of nature offers such a universal domain. In 
this register ‘actions’ and ‘words’, insofar as they signify the recognition of material 
power, are universal and of these ‘[t]he commonwealth can make no changes’.
151
  
 Hobbes identifies a broad set of ‘actions’ which are ‘signs of a person's mind and 
signify universally’ and in which the relationship to material power is decisive. Hobbes 
includes the following: prayers, as signs of hope, are an acknowledgement of material 
power [potentia] preceding the benefit;
152 
thanksgiving, as an acknowledgement of the 
past benefit of material power [potentia]; gifts, sacrifices and offerings, which are the 
actions of thanks; swearing by God when taking an oath — since the oath is only 
necessary due to the inexistence of an omnipotent power on earth; addressing God with 
appropriate thoughtfulness (i.e. with a disposition of fear towards his power); worship, 
which must be publicly performed; and obedience to the natural laws (laws of nature), 
which are referred to as ‘the government of God’. Hobbes refers to a ‘second kind of 
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obligation’ arising from reason and our ‘awareness of one’s own weakness’ to offer 
obedience to all those more powerful.
153
 
Utilising the command-counsel schema, Hobbes distinguishes between 
‘commanded’ worship and ‘spontaneous’ worship. He notes that with respect to 
commanded worship ‘honour is implied not by the actions as such’, i.e. not through 
mediation of the content or meaning of the act that is commanded, but rather ‘what they 
signify directly is obedience’.
154
 The criterion distinguishing commanded worship is the 
relation between the subject and the object of worship, whereas in the case of 
spontaneous worship, worship ‘gives honour by the nature of the actions alone’ and is 
mediated by the interpretation of the actions by onlookers. This distinction allows 
Hobbes to classify the first as natural worship determined by the laws of nature and 
which thus ‘implies honour at all times and places’ insofar as it is commanded. 
Spontaneous worship, in contrast, since it is mediated by interpretation, ‘follows local 
custom’ and ‘can be said to be Arbitrary’.
155
An act of commanded worship then consists 
of a natural sign (the obedience itself) which relates to the material power and a 
conventional sign (the particularity of the act) which is an artifice. Spontaneous worship 
on the other hand is purely conventional.
156
 The ‘infinite number of actions’ not included 
in the register of natural worship (prayer, gift giving, magnifying, obedience and so on) 
are indifferent in themselves with respect to honour and insult and so can be freely 
adopted by convention as particular practices.  
Turning to theology, Hobbes again brackets national conventions and defines a 
minimal universal doctrine which eliminates, as far as possible, the effects of language. 
Hobbes identifies the following attributes assigned by ‘natural reason’ to God:
157
that God 
exists; that by the ‘name of God is meant the cause of the world’;
158
 that God is active in 
the government of the world; that attributes assigned to God must signify things infinite 
and indeterminate rather than finite and determinate.
159
 (While this would appear to relate 
to the content of the utterance, Hobbes specifically insists that ‘when we say that 
something is infinite, we are not signifying anything in reality but an incapacity of our 
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 and finally that attributes of happiness, hope, desire, and so on, when 
assigned to God are re-coded as signifying aspects of the material power relations 
between individuals and God. Similar ideas are reiterated in Anti-White, where Hobbes 
claims ‘that no proposition about the nature of God can be true save this one: God 
exists’.
161
 Our descriptions of God function as oblations rather than propositions.
162
 Our 
utterances concerning God are not claims of ‘philosophical truth' because they cannot 
express the nature of things since God is ‘unfathomable'. Instead, these utterances reflect 
the ‘states of mind that govern our wish to praise, magnify and honour God.’
163
  
This line of argument is only fully developed and systematised in De Cive. There 
are suggestive passages in the earlier text, Elements.
164
 Nonetheless, in general terms, in 
the earlier text, the treatment of ecclesiastical practices and the role of the Church accepts 




 There are parallels between Hobbes’ account of worship and the position of the 
Anglican conformists on the question of adiaphora (matters indifferent to salvation).
166
 
However, the argumentatives strategies offered by the orthodox conformists such as 
Samuel Hoad differed from Hobbes’ attempt to develop a scientific and systematic 
explanation for the mechanics of worship based on laws of nature. While their resulting 
conclusions were similar (i.e. that particular rites should be determined by national 
Churches and that concord and uniformity were decisive), Hoard based his position on 
the premise that de facto variation in practices itself was proof of their indifference in the 
eyes of God and references to Biblical scripture.
167
 In addition, he noted that in certain 
times and places ‘necessity’ may require the subordination of circumstantial rites to the 
broader Christian goal: the preservation of Christianity. Hoard hints at a form-content 
distinction in his reference to rituals of a ‘middle nature’ which are ‘neither pleasing nor 
displeasing to God: yet sub mandato, as they are by lawful authority enjoyned, they 
                                                 
160
 DC, 15.14. 
161
 AW, 434, Fol. 396-7.  
162
 AW, 434, Fol. 396-7. 
163
 AW, 434, Fol. 396-7. 
164
 EL, 11.12. 
165
 EL, 11.9. 
166
 Peter Lake, ‘The Laudians and the Argument from Authority’, in Court, Country, and Culture: Essays 
on Early Modern British History in Honor of Perez Zagorin, ed. Bonnelyn Young Kunze and Dwight D. 
Brautigam (Rochester: University of Rochester press, 1992), 150.  
167
 Samuel Hoard, The Churches Authority Asserted: In a Sermon (London: John Clark, 1637), 25–7. 
64 
become necessary, and attingunt conscientiam, lay an obligation of obedience on the 
conscience’.
168
 That is, for Hoard a command can transform a rite from unnecessary to 
necessary. However, for Hoard, it is the artificial power of legal authority of the office 
that produces the transformation.
169
 Whereas for Hobbes, it is the material power 
supporting the command that is key.  
 The act of worship also has the capacity to increase or magnify the material power 
of the one worshipped, according to Hobbes. In addition to signifying recognition, he 
adds that:  
 
Now since men believe that a man is powerful [potente haberi] 
when they see him honoured, i.e. regarded as powerful [potentiam], 
it comes about that honour is enlarged by worship [cultu propagari] 





Obedience, as a form of honouring or worship, signifies one’s recognition of the material 
power [potentia] of another, but when obedience is observed by others, the effect is an 
increase in the estimation of the material power of the commander, making others more 
likely to obey. The result of this mechanism, as Hobbes notes, is ‘true power’. Hobbes 
plays on the synonymity between cultus (worship) and colendus (cultivation), theorising 
worship around a model of agriculture.
171
 The reference to cultu propagari, suggests 
worship is itself like the propagation of plants and crops, and emphasises that it is based 
on an interplay of natural laws and conscious human activity or labour. This connection 
is further developed in additions to Leviathan. Hobbes adds that ‘cultus signifieth 
properly and constantly that labour which a man bestows on anything with a purpose to 
make benefit by it.’
172
  
The basis of Hobbes’ analogy between honour and cultivation is the 
reconceptualisation of honour as a social and structural effect instead of an innate quality. 
Hobbes notes that ‘[h]onour is not in the person honoured’; since it is merely an opinion 
regarding the person, honour resides ‘in the person who honours’.
173
 The rejection of the 
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innate for a social ontology is even more explicit in Leviathan. For instance, Hobbes 
defines the ‘value or worth of a man’ as a ‘thing dependent on the need and judgement of 
another’.
174
 Honour, dignity, value, and worth are all treated as inextricable from the 
esteem of others on which they are based. His treatment of material power as a strictly 
relative or comparative quality facilitates its determination by social consensus.
175
 
Hobbes notes that since ‘equal powers destroy one another’, the only true power is an 
‘excess’ of power.
176
 Recoding concepts such as ‘worth’, ‘value’ and ‘honour’ as social 
forms countered the mystified hypostasised forms engendered in the ‘bloodline’ of the 
nobility.
177
 It was also key to Hobbes’ scientific account of how honouring behaviour 
such as placating the powerful through service as well as commanded worship (cultus) 
could ‘propagate’ material power by analogy with cultivation.
178
 Relativising a concept 
such as material power through recoding it as differential quality gives it an unusual 
ambiguity. In the case of power, in particular, the difference between two powers can 
only be registered in their actualised forms. The effectiveness of power is equivocally the 
effect and measure (or sign) of the power itself. If power is relative, it only exists when it 
is exercised, or at least appears exercised. 
In Elements, Hobbes noted that even our knowledge of our own power is 
mediated by its apparent effectiveness.
179
 The ‘signs by which we know our power’ are 
the same as the actions which arise from power. Similarly, with respect to social 
recognition, Hobbes notes that ‘the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, 
gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such powers produce’.
180
 Hobbes thus 
attempts to assimilate worship to a category of natural processes determined by cause and 
effect, suggesting that worship could be the object of scientific study. The prototype 
Hobbes alludes to is agriculture, which attempts to understand and utilise the natural 
productive capacity of plants. A key difference is that in plants the causal chain of power 
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is unidirectional: plants have a power to fruit or seed, and the fruiting is both the sign and 
effect of the power. But in the case of worship, the causal chain is circular and the fruit of 
power is more power.  
In De Cive, however, the fundamental ‘end and aim of worship’ is the 
‘enjoyment’ [Gaudium] of the one worshipped. In the recognition of his potentia, 
manifest in the performance of public ceremony, the sovereign experiences ‘nothing 
other than Glory, or the feeling of triumph’.
181
 This purpose is suggested in the earlier 
Elements, where the generative capacity of worship relies on men’s unquenchable 
appetites. With respect to power, the delight or appetite for ‘riches, honours, or other 
power’ does ‘continually groweth more and more’.
182
 The frivolity of defining the direct 
end and aim of worship as sovereign enjoyment, appears in tension with the seriousness 
of the aims of the commonwealth in general (self-preservation). However, naturalising 
worship via anthropology as pleasure, appears key to Hobbes’ attempt to universalise it. 
Instead Hobbes resorts to a redescription of ‘obligation’. Like the ‘obedience’ we offer 
the physical laws of motion, acts based on fear and hope are due to a kind of ‘obligation’ 
imposed by natural law. Natural obligation is owed to the more powerful (such as God) 




Thus, in the early writings Elements and De Cive, Hobbes’ account of the 
generative capacity of politico-religious practices of worship play a key role in generating 
the material power of effective sovereignty. The civil subject, merely by formal 
participation in commanded worship, independently from the interpretation of the 
particular acts commanded, communicates to others his recognition of the material power 
of the sovereign. This recognition, as the fundamental measure of all material power, 
offers a mechanism that propagates and cultivates material power independently of any 
agreement or contract, and, for Hobbes, utilises a wholly natural and universal political 
mechanism.  
Juxtaposing Hobbes’ account of worship against the Augustan conception of 
auctoritas a number of parallels are evident. In the Res Gestae, Augustus describes a 
series of gifts of honours given by the senate and people. He is given a title, his house is 
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adorned with laurels and a crown, and he is commemorated with a golden shield.
184
 Such 
gifts are consistent with Hobbes’ description of the signs of thanksgiving, honour, 
celebration, praise or magnification characteristic of cultus. Augustus continues that 
‘after that time,’ post id tem, he took precedence in all auctoritas. The relation between 
the gifts and the auctoritas are not made explicit, but the temporal sequence suggests 
causation. Hobbes’ account attempts to explain the productive capacity of such gifts and 
celebrations. The social ontology of Hobbesian worship is also consistent with the 
typically social and public understanding of auctoritas.
185
 For Galinsky, Augustus’ 
auctoritas is manifest in his inspirational and moral exemplarity. Heinze describes it as a 
‘union of social and political standing and of impressiveness in character.’
186
 While 
Montaigne and Pascal accorded to custom a ‘mystical foundation’ of authority and 
claimed that ‘[w]hoever tries to trace this authority back to its origin, destroys it’, Hobbes 
forges ahead assured that there is a general principle at work: ‘Whether we want to 
celebrate someone by words or by actions, we shall find some things which signify 
honour among all men.’
187
 However, in searching for the origin of worship, the early 
works suggest worship is dependent on an original seed of material power to be 
increased, cultivated or magnified. 
Thus, in order to initiate the cultivation process of material power Hobbes 
requires a seed. There are a number of possibilities: (i) an initial local excess of power; 
(ii) the appearance of an excess by deceit or illusion; (iii) or perhaps even an excess by 
convention or agreement. As the above argument demonstrates, in De Cive, convention is 
ruled out since the material power is required specifically to meet the inadequacy of the 
artificial power generated by agreements.  
Turning to the former pair of alternatives, if Hobbes is to avoid founding the 
entire structure of material power on a moment of deceit, he must presume an initial 
excess in some individual. In this scenario, one or more others recognising this excess, 
offer obedience, which in turn develops to generate an entire commonwealth structured 
by the cultivation of this initial recognition of excess. Such an account is consistent with 
the passage from De Cive highlighted above in which subjection of the will towards a 
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 However, this image of the initial conditions is difficult to 
align with Hobbes’ presentation of the equality of men in the state of nature. In the state 
of nature, man possesses natural faculties including ‘physical force, experience, reason 
and passion’ and Hobbes admits these can vary between individuals. 
189
 But, he 
forcefully asserts a ‘natural equality’ of men in the state of nature:
190
 ‘Look at a full-
grown man and see how fragile is the structure of the human body (and if it fails, all his 
force, strength and Wisdom fail with it); see how easy it is for even the weakest 
individual to kill someone stronger than himself.’
191
 Hobbes belabours this point in the 
opening chapter of De Cive. There are variations in strength and mental acuity, but rather 
than providing a foundational seed for worship, these merely generate discord and 
dissent: a chaotic scene in which ‘all men are equal to each other by nature’ in their 
capacity to kill one another.
192
 For Hobbes, despite local excesses of material powers, the 
absence of a decisive excess renders the state of nature a uniform if contested field of 
equality.   
In itself, the logic of worship does not proscribe a founding moment of deception. 
Is it possible for one individual to pose as innately superior through deception? Hobbes 
explicitly derides such attempts, describing such an individual who, ‘supposing himself 
superior to others, wants to be allowed everything, and demands more honour for 
himself’ as vainglorious.
193
 Again the results of such deceptions are simply further chaos 
and conflict. However, by the logic of natural signs, which constitute an ambiguous link 
between the recognition of material power and its effects, the act of deception need not 
lie with the sovereign himself. That is, a group can by a false show of obedience produce 
the effect of material power and hence a false recognition of one's own power in a 
potential sovereign. It is enough for a handful of others, to engage in deception through 
the duplicitous performance of obedience to initiate the cascade of material power. 
Regardless, Hobbes also seems to reject this option in De Cive. In this period of his work, 
he is committed to a conception of scientia civilis based on ‘sure principles’ and certain 
definitions.
194
 In De Cive, in particular, he identifies as an attempt to expound the 
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‘Natural law’ which ‘God has revealed to all men… by natural reason’.
195
 In addition, he 
remarks from the beginning of De Cive, that ‘no large or lasting society can be based 
upon the passion for glory.‘
196
 Only in Leviathan does Hobbes identify a way beyond this 
aporia of initial conditions through the model of an authorial fiction.  
 
4 Author and Actor 
From the perspective of worship developed in De Cive, authorisation supplies the seed 
required to initiate the labour of cultivation of material power.
197
 The addition of 
authorisation to Hobbes’ political theory in Leviathan, leaves intact the broad framework 
determined by the dualism of material and artificial power. The contract remains the 
foundation of the legal potestas or imperium of the sovereign and the generative 
mechanism of honouring and worship remains.
198
 However, Hobbes makes substantial 
additions dealing explicitly with questions of persons, personation, authority and 




 Hobbes suggests that the addition of authorisation represents a further attempt to 
account for the inadequacies of the covenant to establish an effective sovereign. He notes 
that unlike certain social creatures such as bees and ants, for whom ‘agreement 
[consensio]’ is natural, for men agreement is ‘by covenant only, which is artificial; and 
therefore, it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make 
their agreement [consensio] constant and lasting.’ Here, as the preceding sections and the 
Latin consensio indicate, agreement refers to a broad sense of correspondence in matters 
of judgement and interests between the particular individual and the common benefit. 
Thus, Hobbes suggests that because the covenant produces only an artificial and 
temporary agreement between men on matters of judgement and the common good, the 
covenant must be augmented by a common material power [potentia communis]. And as 
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Hobbes notes, authorisation, that is, acknowledging oneself to be the author (and owner) 
of the acts of the sovereign, is the means by which such a common material power is 
erected.
200
 The connection between authorisation and material power is unexpected, since 
in the introduction of Leviathan, Hobbes specifically indicates a synonmity between the 
potestas and authoritas of the artificial man, Leviathan.
201
 However, as I demonstrate 
authorisation provides the initial seed of power augmenting the legal artifice of the 
agreement. 
 Broadly, through the new theoretical apparatus, authorisation, Hobbes assigns 
responsibility for the sovereign’s acts to the people. Reflecting on parallels with the 
Roman use of auctoritas, the concept served to direct responsibility to two sources: the 
senate, but also due to the connection with augury and the auspices, auctoritas could be 
used to minimise their personal responsibility for the actions of government. Similarly, 
Hobbes frees the sovereign of responsibility by returning it to the individuals who 
constitute the multitude. Hobbes’ proof of the responsibility of the people relies on 
identifying them as the one who benefits. Invoking the authority of Cicero, Hobbes asks 
‘cui bono?’, or ‘who benefits?’
202
 In cases of transgressions of the law where assigning 
responsibility is impossible, Cicero argues that the alternative is to ask who benefits, or in 
whose interests the transgression was made.
203
 Hobbes explains that ‘amongst 
presumptions there is none that so evidently declareth the author as doth the benefit of the 
action.’
204
 Reflecting the introduction of these principles, one of the decisive changes 
between De Cive and Leviathan is the displacement of the benefit of worship.  
As I noted above, Hobbes is explicit in De Cive that the end of worship is the 
‘enjoyment’ of the sovereign: glory, the feeling of triumph, reflection on his greatness.
205
 
However, in Leviathan the reference to enjoyment is deleted. Although Hobbes admits 
that ‘end of worship amongst men is power [potentia]’ and that this accrues to the 
sovereign, nevertheless, he insists that in the end the cultus is for the benefit of the 
people, since cultus refers properly to the ‘labour which a man bestows on anything with 
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a purpose to make benefit by it.’
206
 In the case of civil worship, it is the subjects, the 
individual worshippers, who ‘labour’ at worship and thus benefit from worship. 
However, the author is not ‘the people’, a collective entity like a pouvoir constituant of a 
conjoined multitude. Each individual gives ‘authority [authoritas] from himself in 




What is an author for Hobbes? He does not give a systematic account of the 
prerequisites for authorship but does indicate the need for animacy, maturity and 
rationality. He writes specifically that inanimate things cannot be authors, suggesting that 
authorship is itself a kind of action, or activity.
208
 In addition, the proscription of children 
indicates a certain level of maturity or autonomy is required. And finally, it requires 
reason, since ‘fools, or madmen that have no use of reason’ cannot be authors unless they 
‘recover the use of reason’.
209
 The grounds for precluding such individuals from 
authorship is perhaps because they cannot ‘make any covenants or understand the 
consequences thereof’. Lacking reason, they are unable to understand the consequences, 
the logic of cause and effect, governing activities in general, and in particular the logic of 
potentia. In addition, he notes they lack the initiative to author: they ‘never took upon 
them to authorize the actions of any sovereign’.
210
  
Hobbes writes that reasoning about chains of consequences relies on the ‘trust of 
authors’ for those minor ‘conclusions’ that we inevitably must rely on in our 
reckoning.
211
 Madmen, it seems, would lack such trust as they are driven by ‘stronger and 
vehement passions’ rather than the reasonable addition and subtraction of signs.
212
 
Hobbes is quite concerned with madness and devotes a number of paragraphs linking 
madness to religious enthusiasm and the whims of the multitude.
213
 The decisive point is 
that authorising is an activity in which trust in an individual’s word substitutes for a 
further chain of consequences (or ‘causes’), thus avoiding the need to run back to a basic 
first principle. The construction of the rights and powers of the sovereign, as 
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demonstrated above, relied on a circular or hermeneutical chain of consequences 
(agreements, inadequacies, supplements). Authorisation offers a means of breaking into 
this circle through a moment of trust on an individual’s word. In a polemical passage 
against Aristotelian scholasticism, Hobbes distinguishes the author from the cause: ‘The 
author of a deed is he who commands [qui fieri jubet] that it be done; the cause is he 
through whose powers [vires] it is done.’
214
 The intervention of authorisation is to break 
the circular chain of causation in Hobbes’ theory of cultus as a means of generating the 
potentia of the sovereign. But what exactly is authorised (or authored) by the individuals 
of the multitude. 
In Leviathan, Hobbes develops an account of the artificial ‘civil person’ of the 
state using the model of theatre. He contrasts ‘natural’ persons from ‘feigned or artificial’ 
persons.
215
 At issue is the attribution of certain actions to some ‘man, or any other thing’. 
That is, the attribution to a natural entity as ‘owner’ of the actions performed by the 
person. Hobbes specifically cites property relations as analogous to authorship. To be an 
author of actions is to possess a right comparable with ‘dominion’, the right of possession 
over goods.
216
 In the case of natural persons, the actor and owner coincide in a single 
individual.
217
 However, in the case of artificial persons there is a much more complicated 
arrangement involving up to three entities: the actor, the artificial person, and the 
author.
218
 Hobbes appeals to the model of theatrical performance to describe the tripartite 
complex of the commonwealth. Firstly, the actor acts and thereby ‘personates’ the 
artificial person. But the artificial person itself is a fictional projection. As noted above, it 
can be a company or association but also the fictional projection of inanimate things such 
as churches, hospitals or bridges.
219
 The person of the state is thus considered the 
fictional projection of the momentary union of the multitude as one people. The third 
participant is the author, the one held responsible for the words and actions performed by 
the actor when personating the fiction.
220
 Utilising the model of theatrical performance, 
Hobbes argues that although the centre of action is the actor (sovereign) he merely plays 
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the role of a fictional character (the artificial person of the commonwealth) and thus 
responsibility for the words and actions performed should be attributed to the author of 
the play (the individuals).
221
 Thus, in the case of the commonwealth, although the actor is 
the natural man of the prince he merely acts as the personation of a fictional people or 
commonwealth and is authorised by the individuals of the multitude.  
Connecting this tripartite structure with the account of worship above, the 
pertinent question is which of the entities does Hobbes consider the proper object of civil 
worship? In his remarks distinguishing commanded worship from forms of idolatry he 
writes: 
 
To be uncovered before a man of power and authority, or before the 
throne of a prince, or in such other places as he ordaineth to that 
purpose in his absence, is to worship that man or prince with civil 
worship, as being a sign, not of honouring that stool or place, but the 
person, and is not idolatry.222 
 
That is the person, the fiction of the commonwealth, is the object of worship. In 
conventional forms of worship, ordained or commanded by the actor who represents the 
commonwealth, the real sign of honour is oriented to neither the natural individual of the 
sovereign, nor the natural objects to which worship is ostensibly directed, but instead to 
the artificial person of the commonwealth. Hobbes continues, noting that when one prays 
to a King, it is only civil worship (and not idolatry) as long as one is cognisant of ‘no 
other power in him but human’.
223
 That is as long as one does not mistake the individual 
for a divine entity. 
In the act of authorisation, the individuals of the multitude author the fiction of 
the sovereign person. This fiction forms the initial seed, which by the ‘labour’ of 
worship, the cultivation performed as cultus, grows to produce the real material power of 
the commonwealth. Politics is transformed into a religio-theatrical endeavour, which 
must be made manifest in two distinct ways. Firstly, an arbitrarily selected actor takes on 
the role of the person of the commonwealth, instituting by command an arbitrary set of 
ceremonial practices. Secondly, these commands must be taken up by the individual 
subjects. Only the participation of subjects in ceremonial practice gives a material form 
and demonstrates the effectiveness of the sovereign’s commands. 
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 There is a provocative addition to Leviathan in chapter thirty-one, which in other 
respects consists of extensive parallels and paraphrases of De Cive.
224
 Hobbes introduces 
a new division of the category of cultus into two species. The first, which is ‘properly 
worship’, is that developed in De Cive and discussed above. Hobbes includes in this 
category both Publicola (worship or cultivation relating to the people or state) and cultus 
Dei (worship of God). The determining aspect is that the object of worship is not a 
subordinate but a superior will and the operative principle of worship is ‘complaisance’, 
that is, kindness or indulgence. However, Hobbes introduces a second type of cultus by 
which a superior will cultivates its subordinates. It is now this form that is aligned with 
agriculture, where humans cultivate inferior creatures, plants and animals, but also in 
education, since the ‘education of children [is] a culture of their minds’.
225
 In this case 
the laws of force and yield form the operative principle which produce a benefit 
according to natural causality. When performed by the sovereign, such a cultus engenders 
a civil religion. Hobbes’ remarks on civil religion are scattered throughout the text and 
developed in subsequent works, Behemoth and Historia Ecclesiastica. These are taken up 
in detail in the following chapter. 
 
* * * 
 
Is there a concept of authority in Hobbes’ political theory? There is no unified conception 
of auctoritas analogous to that of the Roman tradition. Instead there is a complex of 
threads offering an immanent alternative. From King James’s appeal to divine right to 
Pascal’s mystical foundations, authority makes a claim to transcendent origin. In Lipsius’ 
reason of state this appeal is maintained but reduced to mere appearance, the transcendent 
is preserved as a mask. For Lipsius, the appearance of divinity can still found auctoritas. 
Hobbes eschews both transcendence and its mere appearance, for an openly false 
divinity, a mortal God established by and for the benefit of the people. From the contract, 
political worship and authorisation, Hobbes attempts to construct a rational and scientific 
alternative model of authority. From the perspective maintaining the antithesis between 
reason and authority (Mommsen, Arendt, etc), the rationality of Hobbes’ account marks 
recourse to persuasion and argument and hence the death of authority. But Hobbes 
continues to demand trust, fidelity and social reputation play a role. If there is an 
                                                 
224
 cf. DC, ch. 15; Lev, ch. 31. 
225
 Lev, 31.[8]. 
75 
immanent form of authority, it must have its origin in the people. Within the framework 
determined by Hobbes’ materialist metaphysics, the origin must rest in each individual. 
Consistent with this framework, Hobbes depicts each of these threads — the contract, 
political worship, and authorisation — emerging from the individual. Through a 
contractual-religio-theatrical alternative, Hobbes approximates a rationalist authority. 
 A secondary aim of the chapter was to demonstrate the importance of worship to 
Hobbes’ account of the commonwealth. While the contract and the authorisation of the 
sovereign are important for establishing the artificial person of the commonwealth, as I 
demonstrated, the real source of legitimacy — social trust, belief and support — is 
ceremonial participation or worship. 
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Chapter 2: Religion, Politics and Pedagogy  
 
 
From Leviathan to the posthumously published Historia Ecclesiastica, Hobbes’ later 
works are marked by an increased emphasis on religion and, in particular, the role of 
religion in the political and civil education of the populus. This chapter focuses on two 
additional forms of authority Hobbes draws from religious models: a juridical authority 
of the sovereign as arbiter and a pedagogical authority of sovereign as pastor. In contrast 
to the civil worship of De Cive, these additional mechanisms, particularly the latter, 
introduce a direct means of ideological manipulation, anticipating Rousseau’s turn to 
education and pedagogy. We can identify two factors motivating this shift. Firstly, as I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Hobbes recognises that the offices of the sovereign, 
such as the sword of justice, depend on the opinions of the populus.
1
 Secondly, Hobbes 
requires a rational public to achieve the goal of establishing a rational commonwealth 
based on a scientia civilis.  
Consigned to the latter half of Leviathan and subsequent works, less often read or 
discussed, these aspects of Hobbes’ political theory are relatively neglected. However, as 
I argue, the pedagogical authority of the sovereign is fundamental to the agreement itself 
but ultimately undermines the limits Hobbes places on sovereign influence. That is, in the 
turn to religion as a model for political education, Hobbes largely repudiates his earlier 
insistence that external obedience is sufficient and that the internal beliefs of the 
individual cannot be manipulated by the sovereign.  
In this chapter, I argue that Hobbes draws two distinct conceptions of authority 
from religious sources. The first, the authority of the arbitrator or judge, is derived from 
Hobbes’ reinterpretation of Judeo-Christian history and an Erastian subordination of the 
Church to the state. The second, a pedagogical model of authority, is based on a general 
theory of religion conceptualised as a set of universal anthropological practices. These 
two forms are grounded on a distinction Hobbes makes between religion in general (a 
universal anthropological conception of ‘natural religion’) and particular religions. 
Hobbes rejects the Protestant perspective that equates religion with theology, a set of 
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doctrinal beliefs regarding the nature of God or the trinity. Instead, consonant with the 
previous chapter, Hobbes treats religion as a set of practices dictated by the laws of 
nature and thus described by civil science. As I demonstrate in the following, one central 
goal of Hobbes’ later writings is a systematic political re-interpretation of various 
phenomena, practices and events in the history of religions. Reiterating the thematic 
centre of the previous chapter, I show that Hobbes’ attempt to harness religion is driven 
by the presumption that authority is derived from practices rather than ideas. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first focuses on Hobbes’ 
periodisation of the Judeo-Christian era which is based on his revisionist interpretation of 
Sacred History. I demonstrate the importance of this periodisation for Hobbes’ account of 
authority. I argue that Hobbes correlates a series of authority structures to distinct periods 
of Judeo-Christian history as part of a strategic attack on the Roman Catholic and 
Protestant conceptions of church-state relations. The second section turns to Hobbes’ 
account of the juridical authority of the sovereign and its capacities and limits. In the 
third section, I turn to Hobbes’ general theory of religion or ‘natural religion’. I show 
how, aligned with his attempt to orient worship to material power (potentia), Hobbes’ 
later writings develop an anthropological and natural science of religion. Through this 
general theory of religion, Hobbes simultaneously naturalises religion and consecrates the 
state, in the latter case by taking religious practices as general models of political 
influence. In the fourth section, I discuss the pedagogical authority of the sovereign, 
derived from this naturalisation, and show that it ultimately rests on a general conception 
of divine right. The final section reflects on the tension in Hobbes’ account of sovereign 
ideological influence. On the one hand Hobbes demands only the performance of 
outward actions for subjects and allows freedom of conscience, but on the other hand, he 
accords to the sovereign a rather broad divine right of political education. I conclude with 
remarks summarising the broader results of my investigation of Hobbes’ political theory. 
Hobbes’ conception of civil religion is guided by the motif cuius regio, eius 
religio (In a [prince’s] country, the [prince’s] religion).
2
 It forms a second species of 
cultus by which the sovereign cultivates the minds of subjects.
3
 At times, Hobbes 
observes this to the letter, treating each successive kingdom of the Israelites as a distinct 
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peculiar religion, despite subsumption to the category of Judaism. This treatment of 
particular religions is analogous with his treatment of content in the two registers of 
signification discussed in the previous chapter. In this field the authority of the sovereign 
appears primarily as one of the arbiter or judge, evoking a juridical paradigm of 
sovereignty and a loosely ‘Erastian’ subordination of the church to the state. 
Foreshadowing Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology, the sovereign appears as one who must 
‘decide’ on the particular case, whether this pertains to political or religious matters. 
Hobbes’ general theory of religion, on the other hand, attempts to ‘generalise’ from the 
empirical content of various given religions and draws indiscriminately from Christianity, 
Judaism and pagan practices. Religion in general belongs to the structural or formal 
register of signs by which worship functions to signify or magnify relations of material 
power. 
In the secondary literature, these two registers are often conflated.
4
 For instance, 
Ronald Beiner depicts Hobbes’ conception of civil religion as simply a ‘Judaicization of 
Christianity’ aiming to resolve the conflict between the universalist doctrines of 
Christianity and the particularity of the political state.
5
 However, I claim this overlooks 
Hobbes’ reinterpretation of Judaic traditions through a generalised anthropological 
understanding of religio-politics. Beiner’s account adheres to a post-Reformation 
Christian concept of ‘religion’ discussed in my introduction. Instead, with Patricia 
Springborg, I emphasise Hobbes’ pre-Christian influences.
6
 While Springborg is focused 
on the Epicurean resonances traceable to his friendship with Gassendi, the influence of 
Cicero for whom ‘religion is the science of divine worship’ seems just as significant for 
Hobbes’ writings on religion and politics.
7
 Like Cicero, Hobbes equates religio with 
religious rituals and is concerned primarily with their civic and pragmatic effectiveness. 
These commonalities have led me to take John Scheid’s re-interpretation of Roman 
religion as a form of orthopraxis, as a guide for Hobbes’ discussion of religion.
8
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1 Hobbes’ Sacred History 
A distinctive periodisation of the Judeo-Christian era provides the foundation of Hobbes' 
argument for the subordination of the Church to the state. In particular, by delimiting a 
series of synchronic structural periods of political-religious authority, Hobbes uses 
periodisation as an argumentative strategy in defence of the juridical authority of the 
sovereign (as judge and arbitrator of matters of Christian practice and Scriptural 
interpretation).
9
 He distinguishes three broad periods of Sacred History: the Judaic era, 
the Christian era and the Kingdom of God to come. In the first period, Hobbes retraces 
the shifts in theocratic authority manifest in the seat of sovereignty of the Israelites.
10
 The 
covenant between Abraham and God is periodically broken and renewed, at least up to 
the election of Saul. Each rulership marks distinct political entities.
11
 The second period, 
the Christian era, commences with the life of Christ and continues until the day of 
judgement.
12
 Also known as the ‘regeneration’, it is a period of ‘preparation’ for the 
return of Christ and the salvation of man.
13
 Authority in this period is determined by the 
derogation of the covenant.
14
 The final period refers to salvation itself, when Christ will 
return and establish a worldly Kingdom of God on earth.
15
 Through the disjuncture 
between the Judaic and Christian era God’s theocratic authority of command, executed 
vicariously through Abraham and Moses, is diminished to the role of political advisor or 
counsellor during Christ’s life and the subsequent regeneration. The shift provides the 
fundamental argumentative support for Hobbes’ subordination of the Christian Church to 
political authority.  
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The argumentative use of periodisation figures only in the later texts De Cive and 
Leviathan, whereas the earlier manuscript Elements retrojects a logic of apostolic 
succession back to Moses.
16
 In the latter works, Abraham is emphasised in order to 
substantiate a materialist or worldly interpretation of the kingdom to come and to 





(i) The Judaic Period: Abraham and Moses 
In the Judaic period Hobbes uses the theocratic authority delegated to Abraham as an 
example to distinguish between the general political form of religion and the particular 
content of a given religion. In Genesis, God promises Abraham: ‘I will make of you a 
great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great so that you will be a 
blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse; and in 
you all the families of the earth shall be blessed’.
18
 The passage is explicitly political, to 
grant Abraham and his progeny a territory, ‘the land of Canaan for an everlasting 
possession’ and the references to blessing exhibit parallels with the logic of worship 
developed in De Cive.
19
 Hobbes distinguishes the doctrinal truths revealed to Abraham 
from the general political meaning of the covenant itself and the particular content of the 
agreement. Hobbes asserts that God’s revelation to Abraham is only that ‘there is one 
God, Creator of the Universe. And from him the Kingdom of God by agreement took its 
origin’.
20
 The covenant has a general political meaning, a grant of territory and a 
particular demand, a promise to practice circumcision. But, the latter is not actually part 
of the agreement itself. It is merely a conventional and arbitrary ‘sign to preserve the 
memory of this agreement’.
21
 
 Turning to the Mosaic covenant, Hobbes again distinguishes between the 
particular content (i.e. determined by convention) and the general political aspects of the 
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agreement. Hobbes notes that the ‘whole body of laws given by the hand of Moses’ 
includes three distinct types. Firstly, some are laws of nature, which are included in a 
redundant manner. Secondly, some are laws already given to Abraham (presumably 
territory and circumcision). And finally, others are new to the agreement with Moses, 
‘because they were given by God specifically as King of the Israelites’.
22
 God promises 
Moses and his people ‘ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and a holy nation.’
23
 
That is, in the renewal of the covenant by Moses, obedience is rewarded with 
sacralisation, holiness. He re-iterates the political quality of the promise by reinscribing 
into his citations the concept of populis and people, which are depoliticised in the KJV by 
references to ‘treasure’. But he also links the idea of consent and covenant with the 
special or peculiar relationship of God to the Israelites.
24
 
Through God’s omnipotence He already ‘reigned over all men naturally by his 
might’.
25
 God’s material power is the basis of a ‘general right’ over all the earth.
26
 And, 
all the nations of the world are God’s dominion by reason of his power. But the Israelites 
are marked out as having a ‘special’ or ‘peculiar’ relationship with God. Through an 
etymology of periousios, Hobbes explains that ‘peculiar’ signifies the opposite of 
ordinary, quotidian or daily use. The basis of this distinction from the quotidian is the act 
of consent to the covenant on the part of Israelites, which gives God an ‘addition to his 
ordinary title’. Hobbes echoes the distinction between potestas (the title established by 
agreement) and potentia (a natural relation). Consent and covenant give the nation the 
title of holy nation, which Hobbes specifically notes ‘signifies that which is God’s by 
special, not by general right’. That which is called holy, is ‘set apart for especial 
service’.
27
 By establishing the importance of the covenant for the structure of authority 
characteristic of Judaic theocracy (at least until the Kingdom of Saul), where God is 
sovereign and the human representative as merely a viceroy or lieutenant, the 
periodisation enables Hobbes to introduce a fundamental restructuring of authority in the 
regeneration. The suspension of the covenant, results in the suspension of God’s 
‘peculiar’ (theocratic) relation to Christian community. 
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(ii) The Regeneration as the Divine Interregnum 
The second period runs from the appearance of Christ to the last judgement, and includes 
Hobbes’ and our present. According to Hobbes, Christ’s role was not to ‘reign’ but only 
to prepare, through teaching, for the ‘second and glorious coming of Christ as the day of 
Judgement’.
28
 That is, he was to preach the good word (counsel), rather than command.
29
 
Here, as in my previous chapter, the distinction between command and counsel is key. 
Hobbes’ characterisation of the regeneration offers a counterpoint to two alternatives: one 
Roman Catholic, the other Protestant Presbyterian.  
Against Roman Catholicism, Hobbes stages three specific lines of attack.
30
 
Firstly, he develops a genealogy of papal power that demonstrates its contingency, 
emphasising the errors, mistakes and deception through which it was produced.
31
 
Secondly, he draws attention to the worldly aspects of their methods and political goals, 
thereby demonstrating a general ambiguity in the distinction between religion and 
politics. Thirdly, he restricts priestly influence to the domain of teaching and counsel.  
Of the first line of argument, the fullest account of his genealogy of papal power 
is given in Hobbes’ posthumous publication the Historia Ecclesiastica. Demonstrating 
his indiscriminate syncretic approach to religion in general, Hobbes returns to Ethiopia, 
the origin of all ‘pure intellectual activity’, in order to find a precedent for the usurpation 
of kings by priests.
32
 For Hobbes, the Ethiopians represent the first civilisation. They 
‘worshiped gods, had cities, were rulers and were outstanding in the arts’.
33
 However, 
even in this first civilisation, Hobbes decries that ‘the sophists’ — astrologers, priests and 
false prophets — usurped the proper order of natural rule. By manipulating the fears of 
the people they gained control over the king, dictating even ‘when the king ought to 
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The unnatural usurpation is repeated in the Christian era in the struggles between 
Catholic priests and the Roman emperors. In the reign of Constantine, Hobbes 
emphasises the contingency of the outcomes of the Council of Nicea and the 
misunderstanding (by priests) that it marked a subjection of the crown to the council.
36
 
The misunderstanding was compounded by the ‘stolen’ power of the Pope, (a veiled 
reference to the forged Donation of Constantine, exposed by Lorenzo Valla the previous 
century) and was ‘secretly increased, until he was more powerful than the Roman 
Emperor’.
37
 Thus, Hobbes undermines the divine ground and necessity of the authority of 
the papacy by showing how it was achieved through riddles and tricks, a series of 
mistakes, misunderstandings, outright forgeries and deception.
38
 The result was the 
subordination of the Roman empire to the papacy, completed in the reign of Justinian.
39
 
However, the height of papal power was achieved through the ambiguity in the 
coronation of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III.
40
 At the moment 
that Charlemagne was invested with the ‘Regal ornaments’ the Pope, followed by the 
people, reportedly cried ‘Deus dat’, ‘by the gift of God’.
41
 By the ‘negligence of the 
Emperors’ the ambiguity of the utterance led to the belief that the divine right accorded 
the emperor was mediated by the Pope.  
 In the second line of argument Hobbes highlights the worldly desires motivating 
the papacy. Having gained control of the Roman empire, Hobbes insists that the papacy, 
like members of any other political body, do not simply spend ‘their lives in leisure’, but 
employ a range of worldly means to consolidate their material power and wealth.
42
 The 
assertion of divine right followed when the papacy invented legal pretexts for their 
political influence.
43
 The third line of argument is made in different ways, but each relies 
on Hobbes’ periodisation. Attacking Cardinal Bellarmine, Hobbes insists that Christ 
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acted only as ‘schoolmaster’ to persuade men, and not a ‘commander’.
44
 Thus Hobbes 
can accept the origin of Bellarmine’s authority in Christ and its transmission through 
history via Peter and the apostolic succession, while at the same time, insisting that 
Bellarmine has no authority to command. During the regeneration Christ’s role was not to 
‘reign’ but only to prepare for the ‘second and glorious coming of Christ as the day of 
Judgement’.
45
 Hobbes turns the Church’s own claim that there is a distinction between 
the ‘spiritual' and ‘temporal’ into a critique of their extended claims of rights.
46
 He notes 
that the extent of the ‘indirect powers’ of the Catholic Church amount to ‘as absolute a 




 Against the Protestant Presbyterians, his earlier attacks focussed on ‘enthusiasm’ 
and derided it a form of madness and superstition.
48
 This is expanded in Leviathan with a 
discussion of a pagan occasion of ‘enthusiasm’ in Abdera, supposed to have occurred 
during the reign of Lysimachus (306-281BC).
49
 Reportedly, a heatwave and suggestive 
theatrical performances induced a group hallucination, resulting in ‘speaking in 
tongues’.
50
 Using the periodisation, Hobbes insists that in the regeneration miracles have 
now ceased and hence there are no grounds for accepting claims made on the basis of 




In Behemoth, this polemic is expanded against the Presbyterians and 
Independents. Hobbes’ core complaint is against the multiplication of interpretations 
prompted by the translation of the Bible into ‘vulgar languages’ such as English.
52
 This 
has led the Presbyterians to mistake ‘divinity’ (theology or ‘church-philosophy’) for 
‘religion’. The result is a multiplication of sects in England to the detriment of the Church 
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 It is the sense of disorder and populism that most offends Hobbes. 
Populism or demagoguery (theatrical speeches) from the Church pulpit stir desires. 
Preachers act the part of a good tragedian, who ‘applyed themselues wholly to the 
winning of the people’ to their doctrines and reputation. By their ‘art’, they would inspire 
mass audiences and disrupt local dioceses as part of an ‘ambitious plot’ for power and 
‘sedition against the State’. For Hobbes, the fault of such a show is that it inspires distrust 
and competitive behaviour between neighbours, disrupting the peace. The rupture 
between the individual Churches and centralised ecclesiastical government (centred on 
the controversy of Common prayer book) is paralleled with the growing ‘loue of 
Democracy’ in parliament.
54
 Similarly, the Presbyterian ministers in parliament took the 
Church presbytery as a model of government and attempted to introduce an oligarchy, 
replacing the monarchy.
55
 But for Hobbes, this is all in the service of personal interest, 




(iii) The Kingdom to Come 
The kingdom to come is often read as a messianic or eschatological promise. However, 
Hobbes' strategy is one of deflation or displacement. While I accept that Hobbes 
advances a claim for a worldly kingdom of God, I reject the eschatological and messianic 
readings developed by Pocock, Agamben and others.
57
 Such readings appear to ignore 
entirely the strategy at work in parts three and four of Leviathan.
58
 In agreement with Leo 
Strauss, I understand the later parts of Leviathan as a rigorous ‘critique of religion’.
59
 The 
messianic promise is a return of theocracy, but it is strictly separated from the present and 
largely irrelevant for present politics. Hobbes draws out the political meaning of 
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Christian rituals (such as Baptism).
60
 However, in each case Hobbes is careful to shift the 
reference of Christian practice to a future kingdom. Schematically, the regeneration is 
reduced to an interregnum between two eras of direct rule by God. In the Christian era 
God has withdrawn from direct involvement in political affairs and as a result humanity 
must carry along with a worldly substitute: a sovereign who is legitimated by consent and 




2 Authority of the Arbiter: Christianity in the Hobbesian 
State 
The axiom ‘No man can serve two masters’ serves to determine the place of Christianity 
in Hobbes’ modern theory of the state.
62
 The indivisibility of sovereignty and the need for 
a decision dictate the basic structure of the juridical authority of the sovereign, which 
extends to all aspects of worldly existence. Based on his materialist metaphysics, Hobbes 
rejects the division of human affairs into distinct temporal and spiritual domains.
63
 As a 
result, there is no tenable division of authority, since all questions of conflict eventually 
require an arbiter and the divisions of jurisdiction themselves are determined only by 
convention. Insofar as Christianity offers a set of ‘rules of Christian life’ it is 
indistinguishable from the civil laws of a nation and in this juridical state paradigm, the 
sovereign is accorded the final judgement on law and legislation.
64
 In fact for Hobbes, in 
a Christian commonwealth there is no essential distinction between the Church and the 




There are a number of detailed analyses of the subordination of the Christian 
Church to the Hobbesian State in the secondary literature. Sommerville, for instance, 
aligns Hobbes with Marsilius of Padua, and notes that Hobbes’ views on church-state 
relations were ‘commonplace amongst Anglicans’.
66
 He contextualises Hobbes’ stance on 
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Scripture and its interpretation amongst his contemporaries.
67
 He details Hobbes’ 
rejection of the Catholic supposition of a universal Church of Christendom, the basis of 
Catholic claims of legitimate state interference on matters of religion.
68
 In addition, he 
discusses the subordination of Christian clerics to commonwealth authority and the extent 
of the agreement between Hobbes and Erastus on excommunication.
69
 In a recent 
monograph, Collins also offers an extended commentary of Hobbes ‘uses of 
Christianity’.
70
 For instance, Collins notes that ‘Hobbes’ comprehensive subordination of 
the Church to state control was necessitated by his absolutist theory of sovereignty’ and 
he gives an account of the shifts in Hobbes’ ‘statist ecclesiology’ during the civil war 
period.
71
 In addition, recent essays from Olsthoorn, Davis and others, offer more detailed 
analyses of some points mentioned here.
72
 Thus, in the following account of Christianity 
under the Hobbesian state I focus only on a few key points. 
An emphasis on the breadth and limits of the juridical authority of the sovereign 
unify Hobbes’ reflections on the place of Christianity in the Hobbesian state. These are 
developed predominantly in part three of Leviathan, where Hobbes addresses the ‘nature 
and rights of a Christian Commonwealth’.
73
 Hobbes’ considerations can be loosely 
grouped under a number of headings tied directly to questions of authority: (i) on 
prophecy and revelation, (ii) on Scripture, (iii) on the limits of belief, (iv) on the Church 
and the commonwealth, (v) on Excommunication, and (vi) on Erastianism.  
Firstly, although the Christian commonwealth depends on the ‘prophetical’ word 
of God, the content of prophecy are incomprehensible mysteries which do not ‘fall under 
any rule of science’.
74
 Moreover, in the regeneration, the prophetical word is ascribed a 
very limited domain of legitimacy and, despite Hobbes' involved discussion of prophecy, 
he ultimately places prophecy and miracles under the authority of decision accorded the 
sovereign. He makes a sustained case for suspicion of all prophetic claims, since men are 
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often motivated by personal ambition.
75
 The ‘magician, the astrologer, the diviner and 
soothsayer are all believed by the uneducated to be the prophets of God.’
76
 The Christian 
sovereign should be taken as their only legitimate prophet.
77
 Even in the Judaic period 
Abraham had the right by his civil sovereignty to lawfully punish ‘any of his subjects 
[who] should pretend private vision, or spirit, or other revelation from God’.
78
 Although 
the private man always has the ‘liberty’, that is the unrestrained faculty, to ‘believe or not 




 Secondly, in the absence of legitimate prophecy or miracles, Hobbes limits 
Christian doctrine to what is ‘conformable to the Holy Scriptures’.
80
 However, control 
over doctrine, insofar as it is made law, which for Hobbes is the important question, is 
accorded to the sovereign.
81
 In addition, Hobbes problematises the determination of 
canonical scripture itself, based on its variations in history and the difficulties of 
interpretation. Hence, he requires that the sovereign possesses the responsibility to 
appoint a ‘canonical interpreter’ of scripture.
82
 Despite allowing a role of expertise, only 
the civil sovereign has the authority to make Scripture canonical.
83
 
However, thirdly, the sovereign authority is limited in its control of belief.
84
 
Although this limit is increasingly transgressed, Hobbes writes that, with regard to 
doctrine, there is no ‘argument he [the sovereign] can produce to oblige me to believe 
it’.
85
 The internal beliefs of any individual are simply beyond the capacity of another to 
effect and claims of revelations cannot be verified.
86
 As a result, Hobbes insists that 
though the sovereign ‘may oblige me to obedience’, he cannot make me, nor oblige me to 
‘think any otherwise than my reason persuades me’.
87
 This limit appears internal to the 
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juridical model of authority on which this aspect of sovereignty is based. Throughout 
Hobbes’ works he consistently asserts that ‘no human law is intended to oblige the 
conscience of man, but the actions only’.
88
 The juridical sovereign is to determine 
external facts, obedience, the canon, the evaluation of discourse, but not intentions or 
motives.
89
 As Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt and Reinhardt Koselleck recognised, with 
respect to internal beliefs, Hobbes’ limitations on authority leave a ‘barely visible crack’ 
in the armature of the Leviathan.
90
 However, as I show in the following, Hobbes’ later 
works attempt to seal this crack with education. 
 Fourthly, the later works demonstrate a blurring of the distinction between the 
Church and the Commonwealth. In De Cive, Hobbes treats the Church as a kind of civil 
association. Like any group or body of individuals wishing to congregate it is dependent 
on the permission of the sovereign, but insofar as it refers to a ‘crowd’ united as one 
person, it resembles other civil associations.
91
 In Leviathan, by contrast, Hobbes notes 
that insofar as a Church is to have any force to guide the lives of its members it must be 
equivalent to the commonwealth itself.
92
 Nevertheless, there remains a kind of 
asymmetry subordinating the Church to the commonwealth. Both historically and 
logically, Hobbes insists that political concerns precede any particular religious 
institution. In Hobbes’ reading of Sacred History, Abraham is first a civil sovereign over 
his family, before the moment of revelation and covenant with God. Similarly, in the case 
of Moses, he is first determined as a political representative, before establishing the 
particular religion in accordance with God’s commands. Although the Church is 
subordinate to the commonwealth, it remains at least in principle separate from the state. 
Unlike Roman religion and augury, Christianity does not penetrate into daily political 
events and divine worship is distinct from the ceremonies of the state.
93
  
In particular, Hobbes grants the Christian Church autonomy in the ‘mysteries of 
faith’, which pertain to God himself and do not relate to politics, history, morals or 
physics.
94
 The mysteries or ‘declarations of revelation’ are the concern of the apostles, 
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 In the reception of Hobbes’ works, both the ‘mysteries’ and the 
‘magisters’ are somewhat controversial.
96
 Regardless, the category of mysteries is 
defined only to include laws of divine authority by revelation, forgiveness of sins, and 
revelation concerning the afterlife.
97 
For Hobbes, these have little import to material 
existence.  
Lastly, I turn to the interrelated themes of excommunication and Hobbes’ 
Erastianism. Hobbes takes up the theme of excommunication in detail in both De Cive 
and Leviathan.
98
 Although Hobbes grants the Church some rights of excommunication, 
they are strictly subordinate to the civil law, as is ecclesiastical law in general.
99
 The 
limits Hobbes applies to excommunication also hint at the socio-economic arguments 
made by Erastus. Hobbes writes of the absurd consequences when a father, mother or 
master is excommunicated and servants or children would thus be required to cease meals 
and contact with their own parents.
100
 In a wider socio-economic sense, Hobbes notes 
that even Christ did not judge on matters of law, properly or penalties.
101
 With respect to 
heresies, the king must enforce laws and ‘do away with controversy’, but on other matters 
he should allow free speech as long as it does not ‘teach bad morals’.
102
 
 Like Hobbes, Erastus subordinates the church to the state and limits the Church’s 
control of excommunication.
103 
Erastus notes that secular bodies should be the ones to 
‘police the moral lives of the faithful in a Christian State’ because excommunication 
would have socio-economic side-effects on the individual punished.
104
 As grounds, 
Erastus specifically cites the likelihood of abuse of this power by Church elders, who 
although principled may lack the integrity of the apostles.
105
 A number of argumentative 
strategies are shared by Erastus and Hobbes. Both advocate for a minimal conception of 
Christian doctrine and see ceremonial conventions as an ‘invention of man’.
106
 However, 
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a chasm opens between their metaphysical presumptions. Erastus embraces the Lutheran 
ideal of a purified spiritual realm for Christianity. In this scheme, the spiritual 
independence of the Church can only be maintained by rigorously limiting its access to 
material power. In particular, Christian morality and the true universal church belong to 
the Spiritual, while law, legality and the impure worldly Church belong to the temporal. 
In contrast, within Hobbes’ radically materialist metaphysics the former is merely a 
phantasm. 
 
3 Natural Religion and the Consecration of the State 
For Hobbes, the universal laws of religion in general are indistinguishable from the 
political principles by which the artifice of the state is constructed. Thus, Hobbes 
demystifies authority and gives it a scientific and rational basis by naturalising it as 
power relations. However, the operation of these principles requires the cultivation, by 
the sovereign, of the minds of his subjects. Against Beiner’s claim that Hobbes 
‘Judaicizes’ Christianity, I argue that from Hobbes’ perspective, Judaism does not 
provide a particular religio-political content to be applied to Christianity. Instead, he 
identifies in certain Judiac practices and equally in pagan practices, empirical 
demonstrations of universal natural politico-religious forms or techniques germane to all 
politico-religious systems. Like the natural and general register of ceremonial cultus, by 
which the subjects constitute the material power of the sovereign (discussed in the 
previous chapter), the second inverted form of cultus (practiced as pedagogy by the 
sovereign over subjects) operates at the level of religion in general.  
Hobbes’ equation of the worldly and the divine was evident to Bramhall in the 
seventeenth century. Bramhall writes that in Leviathan, ‘humane and divine politiks, are 
but politiks’.
107
 In Leviathan, Hobbes had only offered a cursory remark that the signs of 
honour men offer God and all powers invisible are nothing other than the ‘expressions of 
reverence as they would use towards men’.
108
 In Behemoth, this relationship is developed 
into a tacit hypothesis that there is a fundamental equivalence between the political 
practices of parliamentarians and the ecclesiastical practices of Protestant ministers. That 
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is, a bi-directional influence between ecclesiastical forms and political forms. The 
particularity of Hobbes’ conception is distinguished from the doctrine of ‘divine right’ 
and Schmitt’s ‘political theology’ by the emphasis on practice rather than theology. 
Hobbes argues that, in one direction, political institutions provide the inspiration for 
Presbyterian reforms. He notes that the Presbyterians demanded ‘that the State becoming 
popular, the Church might be so too, and gouerned by an Assembly’.
109
 In the other 
direction, the Presbyterian synod was used as a model for the House of Commons, giving 
the ‘oligarchy’ of parliament a basis in divine right.
110
 Although Hobbes criticises the 
particular aims of those involved, the possible traffic between the two domains is taken as 
self-evident.  
Similarly, Hobbes accuses both Church ministers and parliamentarians with 
stirring up populism and popular government. He draws a parallel between the theatrical 
oratory displays of preachers in the pulpit and ministers in parliament. The phenomenon 
is considered part of an ‘ambitious plot’ for power and ‘sedition against the State’. This 
blurring of the ecclesiastical and the political appears often in Behemoth. The theatrical 
form of Church ceremony leads to a ‘loue with Democracy’ and ‘Harangues in the 
Parliament’ and subsequently self-interested ambition and disruption in both 
ecclesiastical and political matters.
111
  
The basis of such parallels is the presumption that religion is not a theology but a 
practice determined by the laws of nature.
112
 Religion is concerned with the practice of 
obedience, the ‘keeping of the Feasts and Fasts’ which ‘belong to the honour of God’ but 
are neglected by the Presbyterians.
113
 Distancing himself from Herbert’s Protestant 
anthropological category of religion Hobbes, offers alternate anthropology of religion as 
a civil practice. 
 Comparing Leviathan against corresponding sections of Elements and De Cive, 
an increased interest in the anthropology of natural religion is apparent. In Leviathan, 
religion is given its own chapter and additions with religious themes are made throughout 
the anthropological part one.
114
 In chapter twelve, Hobbes introduces the concept of the 
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‘seed of religion’, a ‘peculiar quality’ of man which is largely absent in other living 
creatures.
115
 It is linked to three qualities: (i) a curiosity ‘in the search of causes’, (ii) a 
tendency to treat observed beginnings as causes and (iii) to experience felicity, unlike 
beasts, in a domain beyond the ‘quotidian food, ease and lusts’, a domain relating to 
foresight, imagination and the supposition of causes.
116
 In additions to chapter two, the 
origin of Greek religion is identified in the products of imagination (apparitions and 
dreams).
117
 Hobbes blames man’s ignorance for the advent of pagan religion, pointing 
towards a pedagogical theme common to other additions. In chapter three, defining terms 
such as foresight and prudence, Hobbes now includes a brief discussion of the religious 
categories of providence and prophecy. These are equated with the distinctively human 
powers of foresight and guessing. The former based on one's own activities and the latter 
based on an extensive study of signs (the observation of the ‘antecedents’ and 
‘consequents’ of events).
118
 In chapter six, he adds a distinction between religion and 
superstition, but also connects both to fears of material power [potentia].
119
 In chapter 
eight, Hobbes expands on an early discussion of hallucinations induced by a heatwave in 
Abdera under the heading of madness.
120
 Through these insertions, religion is treated as a 
wholly natural human response to worldly encounters, inspired subjectively by curiosity, 
but connected with foresight of consequences and anthropologically universal.  
In chapter twelve, the ritualistic aspects of religion, worship and honour, are also 
subsumed under general anthropological categories. As mentioned previously, Hobbes 
writes that the origins of worship are political and it was only subsequently applied to 
relations between men and God or gods.
121
 From this naturalisation, Christianity is 
characterised as one instance, one particular form, of worship adhering to general 
principles determined in accordance with the laws of nature. In the Latin, Hobbes notes 
specifically that such worship, cultus, between men is dictante solâ Naturâ, dictated by 
nature alone.
122
 The only difference between divine worship and civil worship is the 
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 It is not the ‘movement, place, dress or gesture of body’ that 
distinguishes them but only that in one case it manifests a sign of our recognition of 




Of course, these seeds of religion, Hobbes notes, have been cultivated by ‘two 
sorts of men’. One through their own inventions resulting in ‘human politics’. The other 
at the prompting and advice of God resulting in ‘divine politics’. Pointing towards the 
significance for authority, both types aim to make men ‘more apt to obedience, laws, 
peace, charity, and civil society’. With the latter, Hobbes includes only those ‘subjects in 
the kingdom of God’ established under Abraham, Moses and our blessed Saviour.
125
 
Given the periodisation of Sacred (political) History and Hobbes’ remarks on the 
‘kingdom of God’, the implication is that in the divine interregnum all politics are 
‘human’ and must be based on natural law, rather than supernatural revelation. Hobbes 
derogates the use of ‘supernatural things’ (ideas, concepts) in politics and suggests that 




The chapter ‘On Religion’ forms one loci of the debate on Hobbes’ atheism.
127
 
Curley, amongst others, uses the chapter to argue that Hobbes saw not only pagan 
religion but also Judaism and Christianity as ‘suspect’.
128
 And although some scholars, 
such as Martinich, maintain that Hobbes was an orthodox theist, it is difficult to read ‘On 
Religion’ without detecting a sense of scepticism toward all religious belief.
129
 Despite 
Hobbes’ occasional references to ‘true religion’ it is quite an elusive category in his 
works. There is no explicit, positive account of the category even in chapter twelve. In De 
Cive, Hobbes does offer a positive example: the religion established by God through 
Abraham.
130
 ‘Abraham is the source of true religion’ and through him mankind is brought 
to ‘true worship’ of God. However, as discussed above, the doctrine given to Abraham is 
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minimal: a monotheistic creator god.
131
 There are a handful of references to ‘true 
religion’ in Leviathan. It first appears in a section on the passions, where ‘true religion’ 
relates to a true fear of an imagined power and a real object.
132
 Nevertheless, in the 
remaining references throughout Leviathan, it is unclear if the category is ever populated. 
Of the few uses of ‘true religion’ and ‘true doctrine’ none provide evidence that there is, 
in fact, any ‘true religion’ beyond ‘natural law’.
133
 The one substantiating instance in De 
Cive, connecting it to Abraham’s revelation, is also reworked and expanded to remove 
any explicit use of ‘true’. The new formulation refers instead to the command by God to 
obey both the ‘moral laws, known by the light of nature’ and any additional commands 
conveyed through a ‘dream or vision’.
134
 Given Hobbes’ periodisation of the present as a 
divine interregnum, it would seem there is only ‘true religion’ to the extent that it is 
allowed by the sovereign, since the rights of the sovereign over religion extend to the 
evaluation of revelation and scripture. 
 This difficulty in identifying a ‘true religion’ in Hobbes’ works is perhaps due to 
the categorical mismatch between religion and truth. That is, if religion is not a set of 
propositions or doctrines, but is instead a set of formal practices, then clearly the 
ascription of ‘truth’ is nonsensical. In Behemoth, as part of his polemic against the clergy, 
he blamed their ‘seditious doctrine’ (theology) with obscuring religion, which consists 
only in the practice of obedience according to the laws of nature. They neglect the duty of 
religion.
135
 This is echoed in the Historia Ecclesiastica where theology is derided as an 
‘impossible system’ which has displaced ‘piety’ [pietas] as the central concern of 
religion.
136
 That pietas, in the Roman tradition, refers specifically to a concept of 
dutifulness associated with family as well as the gods is clearly significant in this 
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 Hobbes notes that the commands of God, first handed down to Moses, are 
ignored and instead ‘pastors teach empty dogmas about the nature of God that are not 
intended to be understood by uneducated people.’
138
  
Hobbes’ anthropological generalisation of religious categories extends to the 
distinction between the sacred and profane. Based on his analysis of Scripture, Hobbes 
offers the definition: ‘to consecrate is, in Scripture, to offer, give, or dedicate, in pious 
and decent language and gesture, a man or any other thing to God, by separating it from 
common use.’
139
 Hobbes insists there is no ‘conjuration or enchantment’ (such as 
transubstantiation of the sacrament). Consecration is merely the designation of an object 
for a particular, separate, type of use. Hobbes discusses the particular, ‘special’ or 
‘peculiar’ relationship between the Israelites and God. This is distinguished from the 
general relationship by which all the nations of the world are God’s dominion by reason 
of his power.
140
 The Israelites are determined as a holy nation, ‘set apart for especial 
service’.
141
 The holy in the most general sense is simply something set aside, by consent, 
or agreement, from ordinary and quotidian use for something special.
142
  
Hobbes’ materialist conception of the holy is consistent with his broader project 
to provide a rational and scientific account of religion and politics. The programme of 
disenchantment is particularly evident in Part IV of Leviathan. He opens by denouncing a 
‘confederacy of deceivers’, the papacy, for introducing into religion phantasms, spirits of 
illusion and demons and for distorting ceremonies from simple symbolic acts of 
representation and memorialisation into rites of conjuration and magical incantations.
143
 
He objects to such superstition and argues instead that such ceremonies require only 
‘decent and rational speech’.
144
 This rationalist re-reading of ceremony is evident 
throughout Leviathan. The ceremonies by which Moses consecrated objects are 
exemplary for Hobbes, since they involve only adding garments and anointing with oil, 
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‘which was a simple and decent cleansing and adorning them’.
145
 The naturalisation of 
religion and the materialist conception of consecration place it and religion wholly within 
the field of the laws of nature, knowable by the dictates of natural reason as well as 
revelation from God. But the decisive point is that in this way both become 
epistemological problems or at least problems which admit pedagogical solutions and 
thus require a consonant form of authority. 
 
4 Pedagogical Authority: The Divine Right of Sovereign 
Pastor 
Hobbes’ demystification of authority transforms it into an epistemological problem, such 
that authority is derived from correct knowledge or understanding.
146
 In recounting the 
political history of the Israelites, Hobbes’ primary aim is to identify throughout history a 
point of unity of rule with respect to both ‘policy and religion’.
147
 For the most part, this 
is not difficult. Abraham, Moses, Aaron, Eleazar the high priest and Samuel all typify 
such a unity, without the need of a forced interpretation. They each acted as both civil 
sovereign and high priest. Only the period of Joshua is more difficult. As Curley notes, 
citing Aquinas and Spinoza, it is more readily characterised as a ‘mixed form of 
government, in which authority is divided.’
148
 However, Hobbes glosses over this 
difficulty. Instead, he points to another problem, he remarks that despite the actual unity 
of temporal and spiritual power over the Israelites, ‘the people understood it not.’
149
 
What precisely did the people fail to understand? They did not understand the principles 
of indivisible sovereignty. As a consequence of their lack of understanding, the people 
demand miracles, great ability or felicity.
150
 The result was disobedience under ‘pretext’ 
of ‘justice or religion’.
151
 This led to ‘the civil troubles, division and calamities of the 
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 Thus civil disturbance and difficulties in government are due not to failures of 
rule but failures in pedagogy. The basis of effective authority is understanding and hence 
education. The introduction of ‘authorisation’ in Leviathan may have shifted Hobbes’ 
attention to education, since, to recall from the previous chapter, the one prerequisite for 
authorising the sovereign is rationality. Neither fools, madmen, nor children are able to 
authorise the sovereign in Hobbes’ account.  
Revising his earlier account of the causes of the civil war, in Behemoth, written 
around 1667-1669, Hobbes describes the seed of conflict as ‘certaine opinions in Diuinity 
and Politiks’ propagated by the universities and spread through the pulpit.
153
 These 
produce the ‘corrupt[ion] of the people generally’.
154
 All ideological and educational 
influences are smeared as ‘seducers’. Catholic remnants, who remain loyal to the papacy, 
spread the idea that the pope is their sovereign. Independents, who demand private 
interpretation of Scripture, induce division and sects. Democrats, infected with classical 
philosophy, have been miseducated and undermine the present form of government. The 
growing bourgeoisie are tempted by the example of the Netherlands and so break the first 
Mosaic commandment or at least Hobbes’ politicised recoding of it as: not to love the 
forms of government of one’s neighbours. The miseducation of the people has the result 
that they know not their political duty and its necessity against unrest. Instead some 
subjects even seek financial advantage from the disruption produced.
155
  
Hobbes’ diagnosis of the present civic disruption has two aspects. Firstly, he 
criticises the particular claims made by Protestants and the papacy, but he also notes that 
the problem is that the Church dominates all pedagogical roles by monopolising the few 
opportunities for teaching the people. The lack of leisure of the common man, whose 
mind is always occupied by ‘private business or pleasures’, requires that a time be set 
aside and separated from quotidian concerns in order for civic education to be effective. 
In this way common man can be ‘taught their duty’.
156
 
 However, in a sense, pedagogical authority appears an unavoidable obverse of 
juridical authority, because the people must know the laws. In the Dialogue on the 
Common Laws of England, Hobbes specifically defines a law as a command ‘declaring 
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Publickly, and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do.’
157
 
Hobbes insists that a law must be made known, to be a law as such. This requirement has 
two consequences, firstly law must be given a material form as a ‘declaration or 
manifestation’ of the sovereign’s will by ‘voice, writing, or some other sufficient 
argument of the same’.
158
 But secondly, for those incapable of ‘knowing,’ law does not 
exist. ‘Over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law, no more than over brute 
beasts’.
159
 This aspect of Hobbes’ political theory is often overlooked and particularly by 
Schmitt. It points directly towards the kind of rationalist political solution embodied in 
Fichte’s ‘naive schoolmasterly “educational dictatorship.”’
160
 
Among the duties of the office of the sovereign representative, Hobbes includes 
the duty to inform the people of the ‘grounds and reasons’ of the rights of sovereignty 
itself.
161
 He writes that the ‘grounds of these rights’ must be ‘truly taught, because they 
cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of punishment’.
162
 Thus Hobbes 
introduces a further legitimating supplement: education. It is not enough to establish an 
artificial power and law by contract, a material power (for execution) by ceremony and 
popular responsibility by authorisation. To maintain a commonwealth one also needs a 
robust system of education. The duty in question is that of ‘supreme pastor’ to the 
commonwealth.
163
 Contrary to the forms of legitimation derived from the contract, 
ceremony or authorisation, which flow from the populus, the origin of the pastoral 
authority is ‘divine right’. It is one of the few positive remarks and uses made of divine 
right in the text. While all subordinate pastors possess authority jure civili, Hobbes insists 
that the sovereign has such authority jure divino.
164
 In general, the pastoral role is 
modelled on the Apostles and their domain of authority which includes teaching, 
prophecy and evangelical tasks.
165
 In Behemoth, the role of the Christian king is extended 
further, to the role of both bishop and shepherd of a diocese composed of the entire 
commonwealth (his dominion).
166
 As supreme pastor, the sovereign’s primary duty is to 
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ensure that the multitude understands the grounds and structure of the commonwealth and 
importantly are motivated to participate in other forms of legitimation. But the operation 
of pedagogical authority is by ‘general providence’ rather than attention to particulars.
167
 
Hobbes’ recourse to divine right is distinctive, differing from the arguments advanced by 
King James I or Mainwaring which relied on Aristotelian theology and grounded the 
entire political structure of the monarch. However, as the ultimate support of authority 
the divine right of supreme pastor is just as foundational as the divine right theories of his 
contemporaries.  
The dangers arising from neglect of education has a mythical precedent cited by 
Hobbes: the daughters of Pelias, who are tricked by a sorceress into killing their father 
the king. According to Pindar, Pelias ruled lawlessly after installing himself by force as 
king of the city of Iolcus, thereby usurping the hereditary dynastic rule of Aeson and 
Jason.
168
 Hobbes’ reference to Pelias’s fate in a section on the pedagogical duty of the 
sovereign points to the importance of religious and ideological rule over sheer force: for 
it was Pelias’ dereliction of state cult that led to his gruesome regicide by his own 
daughters and at his own command.  
Diodorus writes that Medea the sorceress, aiding Jason in the restoration of his 
kingdom against Pelias, offered him an alternative to armed conflict. She promises ‘to 
slay Pelias all alone by means of cunning and to deliver him to the chieftains of the royal 
palace without their running any risk.’
169
 She enters the city, disguised as an old woman, 
carrying an idol of the goddess Artemis. Feigning divine inspiration and revelatory 
messages she excites the ‘superstitious populace’ and gains access to the palace.
170
 
Accounts of revelation and miraculous demonstrations enabled her to gain the trust of 
king Pelias and his daughters, thereby convincing the aged ruler that she could restore his 
youth. Pelias commands his daughters to obey Medea. And after demonstrating the 
procedure on an old ram, Medea convinces the daughters to kill and dismember Pelias in 
order to boil him in a cauldron, purportedly to restore his youth. Instead, after Medea 
signals the death of Pelias, Jason and his men take the city. Thus Pelias, who ruled 
lawlessly and by force alone, is undone through religious subterfuge and manipulation. 
The example clearly resonates with two of Hobbes’ regular assertions: firstly, that forms 
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of worship independent of the state are a source of danger to any ruler; and secondly that 
all claims of revelation and personal ‘enthusiasm’ should be treated with scepticism, as 
they can easily be feigned and provide a front for other motives. 
Hobbes also uses the myth of Pelias to introduce another line of argument: that 
the Biblical ten commandments are not specific to Judeo-Christian religion, but 
instantiate a set of general political principles which form the ‘natural and fundamental 
laws’ of sovereignty.
171
 Here, the fact that Medea entered Ioclus with an idol of the 
goddess Artemis demonstrates the terrible consequences of breaking the commandment 
to monotheism: thou shalt have no other gods. In effect, Hobbes re-interprets the Judeo-
Christian tradition as embodying a particular example of a general set of political 
principles. The task he sets himself is thus to identify a set of principles of reason, ‘found 
out by industrious meditation’ which generalise the commandments given to Moses by 
revelation.
172
 These reasoned political principles can then be taught to the people in lieu 
of the commandments, which, in the regeneration, lack the support of miracles and 
revelation. 
Hobbes begins with the first commandment, the call for monotheism: thou shalt 
have no other gods, Non habeis Deos alienos.
173
 This commandment is reinterpreted as 
the principle that the common people ‘ought not to be in love with any form of 
government they see in their neighbour nations, more than with their own, not (…) to 
desire change.’ Hobbes notes that this principle is crucial to the obedience and concord of 
a people, independent of the particular political form adopted (i.e. aristocracy or 
democracy). The precondition for the effective flourishing of a commonwealth is 
obedience, connecting the commandments with his account of public worship discussed 
in my previous chapter. 
Turning to the second commandment, Hobbes equates the sovereign with a 
‘jealous god’.
174
 He warns that subjects should be wary of showing love, in the form of 
obedience, to his competitors. The commandment is equated with the lesson that popular 
rivals to the sovereign represent a threat to the stability of the commonwealth. The third 
commandment (not to take God’s name in vain), is equated with speaking 
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contemptuously of the sovereign. The political effects are to ‘slacken obedience’, which 
undermines the ‘safety of the commonwealth’.
175
 Hobbes continues by producing a 
generalised political principle corresponding to each of the remaining commandments: 
one should honour one’s parents, because the family is the originary model of the 
commonwealth; one should avoid violence, respect the property of others and avoid 
corruption because these undermine justice; and of the tenth commandment, Hobbes 




The fourth commandment, ‘remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy’, is taken 
as a general principle for political education and hence, the basis for the pedagogical 
activity of sovereign authority.
177
 He returns to the pedagogical problems of the 
reproduction of a political form. He writes that ‘after one generation [has] past’ the 
people cannot be taught, nor remember these general political principles, nor even know 
‘in whom sovereign power is placed’. As an aid to memory, they must be read the laws 
and principles of the commonwealth at ‘some certain times’ that are set ‘apart from their 
ordinary labour’. The sabbath is taken as a general pedagogical strategy which functions 
through consecration, that is, by setting apart one day from the quotidian toil of ordinary 
life. The day of rest offers the opportunity to ‘take joy also in themselves by lawful 
recreation’.
178
 Thus, Hobbes proposes that a policy of state consecration through the 
apparatus of the ‘sabbath’ is the condition of possibility of the reproduction of the 
commonwealth. But importantly, this is thematised as a problem of memory or 
memorialisation, a theme also taken up in the discussion of Abraham and the role of 
circumcision in the covenant. He generalises the assemblies of the Jewish synagogue as a 
‘school of the Jews’ where the ‘Laws of the nation’ are taught.
179
 They ‘differed not in 
nature, but in name only, from public schools’.
180
 The sabbath was originally a civil or 
political endeavour motivated only towards the ‘acquainting of the people with the 
Commandments which they were to obey’.
181
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In Behemoth, Hobbes asserts the utility of regularly reading the Laws of England 
in congregations in order that the people would ‘know what to doe, for they already know 
what to beleeue’.
182
 This would address the present politico-religious error of 
Christendom, through which individuals independent of the state (Church pastors) are 
allowed to ‘Harangue all the people of a nation at one time, while the State is ignorant of 
what they will say’.
183
 Returning to the metaphor of agriculture, Hobbes notes, that 
instead of cultivating obedience through ‘diligent instruction’, the current independence 
of Church preaching spreads ‘fruitless and dangerous doctrines’ that only terrify and 
amaze the common people. Singling out Christendom, Hobbes notes that for as long as its 
educational faults remain, Christendom ‘will be subiect to these fits of Rebellion’, such 
as those suffered in the 1640s against Charles I.
184
  
In his later writings, Hobbes identifies the origin of these errors in the 
universities, the ‘means and conduits by which the people may receive this instruction’ in 
their political duties.
185
 Because the clergy in the pulpit are the sole conduit by which the 
opinions of the general population are formed and the clergy are educated in the 
universities, then the ‘instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of 
youth in the universities’.
186
 In earlier centuries, emperors and Christian kings had 
mistakenly allowed the pope and Roman clergy to gain control of education.
187
 Hobbes’ 
disdain for the universities is generally directed at their Aristotelian tendencies and the 
resulting mess of theological discourse. But, in Behemoth, he also blames the classical 
works of Cicero and Aristotle for acquainting the people with ‘democracy’.
188
  
Against the Roman Catholics, Hobbes describes the universities as the slow and 
gradual means by which the papacy was able to steal entire kingdoms.
189
 He notes that 
Charlemagne, prompted by Pope Leo III, established a university in Paris (now the 
Sorbonne), dedicated to theology.
190
 This set an example for other rulers, who followed 
with further ‘walled’ institutions dedicated to the arts and administered by the papacy. 
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Through the universities, if he desired, the pope ‘could have impressed any attitudes on 
the minds of generations to come.’
191
 Through control of education, the papacy was able 
to usurp political rule and make citizens ‘hostile to their own kings’.
192
 By invoking fear 
in the people, they terrified them into an obedience of the pope’s canons.
193
 And they 
made use of the obscurity of Aristotelian methods of philosophy ‘to puzzle and entangle 
men with words’.
194
 The result was ‘contempt for kings’ and ‘the common people, freed 
from civil law, went wild’.
195
 The real aim of the universities was purely political: the 
‘maintenance of the Popes Doctrine, and of his Authority over Kings’.
196
 Hobbes notes 
that through Aristotle’s doctrine of contingency the men of the universities ‘make God 




5 The Aporia of Juridical and Pedagogical Authority 
The breadth of the pedagogical authority of the sovereign, however, stands in tension 
with the limits Hobbes usually ascribes to the sovereign’s influence. From the juridical 
standpoint Hobbes insists that the sovereign is unable to act on the internal conscience of 
the subjects.
198
 The sovereign can legislate and obligate the subject to perform acts but is 
simply unable to have such an effect on inward beliefs and opinions. Nevertheless, this is 
precisely what is demanded of pedagogical authority and what the universities 
demonstrated was possible, evident in Hobbes’ own criticisms. In De Cive, since the 
natural law was ‘innate’ in individuals, Hobbes presents his role, somewhat naively, as a 
rational and scientific uncovering of the natural law of politics: a ‘law which God has 
revealed to all men through his eternal word which is innate in them, namely by natural 
reason.’
199
 Reflecting a transformation in perspective, in the 1660s the current education 
system is described as a ‘trojan horse’ of sedition. In earlier works Hobbes implicitly 
depicts politics as a problem of reason admitting correct solutions. In De Cive, this 
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demands unquestioned ‘simple obedience’. But, in the later texts this is relinquished for a 
much weaker ‘will to obey’. Hobbes forsakes the demand for outward ritual performance 
and advocates charity, love and an inward intention toward obedience. Failures to obey 
are unavoidable, but can be remitted through faith in Christ.
200
 In an ambiguous passage 
Hobbes inverts his usual statement that the sovereign cannot control belief and appears to 
demand precisely that. 
 
[T]he examination of doctrines belonging to the supreme pastor, the 
person which all they that have no special revelation are to believe 





The doctrines that subjects ‘are to believe’ are to be judged and decided by the sovereign. 
The authority of pastor is coincident with the authority of the arbiter or judge of doctrine. 
Hobbes uses a peculiar phrase ‘are to believe’. The subjects of the commonwealth ‘are to 
believe’ doctrines determined by the sovereign. Is this an imperative, an obligation, or a 
statement of fact? The status of this competence ‘belonging’ to the sovereign is also 
ambiguous. Is it a right or legal power, like the sword of justice? In De Cive, the final 
right accorded the sovereign as a result of the contract, was the right ‘to decide which 
opinions and doctrines are inimical to peace and to forbid their being taught.’
202
 
However, the pastoral role in Leviathan is not legitimated by the contract, but jure divino. 
The passage also implies that subjects are obliged to believe the doctrines judged to be 
divine by the sovereign. That is, the sovereign is required to legislate with respect to 
articles of belief. But Hobbes insists that belief is an ‘inward thought’ or ‘internal 
faith’.
203
 These are ‘exempted from all human jurisdiction’ since they are unknowable, 
and more importantly not under our voluntary control.
204
 Hobbes is aware of the aporia 
produced here, but unable to find a suitable solution.  
In the anthropology of part one of Leviathan, Hobbes describes the interrelations 
between knowledge, faith, belief and opinion through a discussion of discourse.
205
 He 
notes there are two types of discourse: one begins with definitions and produces 
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 The other, which begins with contemplation or incomplete 
chains of presumptions, is called ‘opinion’. In belief, one holds two opinions, one 
regarding the content of the discourse, and another regarding the person from whom the 
discourse is received. For Hobbes, our belief relies on the faith we hold in the person who 
relays a discourse, where this discourse is traced to either some contemplation of the 
individual or words of some other individual. This entails that to have a belief based on 
faith we must know personally the individual from whom the discourse originates. In the 
case of Christian doctrine and the words of Christ captured in Scripture, this is clearly 
impossible. After Christ’s ascension we have no grounds for belief based on Christ’s 
words or his scribes alone. There are two alternatives: reputation and authority. In the 
immediate centuries after the ascension, the Christians relied on the ‘reputation of their 
pastors’ as guarantors of articles of faith. However, after the unification of Christianity 
with civil sovereignty by Constantine, reputation is superseded by delegated authority, 
implying the legal determination of belief.
207
 
 Hobbes attempts to avoid this difficulty by requiring only ‘the captivity of our 
understanding’ rather than complete ‘submission of the intellectual faculty.’ To captivate 
the understanding, which demonstrates a ‘will to obedience’, is simply to accept a 
proposition without scrutiny and to forbear contradiction. Even so, the understanding 
itself is one part of the intellectual faculty and these, ‘are not in our power to change’.
208
 
The latter implies that one cannot actively captivate the understanding and hence cannot 
simply will to believe doctrines based on legal authority. Unable to offer a solution, 
Hobbes simply shifts tack and instead notes that the ‘causes why men believe any 
Christian doctrine are various’. He rejects the papal claims of infallibility and protestant 
claims of the ‘testimony of private spirit’ as mistaking belief for knowledge.
209
 Offering 
an alternative, Hobbes cites education and suggests that it is only by indoctrination that 
‘we believe the Bible to be the word of God’.
210
 In Christian commonwealths the ground 
of belief in Scripture is that subjects ‘are taught it from their infancy’.
211
 However, as he 
notes education is not always successful. Hobbes concludes with a second aporia that the 
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ground of faith is either teaching or the gift of God, but neither is sufficiently effective. 
Teaching fails for lack of a good master and Hobbes denies that God intervenes through 
special providence to each and every individual, which limits the reach of immediate 
gifts.
212
 Ultimately, Hobbes forsakes providing a decisive answer and simply moves on to 
other things. As the critique of the universities demonstrates, in the later works Hobbes 
had come to recognise that it was possible and necessary to influence belief. Nonetheless, 
it broke with his materialist anthropology and ontology, in which the deliberation of the 
will is merely a mechanism of addition and subtraction, and thus it could not be 
integrated into his systematic philosophy.  
 
* * * 
 
In this chapter, I demonstrated the significance of Hobbes’ theory of religion for his 
articulation of a rational theory of authority. This is structured by a distinction between 
the particular history and cultural specificity of Christianity and the general laws of 
religio-politics that pertain to all political forms and find expression in Christianity and 
other particular religions. I showed that Hobbes reinterprets Christian Sacred history in 
order to reject the Catholic claims of authority and to support a model of civil religion in 
which Christianity is subordinate to the juridical authority of the sovereign. In addition, I 
argued that Hobbes appeals to a conception of divine right rationalised through a religio-
political scientia civilis, in order to support the pedagogical authority of the sovereign as 
‘supreme pastor’. The increasing importance of the pedagogical authority in later works, 
marks a growing tension in Hobbes’ attempt to limit sovereign influence to the sphere of 
outward performance and in the 1660s Hobbes acknowledges explicitly that ideological 
influence is an unavoidable facet of political rule. Hobbes’ trajectory points towards the 
theories of nationalist politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries discussed in the 
following chapters. For instance, Fichte’s nationalist politics, despite its organicist basis, 
share certain traits with Hobbes’ later political theory.  
 In the broader survey of Hobbes’ oeuvre, constituting part one, I drew out the 
multi-faceted structure of legitimacy and authority developed progressively in Hobbes’ 
political theory. We can identify five distinct themes associated with forms of authority 
and their mechanisms of legitimation. (i) While Hobbes' attempt to theorise a robust 
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logical conception of the contract remains primary for his legacy, the artificial power 
thereby produced (a quasi-transcendent arbitrary ruler) remains inadequate to the tasks of 
government. (ii) Hobbes supplements this with a theory of political worship operative 
according to a natural science of power based on a broad reconceptualisation of power as 
a sphere of influence (whether by force, strength, reputation, riches, beauty or rhetoric). 
According to a logic of signification, the concrete display or performance of power 
relations magnifies or cultivates material power. (iii) However, lacking an initial ‘seed’ 
for cultivation, this process is augmented with a ‘democratic’ theory of authorisation 
modelled on theatrical fictions. The individuals of the populace author a fictive person or 
dramatis personae to be played by the natural individual of the sovereign. The 
mechanism legitimates the acts of the sovereign by displacing responsibility to the 
individuals of the populace. (iv) Hobbes reads Scripture and Sacred history through the 
lens of the contract and authorisation engendering the juridical authority of the sovereign: 
the judge, interpreter and arbiter of conflicts and contests. (v) However, the fictive and 
hence ideological basis of authorisation combined with his recognition of the intellectual 
influence wielded by the Catholic Church, drives Hobbes towards education and 
pedagogy and the divine right of ‘supreme pastor’. 
Although Hobbes attempts to eliminate the mystical basis of authority and the 
irrationality of auctoritas, its defining traits reappear within Hobbes’ political structure. 
The dignity, reputation and prestige Cicero links to auctoritas Hobbes displaces to the 
worship of power. The religious sanction of culturally specific practices, whether augury 
and divination or circumcision and coronation are re-interpreted as particular instances of 
general laws of religio-politics. Ultimately it is the ‘divine right’ to form the opinions of 
the populus (in a general sense of the divine) that legitimates the entire political edifice, 
including the contract.  
 The multiple forms, mechanisms and modes of operation of Hobbes’ conception 
of authority stand in stark contrast to the presupposed unity and indivisibility of the 
sovereign. The multiplicity is given form in the array for formulas used by Hobbes to 
describe the Leviathan. As Schmitt recounts, the leviathan, the ‘civitas or respublica is a 
huge man, a huge animal, an artificial being, an animale artificiale, an automaton, or a 
machina’.
213
 One difficulty faced by Hobbes is the need to unify these occasionally 
antithetical theorisations of authority in the body of the sovereign. For instance, from the 
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perspective of the contract, the individual of the sovereign is arbitrary, since, 
foreshadowing Schmitt, the decision is more important than who decides. Nonetheless, in 
the later works the fundamental role of the pedagogical authority given by divine right 
logically precedes the contract. Thus the arbitrary decision on the individual who must 
act as sovereign is always already made.  
In any case, Hobbes’ programme for political education through civil religion is 
echoed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in organic theories of the nation (or Volk) 
and again in the nationalist movements of the twentieth century. The legacy of this logic 
for democratic forms remains contentious. While Voegelin and Gentile attempt to 
distinguish the religio-nationalist legitimation of fascism from its liberal counterparts, 
others such as Michael Billig insist that there is a broad use of such techniques across all 
political regimes of the twentieth century.
214
 In part two, I turn to Carl Schmitt’s writings 
and show how, in the twentieth century context, he develops different approaches to the 
problem of the relation between ideas and external performance emphasising the concrete 
particular, in contrast to the formalist tendencies in Hobbes’ works. 
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Part II : Carl Schmitt 
111 
Chapter 3: Commissary Authority 
 
The terrestrial human tames and 
domesticates animals: elephants, camels, 
hores, hounds, cats, oxen, donkeys and all 
that is his. Fish, on the contrary, are not 





The 250 years between the composition of Hobbes’ political writings and Schmitt's first 
forays into political theory were witness to various political, religious, social, economic 
and technological changes. An important development was the establishment of a 
centralised bureaucratic civil service. This chapter focuses on Schmitt’s attempts to 
elaborate a specific form of bureaucratic authority distinct from Max Weber’s depiction 
of the bureaucrat as a rationalised apolitical instrument. According to Schmitt, the 
legitimacy of the civil service rests on the legacy of hierarchical privilege.
2
 Its authority 
and dignity is derived from a politics of ‘representation’ based on the monarchical 
principle, rather than scientific rationality as Weber claimed. 
Although Schmitt asserts that there exists an analogy between the monarchical 
principle and the democratic principle, he insists that the political structures engendered 
by each are not simply transposable.
3
 Especially where questions of authority and 
legitimacy are concerned, no simple substitution of democratic concepts for monarchical 
alternatives is possible. Instead, any transition from one to the other also requires a 
change in ‘structure and content’.
4
 That is, the systemic structure of political forms, 
institutions, beliefs and activities does not remain intact with a hegemonic shift from the 
monarchical principle, associated with concepts such as honour, privilege and hierarchy, 
to the democratic principle, where the latter demands the equality of all citizens and the 
abolition of privilege.  
While we could question how strongly this structural dualism is actually operative 
in Schmitt’s works, I accept that, to a certain extent, it is efficacious. As a result, I posit 
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that Schmitt oeuvre can be periodised, at least loosely, as follows: (i) the early writings of 
1917-1923; (ii) the ‘democratic writings’ of 1923-1932; (iii) the Nazi writings of 1933-
1939; and (iv) the late writings after 1939. Works concerned with the monarchical 
principle bookend his oeuvre, including both the early and late writings. This 
periodisation is reflected in my division of part two of the dissertation into two chapters. 
This chapter focuses on the monarchical structure and chapter four on the structures 
arising from the democratic and Führer principles. For multiple reasons the Nazi writings 
are difficult to classify and their relation to Schmitt’s other work is contested. However, 
since Schmitt explicitly asserts that the Fuhrerprinzip represents an alternative paradigm 
of rule, I have treated these separately in the final section of chapter four. 
In the present chapter, I focus on Schmitt’s attempts to articulate a distinct 
conception of bureaucratic authority within the theoretical framework defined by the 
monarchical principle, but in the context defined by the rise of mass politics in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. These attempts can be interpreted in two ways: 
either as (i) an attempt to buttress and strengthen traditional, conservative forms of 
authority or as (ii) an alternative conservative form, which is no longer strictly 
‘traditional’. Despite Schmitt’s affinities with the counter-revolutionary ideas of Maistre 
or Bonald, he was quite critical of the traditionalism of the Restoration.
5
 He complained 
that the attempt to fight the ‘activist spirit of the French Revolution with ideas such as 
tradition and custom and with the belief that history progresses slowly’ produced a 
‘complete negation of natural reason’ and left one in a state of ‘moral passivity’.
6
 
Moreover, Schmitt often depicted traditionalism as ‘an irrational rejection of every 
intellectually conscious decision’.
7
 Hence, while Schmitt’s alternative remains faithful to 
the foundations of privilege and honour central to monarchical politics and it revives 
argumentative strategies used in the divine right doctrine of the Middle Ages, it also 
manifests, in other respects, a break with ‘traditionalism’ and an attempt to theorise a 
rationalist conception of hierarchical authority. 
 My contention in this chapter is that Schmitt’s monarchical writings are unified 
by his attempts to elaborate a distinctive concept of authority based on the ‘personal 
office’ of the Roman dictator and Jean Bodin’s commissar. For clarity, I refer to this 
nominally as ‘commissary authority’. For Schmitt, it represents an alternative rationalist 
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‘traditional’ authority and I claim that this model can be identified in multiple works and 
contexts: in Dictatorship (1921) it provides a model for the civil servant of the state; in 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) it defines the relations between the 
Church and state; and in Nomos of the Earth (1950) it is key to the historical and 
theoretical role of the katechon. I argue that this authority is composed of two distinct 
elements: a concrete task and an independent hierarchy of privilege. Through their 
articulation, Schmitt attempts to constitute a limited, finite form of authority, attuned to 
the particular, and which is capable of preserving the ‘humanity’ of the bureaucracy and 
overcoming the reduction of the state to an impersonal and mechanical apparatus. 
Further, I suggest that while this model is constructed from a broad variety of precedents, 
including Christian, pagan, monarchical and imperial, an important source is the 
Medieval doctrine of divine right. For Schmitt, the foundation of authority is divinely 
guaranteed custom (Sittlichkeit, Ethos, nomos), the origin of all right and justice (Recht 
and Gerechtichkeit). 
 The chapter is divided into five sections. In the first, I provide a context for 
Schmitt’s account of commissary authority through a brief sketch of Max Weber’s 
canonical tripartite taxonomy of legitimate Herrschaft, his conception of bureaucracy and 
his depiction of the routinisation of authority. In the second section, I extract from 
Dictatorship and related texts Schmitt’s initial theorisation of ‘commissary authority’ 
based on the Roman dictator and Jean Bodin’s commissar. I demonstrate that with this 
concept he aimed to save the civil service from the threat of instrumentalisation. I show 
that the specificity of this authority is derived from two elements: the commission or 
specific task to be completed and the presupposed hierarchy. In the third section, I show 
how these are fleshed out in a Catholic-theological and juridical context in the subsequent 
works: Political Theology and Roman Catholicism and Political Form. I demonstrate that 
these continue to develop themes from Dictatorship and incorporate an ambiguous notion 
of human dignity [Würde]. In the fourth section, I turn to the 1950s works including 
Nomos of the Earth and Schmitt’s references to the concept of the katechon. I 
demonstrate that for Schmitt, the katechon embodies a commissary authority that avoids 
assimilation to Dosteovsky’s Grand Inquisitor, a common foil for Schmitt.
8
 In the final 
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section, I argue that Schmitt’s work exhibits unmistakable resonances with divine right 
doctrine, in particular, that described by John Neville Figgis. 
Across Hobbes’ works we witnessed a development from the concrete 
presentation of authority in ceremony to the need for explicit educational (ideological) 
intervention in the form of a civil religion. While Schmitt remains in the sphere of 
ideology, he rejects the pedagogic despotism advocated by Hobbes (and later by 
Rousseau, Fichte and others).
9
 Instead of imposing a rationalist political education like 
August Comte’s religion of humanity, Schmitt reasserts the existing political dimensions 
of Christian religion, in particular Catholicism, and resurrects aspects of divine right 
doctrine. Although both Hobbes and Schmitt ultimately rely on divine right, Schmitt’s 
revival of traditional precursors contrasts with Hobbes’ attempt to integrate it with his 
scientific and geometric vision of politics. Similarly, in Schmitt’s democratic writings 
(discussed in the next chapter), the participatory aspect of acclamation recalls Hobbes’ 
use of ceremony, while rejecting the formalist vision of rationality on which it is based.  
 
1 Max Weber and the Bureaucratic Apparatus 
Like many of his contemporaries, Schmitt was significantly influenced by the works of 
Max Weber. In particular, the legacy of Weber’s taxonomy of Herrschaft, suggests it was 
a likely reference point (if polemically) for Schmitt. A brief account of Weber’s tripartite 
ideal types: charismatic, traditional and legal-rational authority, thus promises to 
contextualise Schmitt’s account of commissary authority.
10
 On a number of issues 
Schmitt and Weber were largely aligned.
11
 In contrast to figures such as Otto von Gierke 
who depicted Genossenschaft (cooperation, fellowship) as a primary mode of human 
interaction, both Schmitt and Weber describe some type of Herrschaft (domination, rule 
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or authority) as unavoidable.
12
 In addition, many of Schmitt criticisms of Weimar politics 
are foreshadowed in Weber’s 1919 lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’ and article ‘The 
President of the Reich’. Weber decries the lack of unity at the federal level and the 
reduction of politics and politicians to ‘horse-trading’ and ‘political shopkeepers’ 
respectively.
13
 Schmitt’s critique of Political Romanticism, took up similar themes, 
derogating liberal politicians as ‘servile functionaries’ that could be ‘used by any political 
system’.
14
 Schmitt and Weber were largely in agreement that the spread of ideas typical 
of liberal-rationalist enlightenment would result in a mechanisation of politics.
15
  
Nevertheless, there are key points of divergence between them.
16
 Weber depicts 
the transformation of politics and the state as a largely unavoidable result of 
‘rationalisation’, denying the possibility of identifying a ‘Catholic rationality’ in contrast 
to ‘scientific rationality’ as Schmitt does. Weber’s diagnosis of the ‘disenchantment 
[Entzauberung] of modernity’ implicitly presupposes the veracity of the equation of 
rationality with ‘instrumental reason’.
17
 The development and rationalisation of 
administration is motivated by broadly economic factors: the division of labour and 
efficiency. The result is a system of impersonal administrative offices distributed on the 
basis of merit and remunerated by fixed salary, yielding the modern ‘civil servant’. A 
figure whose ‘moral discipline and self-denial’ maintain the existence of the ‘whole 
apparatus’ of modern administrative government.
18
 European history thus represents the 
progressive transition from an age of magic, personalism, religion and superstition, to the 
modern age of sterile, disenchanted science, bureaucracy, impersonal office and 
economism.
19
 It was the inevitability of this progressive instrumentalisation that Schmitt 
rejected. Contrary to the progressivist philosophy of history on which Weber’s account is 
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based and its concomitant vision of rationality, Schmitt claimed that there was an 
alternative alive in both juristic and Catholic thought. Against Weber, Schmitt attempts to 
save the civil servant (or at least some of them) from the fate of instrumentalisation by 
defending a concrete conception of reason.  
One lasting legacy of Weber’s work is his tripartite account of the ideal types of 
legitimate Herrschaft (authority): charismatic, traditional and legal-rational. Charismatic 
authority, Weber generally depicts as the original source of all authority and is 
exemplified in the magician, the religious prophet, the demagogue and the hero. The 
charismatic individual is an exceptional figure and is often attributed special powers or 
qualities. The source of charisma is an inherent quality of the individual, assumed to be 
given by grace of God or divine intervention, but typically, by unknowable 
mechanisms.
20
 The magical charismatics of pre-history are the source of all authority. 
Inheriting an antithesis between charisma and law from Rudolf Sohm’s Kirchenrecht, 
Weber accords charismatic authority an anarchic essence, one opposed to all order or 
patriarchal domination and independent of all routine occupation or family obligation.
21
 It 
is antithetical to doctrine and dogma and dispenses salvation only by personal 
mechanisms.
22
 It is governed only by the personal call of the prophet, embodied in a 
mission and known through revelation.
23
 However, there is an essential instability and 
precariousness to charismatic authority, due to its connection with an individual and lack 
of formalisation and thus it tends to be routinised into one of the other two types of 
authority. 
 Traditional authority, Weber associates specifically with the ‘irrational’ and 
legitimation through duration, repetition and habituation.
24
 Its primary model is the 
family, a supposedly ‘organic’ or naturally developed, ordered hierarchy oriented by the 
patriarchal head. The lord and vassal, the feudal estates of the Middle Ages and the 
princedom are the primary examples cited by Weber. There are two distinct components 
to traditional authority, a domain of specific norms and rules and a relatively open 
personal will or prerogative of the patriarch.
25
 Both the specific rules and the position of 
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each individual in the hierarchy are legitimated by appeal to the existence of the order 
itself, which is legitimated by a ‘common process of education’. Repetition, habituation 
and education are key to establishing traditional authority as ‘an inviolable norm of 
conduct’. The rules are legitimated by ‘piety for what actually, allegedly or presumably 
has always existed’ and infractions result in ‘magical or religious evils’.
26
 The hierarchy 
is transmitted by tradition and the specific content of norms by appeal to ‘time 
immemorial’. Weber emphasises that this mechanism is ‘irrational’ (in contrast to the 
scientific claims of legal-rational forms) and points to the impossibility of any open 
innovation. Instead, new rules must be introduced under the guise of forgotten, 
rediscovered or now correctly understood existing rules. But in addition, Weber writes 
that alongside the ‘norms of conduct’ given by tradition, there is a personal ‘realm of free 
arbitrariness and favour of the lord’. He suggests that this dualism itself constitutes the 
specific ‘irrationalism’ of traditional authority. One aim of Schmitt’s Dictatorship is to 
recast this secondary sphere of authority as concretely rational.  
 Weber’s depiction of tradition and traditional authority is largely consistent with 
the conservative accounts found in the counter-revolutionary thought of Edmund Burke 
or Joseph de Maistre: education through the arts, theatre and poetry, inculcate the moral 
sentiment required to maintain a structured hierarchy.
27
 Authority is based on habituation, 
a ‘gentle persuasion’, which instils the ‘vital prejudices’ that are required for any durable 
political institution.
28
 In this tradition, the social structure is ultimately irrational, a 
‘mysterious incorporation’ across space and time, that must mould together a ‘permanent 
body composed of transitory parts’.
29
 The guiding force is irrational or at least 
unknowable by man. For Maistre, divine Providence acts as a ‘a secret power that carries 
each individual to his place; otherwise the state could not continue.’
30
 Thus science and 
rational thought has no place in the domain of morality and politics. In this domain, 
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 The final form of Herrschaft, Weber identifies with ‘legality’ and ‘rationality’ and 
depicts as a particularly modern form of legitimation, although with precursors in pre-
modern epochs. It is typified by a reliance on abstract rules and norms, formalisation of 
offices with delimited and specific spheres of operation, impersonal notions of duty to 
office, obedience towards the law itself (rather than any person), a hierarchical structure 
of offices of control and supervision and meritocratic appointment based on competence. 
The operative principles of legitimation include: (i) a drive towards logical generalisation 
and universalisation on a Kantian model such that ‘every body of law consists essentially 
in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally 
established’;
 
and (ii) an ‘economic’ impulse that relies on a claim of expediency, 
exigency or efficiency. Economic factors, such as the division of labour, motivate the 
determination of various aspects including: separate spheres of competence; selection by 
suitability and appointment (rather than election); separation of office and person; 
security of continuous operation by written rules and regulation; specialised training and 
knowledge. The instrumentalised nature of this legitimation is presupposed by the need 
for a charismatic leader at the apex of the hierarchy. The limit of justification by 
efficiency and exigency occurs ‘at the top of the bureaucratic organisation, [where] there 
is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic.’ Weber gives as 
examples both the capitalist entrepreneur and government ministers and a president, who 
possess no ‘technical qualifications’.
32
  
While Schmitt’s conception of commissary authority shares aspects of both 
Weber’s traditional and charismatic ideal types, it resists subsumption into his typology, 
possessing qualities that, for Weber, appear antithetical. Commissary authority is not 
charismatic or anarchical but establishes order on the basis of a given hierarchy. It is not 
traditional but the vector of bureaucratic development itself. It is not irrational, but 
derived from a specific rationality of the particular, the singular concrete situation and 
thus resists the generality of legal-rational authority. In Roman Catholicism, Schmitt 
claims that there exists a distinct form of rationality associated with Roman Catholicism 
and jurisprudence which stands in contrast with the economic and technical sense of 
rationality Weber generally relies on.
33
 There are hints of such an alternative in Weber’s 
marginal and undeveloped remarks on ‘Kadi-justice’ and ‘empirical justice’. Regardless, 
Weber considers these ‘non-bureaucratic’ forms of authority and depicts them as 
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ultimately ‘irrational’. For Weber, the bureaucracy developed through the routinisation of 
other forms of authority. He depicts charismatic authority as the originary or primary 
form of all authority. Although due to its instability, it is inherently short-lived unless 
transformed by routinisation into another form.  
Firstly, it can be transformed by ‘objectification’ into a patrimonial right, 
possessed by a privileged group.
34
 This is depicted as an often necessary acquiescence to 
the needs of the laity, for whom daily exigencies require consideration and concessions. 
For example, in the struggles between the developing priesthood and the laity, one 
primary force operative on the congregation is described as the inherent ‘traditionalism of 
the laity’. Foreshadowing Schmitt’s turn in the 1950s to the concept of nomos, Weber 
correlates traditionalism and agrarian social patterns such that: ‘[t]he more agrarian the 
essential social pattern of a culture [...] the more likely it is that the agrarian elements of 
the population will fall into a pattern of traditionalism.’
35
 The implication is that the daily 
routines of agrarian production are unsuited to the anarchistic tendencies of purely 
charismatic organisations. As I demonstrate in this chapter, Schmitt’s account contests 
the originary role of charisma and argues instead that social hierarchy itself plays a 
primary role. But in addition, Schmitt rejects Weber’s Protestant-inspired narrative in 
which routinisation is correlated with degradation; where an originary inner-worldly or 
affective mode of sanctification is degraded in (Catholic) formal ritual or the ecstatic 
orgy is transformed into a merely ritualistic ‘permanent habitus’.
36
  
Secondly, charismatic authority can be rationalised, motivated by similar factors, 
in particular, the need to acquiesce to more general needs. Although in this case, it is 
transformed into an impersonal rational bureaucracy. It is defined against emotionality or 
sentimentality and develops on the basis of law (principles, rules and norms) that delimit 
and specify the requirements of administrative office.
37
 Authority develops into a form 
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Schmitt rejects these models for the development of the bureaucracy, offering an 
alternative based on an authority exhibiting similarities to Weber’s ‘Kadi-justice’ and 
‘empirical justice’. The former Weber defines as ‘informal decisions based on concrete 
ethical or otherwise practical value-judgements’, which is not based on any rational basis. 
The latter is formal but based on ‘analogies’ with reference to historical precedents. 
Weber designates England’s legal system as a ‘less rational and less bureaucratic system 
of justice’ based on the continued influence of these alternative decision making 
methods. From this perspective, Schmitt’s account of commissary authority appears as an 
attempt to demonstrate the rationality of precisely the empirical, ethical sense of justice 
and bureaucracy dismissed by Weber. 
 
2 The Commissary Dictator 
Schmitt’s alternate history of bureaucratic development forms one theme of his 
monograph Dictatorship (1921), a ‘systematic contextualisation of dictatorship’.
39
 He 
traces a chronological theoretical-history of the office of the dictator, focusing on its 
transformation from an original ‘commissarial’ model to the ‘sovereign dictator’ of the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. The work intervenes in the debate over the legitimate 
capacities of Reichspräsident under the Weimar constitution, but also offers a counter-
narrative to Weber’s progressivist account of the development, nature and fate of the civil 
service itself.
40
 Focussing on the concrete commissio or task, Schmitt defends an 
alternative image of the authority of the bureaucrat. It is neither the absolute and 
perpetual authority of the sovereign, nor the authority of the regular office, a legally 
circumscribed potestas. Schmitt’s alternative attempted both (i) to overcome the threat of 
‘instrumental reason’, the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, that led towards the 
instrumentalisation of the state apparatus, and (ii) imagine a limited form of authority that 
would preserve the ‘inexhaustible creative capacity of man’.
41
 This alternative is 
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constructed from two models: the dictator of the Roman republic and the commissar in 
Jean Bodin’s Six Books of the Republic.  
Schmitt’s aim to save the bureaucracy from instrumentalisation is announced 
explicitly in an earlier essay, ‘Diktatur und Belagerungszustand’ (‘Dictator and State of 
Siege’) (1916). Schmitt makes an emphatic defence of the administrative functions of the 
state, assigning it a primary and primordial role. He asserts that separation of the 
legislative and executive functions transforms the administration into an ‘obedient’ and 
‘subaltern’ figure, merely the ‘arm’ or the tool of the legislature:  
 
The administration is more than just the execution of positive legal 
provisions, the law is only the framework within which the creative 
activity of the administration takes place. The historical 
development was not simply that first the law as consummate will 
was spoken and then it would be executed. The beginning of all 
state activity is administration: legislation and jurisdiction are only 




Schmitt criticises the asymmetry produced by the separation of the legislative and 
executive. The division itself derogates administration to the role of a tool or instrument 
of the superior organ of the body, the legislature. In contrast, the commissar embodies an 
alternative form of authority rationally attuned to the concrete situation. Schmitt suggests 
that only such an alternative can counter the technical-economic vision of rationality 
which renders the civil service a ‘compliant administrative apparatus’.
43
 
The structure of Schmitt’s argument is revealed in his attempt to recode the 
dynamic of commissary authority into the schema of an Hegelian Aufhebung. Schmitt 
depicts the dictator as the necessary moment of Hegelian completion, the result of a 
process of immanent conceptual development beginning with the military commander.
44
 
In the first moment, the military commander is posited as the immediate ‘undifferentiated 
unity of administration’ that responds unreflectively to the factual situation, the actual 
state of siege. In the first negation, the immediacy of command during the state of siege is 
put in question demanding the division into legislation and executive. However, in the 
reassertion of the concrete ‘power of the facts’ in an actual state of siege, the logic 
demands either a reversion to the military commander or second a negation embodied in 
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 Schmitt claims that in dictatorship the division of powers is itself sublated 
[aufhebt]. That is, overcome but at the same time presupposed. The dictator does not 
return to a sphere of immediate administration annihilating the separation, but admits the 
existence of law and acts only because ‘the means provided by law are …. no longer 
sufficient.’
46
 As I demonstrate in the following, for Schmitt, the condition of possibility 
of the commissary dictator is the recognition of two parallel spheres of legitimate state 
activity. The first is general and formal activity via ‘law,’ but the second is neither 
general nor formal, but attuned to the particular concrete object or need. In Bodin these 
parallel spheres are engendered in the distinction between droit, law in the proper sense 
and the ordonnance, the particular decree or ordinance of the prince. Only in the latter 
sphere can a ‘person’ respond to the particularity of the concrete situation that escapes the 
generality of the law.
47
 
The need for the dictator emerges from the reassertion of the priority of objective 
reality over the idealism of legality. Schmitt insists there is something of the factual that 
exceeds general legislation: ‘the power [Macht] of the facts’.
48
 This demand originates in 
the particular, the place, the time or the occasion. Schmitt’s position has certain affinities 
with those of counter-revolutionaries such as Burke or Maistre who also asserted the 
inadequacy of liberal-rational science to moral and political reality.
49
 Schmitt 
counterposes commissary authority against Locke’s bias for the law. He claims that for 
Locke, sheer force [Gewalt] or power [Macht] and the factual [Tatsachen] are 
meaningless for authority and law. They correspond to the ‘way of beasts’, only the law 
gives authority.
50
 Countering Locke, Schmitt argues that there are certain occasions when 
objective reality reasserts itself and only the decision of a particular individual, 
possessing the ‘creative capacity’ of man can address its demands. This requires that the 
will of the particular individual must be distinguished from the will of the law. As I 
discuss in more detail below, the occlusion of this distinction, manifest in both the 
plenitudo potestatis of Pope Innocent III and the ‘general will’ of Rousseau’s The Social 
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Contract, is one factor driving the transition from the commissarial dictatorship to the 
sovereign dictator.  
The significance of the commissar is evident in Schmitt’s remarks on the 
degraded form of the ‘people’s commissars during the French Revolution’. Schmitt 
contrasts the civil servants of the Middle Ages with the centralised bureaucracy which 
developed after the establishment of the Comité de salut public. He implies the former 
acted in the manner of true commissars. The latter, however, are reduced to mere 
instruments of the central body. Through the expansion of monitoring and supervision, 
foreshadowing Schmitt’s criticisms of ‘oversight’ in later works, ‘[a]ll agencies and civil 
servants were subjected to the direct control of the Comité de salut public’. The authority 
of the commissar was replaced through centralisation with a logic of control and 
surveillance, in which the ‘public authorities… become, without exception, unconditional 
instruments.’ The ‘independent decisions’ demanded of the commissar were replaced by 
a logic of centralisation, in which the commissars must ‘report back to the Comité 
regularly’. For Schmitt, the revolution constructed a great ‘machine of government’ that 




In Schmitt’s Political Romanticism published two years earlier, he detects the 
same ‘relative indifference’ to the substantive content in the aesthetic realm. Like the 
machine of government, the ‘romantic quasi argument can justify every state of affairs’.
52
 
In charting the political career of Adam Mueller, Schmitt’s exemplary romantic 
politician, it is Mueller’s flexibility and amenability to whoever happens to be in power, 
that he criticises. Of course, Schmitt himself is often accused of a similar indifference.
53
 
Nevertheless, in Political Romanticism, Schmitt depicts romantic opportunism as the 
aesthetic complement to liberal political thought. Both are dominated by an infinite 
deferral, the ‘state of eternal becoming and possibilities that are never consummated’. 




In Weimar era Germany, Locke’s position was occupied by Hans Kelsen with his 
attempts to circumscribe all authority by legal norms, rules and procedural limits, 
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instrumentalising the state as a ‘machine of government’. Against Kelsen, Schmitt’s 
revival of the dictator reasserts that ‘the authority of the state cannot be separated from its 
value’.
55
 But what is specific to commissary authority that avoids this 
instrumentalisation? Schmitt relies on two distinct elements: the idea of a concrete task 
and the presupposition of a social hierarchy. Schematically, these determine both ‘what 
must be done’ and ‘who must do it’ and are given various articulations: in Dictatorship, 
the commission and normal situation; in Roman Catholicism, the papal mandate and a 
Christian conception of dignity; in Nomos of the Earth, the task of the katechon 
(defending against the antichrist) and the order of the nomos. In each case, Schmitt 
emphasises the personal nature of the relation between the commissioner and commissar. 
Multiple terms are used to characterise this relation. But the result is ambiguous and in 
Dictatorship the specificity of the relation remains unclear. The commissar is the 
‘prince’s deputy [Stellvertreter des Fürsten],’ or ‘Untertanen’ with an ‘entrusted power 
[Macht]’.
56
 He cites Hobbes, who describes the dictator as a ‘servant’ or ‘minister’ who 
merely ‘exercises’ [Ausubt] the power [Macht] of the Sovereign.
57
 Referring to the legate 
of the pope, the relation of Stellvertretung is treated synonymously with representation 
[Repräsentation].
58
 Foreshadowing a formulation found in Roman Catholicism, the 
commissar is the personal representative of the commissioner.
59
 As a ‘personal 
representative’ the commissar must ‘act vicariously’ on behalf of the commissioner. 
60
 
The emphasis on the individual person marks a break with counter-revolutionaries 
such as Maistre, Bonald or Burke. For these traditionalists, whether it was common law, 
Providence, or the nation, the final source of reason was a supra-individual entity. But for 
Schmitt, the individual person constitutes a point of singularity, an excess beyond 
mechanistic science. The person is accorded a unique capacity to intervene in the sphere 
of causality.
61
 Schmitt distinguishes his conception of the individual person by 
juxtaposing two models of the relation between the individual and the state. In the 
rationalist model he associates with Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau, the individual is 
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something finite and limited and hence can be subsumed by the state.
62
 For example, the 
state is given form in the unlimited mortal God of Hobbes’ leviathan and the collective 
will of Rousseau. However, in Schmitt’s alternative, adopted from Christian natural law, 
the individual is unlimited and independent of the finite and limited state and society. 
According to Christian natural law,  
 
[the] individual is superior to any limitation and ascription; superior 
to any allocation of his/her value, the individual is the bearer of an 
immortal soul, created and redeemed by God alone. State and 




This line of thought is further developed in Political Theology, in a surprisingly Kantian 
fashion through the concept of the ‘legal form’ and the human capacity for decision or 
judgement. This is discussed in the following section. The specificity of commissary 
authority is determined by two aspects: the task and the hierarchy. 
 
(i) The Task 
Schmitt draws on Livy’s History of Rome for a model of the dictator.
64
 Demonstrating 
both aspects (hierarchy and task), Livy notes that only ‘men of consular dignity’ could be 
selected for the dictator, one who was ‘installed for some specific purpose’ whether that 
was ‘the task of dissolving [a] dangerous situation’, ‘organising a people’s assembly,’ or 
some other task.
65
 Schmitt passes quickly over the abuses of the office of dictator by 
Sulla and Caesar and centers his account on Jean Bodin’s Six Books. Bodin distinguishes 
the commissary dictator from both (i) the absolute sovereignty of the prince, an 
absolutely unlimited and potentially arbitrary form of authority constantly at risk of 
degenerating into tyranny and (ii) the potestas of a determinate office, an authority 
attached to a specific set of regulated competencies. Instead the commissary dictator ‘has 
an extraordinary duty, defined by a specific mandate’.
66
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Through the concrete task, which could be various and often far-reaching, Schmitt 
claims the power of the commissary dictator remains limited.
67
 As examples of this 
limited authority, he cites the commissar of service, the commissar of business, 
commissars of reformation and commissars of action. In the papacy of the thirteenth 
century commissars were commissioned by Pope Innocent III with major ‘restructurings 
of the ecclesial organism’ including reforms and interference into the ecclesial functional 
hierarchies.
68
 In the sixteenth century, commissary functionaries ‘implemented the 
central power of the state and eliminated local self-government’.
69
 Against Weber's thesis 
of systematic rationalisation, Schmitt claims ad hoc intervention by commissars is the 
primary vector of bureaucratic development. In ‘all states, at the origin of their 
development, they do not use regular officials, rather only commissars are used.’
70
 Thus 
in reforming the state, one must rely on ‘extraordinary commissars [Beauftragter]’.
71
 
Only the existence of the sovereign is presupposed, not a state organisation (ie. the 
constitution). However, the distinguishing criteria is the particularity of the goal.  
 The sovereign, in contrast, has only a general aim. Dictatorship and sovereignty 
are juxtaposed in Schmitt’s discussion of Cromwell. He attempts to distinguish the initial 
commissary role assigned by the Long Parliament from the later ‘sovereign’ role adopted 
by Cromwell. According to Schmitt the latter lacked the specific interventionist character 
required for a dictatorship.
72
 Similarly, he distinguishes the legal [rechtliche] nature of 
dictatorship from the police state on the basis of the latter’s ‘general task of 
administration’ which relies only on legal office and lacks ‘the idea of a situation that 
ought to be created’.73 However, as I demonstrate in section four, the concept of the 
katechon functions to transform the otherwise general aim of administration into a 
concrete task to restrain the antichrist.
74
 
The commissar’s attunement to the ‘occasion’ appears to align Schmitt’s position 
with that of the opportunism of romanticism and technical rationality he criticised in 
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 Schmitt’s focus on the task or goal threatens to prioritise 
precisely the instrumentalism captured in the ‘three elements of rationalism, technicality 
and the executive’ through which Machiavelli understood the dictator.
76
 Schmitt attempts 
to distance his position from this technical understanding by demanding publicity over an 
arcana imperii.
77
 He claims Machiavelli’s technical thought inevitably leads to arcana.
78
 
In this tradition, politics is turned into a ‘secret teaching’ or mystified science.
79
 Against 
Arnold Clapmar, Justus Lipsius and the arcana imperii, Schmitt cites the publicity of 
Bodin’s commissar. The commissar is a ‘public person [öffentliche Person] who is 
empowered externally’.
80
 The public ‘representative’ character of the commissar prevents 
Machiavelli’s reduction of the commissary authority to an arcana.
81
  
To distinguish the commissar from another public figure, the ‘regular official’, 
Schmitt focusses on their legal bases. The basis of the commissar is the personal 
ordinance or decree of the sovereign rather than general law.
82
 The commissar is a 
personal representative of the sovereign, whereas the regular officer has a remit 
circumscribed by general rules and procedures specified by law. The regular office 
inherits a permanent character from the objective nature of law and tends to be treated as 
an abstract right, possessed or owned by the officer. In contrast, the concrete singularity 
of the commission lacks this ‘permanent character’.
83
 The mandate of the commissar is 
not a ‘subjective right’.
84
 It is a precarium and can be revoked at any time. The regular 
official has an abstract, legally circumscribed remit on the content of their actions. The 
limits take the form of general procedural requirements. Their duty is determined on the 
model of the subsumption of a particular under a general law or principle. Schmitt 
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describes the decision of the regular official as ‘just a concretisation of a decision already 
entailed by the law.’
85
  
The limits on commissary authority, however, operate instead as ‘concrete’ 
temporal or spatial restrictions. The authority of the dictator has a specific duration and is 
attuned to a particular problem. Schmitt insists that the law is not annihilated by the 
dictator, but merely put aside temporarily in order to be protected.
86
 Schmitt admits that 
the commissar, based on an arbitrary ordinance of the commissioner, ‘remains 
nevertheless a direct tool of the concrete and alien will of someone else’. Despite this, 
since he is not given abstract laws, but simply a task, a ‘concrete result’ that must be 
achieved, Schmitt claims that the dictator is left with a greater degree of freedom in 
producing that result.
87
 Like the military commander, the commissar ‘is given freedom in 
the choice of means’.
88
 This provides ‘certain legal possibilities [bestimmte rechtliche 
Möglichkeiten]’ and opens up a space for personal creativity. The dictator can deliberate 
and ‘take all measures without having to consult any advisory or executive body’.
89
 
However, in order to achieve this task, the dictator is clearly dependent on an existing 
apparatus of the state. To facilitate the freedom of the dictator, the ‘organs of execution’ 
must offer unconditional obedience.
90
 Schmitt’s point seems to be that while the state can 
persist in a state of stasis through regular offices, in order to intervene via reform or in the 
face of concrete difficulties another personal authority, like the Reichspräsident, 
irreducible to Weber’s legal-rational authority, is required. 
If the regular official can be measured against norms of procedure or legal 
standards, the only possible judgement of the acts of the commissary dictator is whether 
‘they have achieved their goal’. As Schmitt writes ‘only the goal [Zweck] governs’.
91
 
Schmitt pushes to its radical endpoint the realist political formula that the end justifies the 
means.
92
 It is not a question of legally determined rights or competencies. The only 
measure is the ‘appropriate’: ‘[e]verything that is appropriate in the actual 
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circumstances’. Whatever is deemed necessary to produce the ‘concrete result in a 
concrete case’.
93
 For Schmitt, the dictator cannot be measured against any other standard 
of action.  
However, Schmitt is faced with an aporia of obedience and autonomy. Despite the 
autonomy of decision on means, the dictator must remain indifferent to the goal itself.
94
 
Their obedience to the goal resembles the ambivalence of the technical engineer, who 
fulfills equally demands for ‘a silk blouse or poison gas’.
95
 As a ‘meat inspector’, 
commissar of the police, envoy or dictator, the specific task given by order from the 
sovereign is not to be rationally questioned.
96
 In order to preserve the autonomy of the 
commissar, the crisis must be immediately actual, but the mediation of the commissioner 
precludes this necessary presumption. Schmitt struggles to deal with this difficulty in his 
forced reading of Bodin on the issue. Schmitt admits that Bodin ‘portrays the [regular] 
official as being free and the commissar as being dependent’.
97
 Bodin presumes that the 
more abstract remit of law leaves the officer a greater degree of independence, compared 
with the immediate demands of the sovereign, for whom the commissar is ‘like a 
privately hired executive’. To preserve the creative ‘humanity’ of the commissar, Schmitt 
weakly counters this with the claim that ‘the commissar is apparently [anscheinend] less 
bound, and therefore freer than the regular official, who must not go beyond the 
framework of legally standardised activity [gesetzlich normierten Tätigkeit].’
98
 Schmitt’s 
defence of a non-instrumental bureaucracy relies precisely on the actual freedom of the 
commissar. Failing to substantiate this re-reading of Bodin, Schmitt quickly moves on. 
However, this difficulty remains in the later works, discussed below, insofar as the Last 
Judgement and tasks assigned the katechon are unquestionable, but mediated by the pope. 
 
(ii) The Hierarchy 
Throughout Dictatorship, a condition of possibility of commissary authority is a pre-
existing hierarchy. The commissar inherits a certain independent authority from the 
existing order, which is supplemented by the commission in the concrete case. The 
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commissary authority is parasitic on traditional authority, in the Roman context it was 
understood that only the senate could act as commissioner (so to speak) and only one of 
the two consuls could be appointed as commissar (dictator).
99
 Thus the preexistence of 
both the senate and the consulship is prerequisite for the dictator. Although the dictator is 
an actor of the extraordinary or exceptional concrete situation, Schmitt claims they 
remain dependent in a fundamental manner on the hierarchy of this ‘normal situation’ 
and a transcendent authority who can function as the source of a commission. In the 
1950s works, the turn to nomos attempts to provide a non-arbitrary ground for the 
hierarchy on the basis of agriculture. 
In the ecclesiastical sphere the papal plenitudo potestatis plays this role. The 
ecclesiastical commissar relies on the ‘normal situation’, the existence of ‘the churches’s 
dignity, justice, public tranquility and the common good’.
100
 While an extensive 
hierarchy of privileges could exist, all that was strictly necessary was the 
predetermination of the sovereign. For instance, the authority of the legate was derived 
from the person of the pope, such that the ‘legate acts vicariously in the name of our 
master, the pope’. Authority flowed from the papal sovereign into his personal 
representatives and again into their subordinates.
101
 However, as his own examples 
indicate (Cromwell, Caesar, Sulla) and despite his claims that the commissary authority is 
finite, Schmitt is haunted by the ineffectivity of these limits. Through the task, the 




Schmitt avoids this issue, in order to maintain a marked distinction between the 
commissary dictator and the sovereign dictator, a strategic move in his attempt to 
construct an elaborate critique of the abilities of the collective subject. In this respect, 
Dictatorship can be read as a historico-theoretical proof of the incapacity or debility of 
the pouvoir constituant to actually act or decide. For Schmitt, the blurring (or ‘transition’) 
between the commissary dictator and the sovereign dictator demonstrates that the 
democratic collective subject is unable to issue a commission in the immediacy of the 
concrete situation. This transition, he claims, accompanied the shift to a broadly 
‘democratic’ political model after the French Revolution. The transition to the sovereign 
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dictator is demanded by the distinct character, nature and capacities of the democratic 
equivalent of the sovereign, the pouvoir constituant. Further emphasising the ‘structural 
and conceptual’ differences between monarchical and democratic political forms, Schmitt 
writes that ‘the direct commissar of the people, unlike the commissar of the absolutist 
prince, no longer has a stable reference point for his dependence’.
103
  
The real strategy of Schmitt’s historical-theoretical contextualisation of the 
dictator is here apparent. Dictatorship is not an ‘attempt juridically to legitimate the 
[revolutionary sovereign dictator] by means of the notion of constituent power’ as Renato 
Cristi claims.
104
 Instead, it demonstrates that the ontological shift to an abstract 
subjectivity of the ‘general will’ eliminates both the capacity of the sovereign to act and 
as a result the possibility of the commissary dictator. The key causes behind this 
transition are (i) the elimination of the distinction between the ordinance and general law, 
which results in the equation of the sovereign will (now in general form) with the law; 
and (ii) the transformation of the political-legal structure, by Sieyès, which introduces a 
caesura between the foundation of authority, the pouvoir constituant and the ‘organs 
invested with state authority’.
105
 As a result the pouvoir constituant, in its absolute 
generality, is radically separate from all particularity and cannot address or intervene in 
any particular sense. For Schmitt, Hobbes avoids this difficulty because he does not 
ontologise the collective entity of the people. Hobbes’ populus is not a pouvoir 
constituant but an actual physical assembly. In Hobbes’ materialist ontology, the 
commissary dictator remains a possibility only if ‘the populus, … that is, all the citizens, 
acting together as a constitutional subject’ can assemble during the dictatorship.
106
 The 
true object of Schmitt’s critique is regularly overlooked in the secondary literature. But in 
Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren, Schmitt returns to this very question: what can a 
‘collective subject’ actually do? Is a collective entity actually a ‘subject’? Schmitt is 
critical of Marxist and socialist literature which simply ‘define the proletariat as a 
collective entity — that is, as a genuine agent’ or that presume that dialectical logic alone 
shows that ‘humanity will become conscious of itself’.
107
 The problem is to demonstrate 
what abilities or capacities (rather than rights) such a collective entity does possess. 
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In the next section, however, I turn to Schmitt’s subsequent works of the 1920s 
where the threat of a Caesarist commissar reappears in the figure of the Grand Inquisitor. 
In addition, in these works Schmitt elaborates on his conception of representation and 
personhood, two themes neglected in Dictatorship. 
  
3 The Dignity of the Representative 
Political Theology and Authority 
To develop a more robust theory of representation and commissary authority, Schmitt 
turns to the Catholic Church. He rejects the secularisation thesis of Protestant liberals 
such as Weber. Influenced by his Catholic upbringing and counter-revolutionary thinkers 
such as Louis de Bonald, Schmitt insists that the Church and the papacy must continue to 
play a role in politics. In his essays of the early nineteenth century, Bonald asserts that 
there exists a fluidity between religion and political concerns.
 108
 He connects agricultural 
practices to pagan rituals and the worship of God in order to suggest that in Christianity 
man achieves a ‘profound politics’ which prevents the rupture of society by conflicting 
interests.
109
 Similarly, in Dictatorship, Schmitt implicitly presupposes a continuity and 
fluidity of institutional forms between Church practices and political equivalents (for 
instance, the legates of Pope Innocent III are treated as exemplary of the ‘political’ 
commissary dictator).
 110
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  Schmitt’s consummate statement on the relation between institutional forms and 
conceptual structures opens the third chapter of Political Theology and serves as a 
definition of the term ‘political theology’: 
 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts, not only because of their historical 
development … but also because of their systematic structure, the 





The core of Schmitt’s postulate is that there exists a structure preserving homology 
between the system of concepts of an age and its system of social institutions, but in 
addition, it asserts that modern state institutions, despite their claims of secularity, are 
based on theological precursors. Thus, the historical development traced in Dictatorship 
is extended to a more general claim that there exists ‘fundamentally systematic and 
methodological analogies’ between politics and religion. The postulate is important for 
Schmitt’s account of authority since it enables him to oscillate indiscriminately between 
religious concepts and institutions and their political equivalents, including structures of 
hierarchy and authority. There are strong (restricted) readings as well as weaker, more 
general, readings of this postulate.
 113
 The former, against the ‘secularisation thesis’, 
implies a largely one-way influence of ideas from theology to politics. This ‘strong’ 
thesis faced a number of attacks, notably from Erik Peterson in ‘Monotheism as a 
Political Problem’(1935), and Jan Assman in texts such as ‘Monotheism.’
114
 However, 
Schmitt often relies only on a weaker sense in which ‘centres of intellectual life’ come to 
effect ‘all moral, political, social and economic situations’.
115
 Here the strategic 
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importance of the homology is to enable an indiscriminate traffic of ideas between 
politics and theology. 
 In the background of this theme lies the debate between Edwin Hatch, Adolf 
Harnack, and Rudolf Sohm on the organisational structure of the early Christian 
Church.
116
 Sohm’s side in the debate is the most pertinent for understanding Schmitt. 
Against the secularist-institutionalist theories of Hatch and Harnack, Sohm claimed that 
there was a fundamental antithesis between the true ecclesia and formal systems of 
organisation.
117
 The foundation of the Church was charisma, ‘the gift of grace’. But in 
contradistinction to Max Weber, Sohm’s sense of ‘charisma’ referred largely to the 
rhetorical force of the true word of God. The government of the Church was that of 
prophets and teachers: ‘purely spiritual’ and ‘without legal authority’.118 Sohm’s 
Protestant model presumed a radical dichotomy between authority based on law and the 
charismatic persuasiveness of the content of the Christian Gospel.
119
 Schmitt’s essays on 
Church-State relations respond to this debate with a ‘Catholic’ alternative identifying the 






In Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmit celebrates the success of the 
‘rationalism’ of the Roman Church of the Middle Ages in establishing the priesthood 
with a distinct form of authority. It rejected the enthusiasm of paganism, Dionysian cults 
and ecstasies for the office.  
 
Roman rationalism lives on in the Roman Church…this rationalism 
resides in institutions and is essentially juridical [juristisch]; its 
greatest achievement is having made the priesthood into an office 
[Amte] — a very distinctive type of office. The pope is not the 
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Prophet but the vicar [Stellvertreter] of Christ. Such a function 
[Formierung] precludes all the fanatical excesses of unbridled 
prophetism. The fact that the office is made independent of charisma 
signifies that the priest upholds a position [Würde] that appears to be 
completely apart from his concrete personality. Nevertheless, he is 
not the functionary and commissar of republican thinking. In 
contradistinction to the Modern official, his position [Würde] is not 
impersonal because his office is part of an unbroken chain linked 





The passage returns to central themes of Dictatorship. 
122
 Schmitt distances the authority 
of the papal office from Rudolf Sohm’s and Max Weber’s charismatic prophet and the 
degraded commissar of French revolution.
123
 The pope is instead the commissar of 
Christ, the personal representative of the individual concrete person of Christ. The 
particular will of Christ inaugurates the Petrine office of the Church. However, it is 
curious that Schmit does not explicitly cite Matthew 16:18 ‘I tell you, you are Peter, and 
on this rock, I will build my church, and the Gates of Hades will not prevail against it,’ a 
key passage for divine right doctrine under Pope Leo I.
124
 Although Ulmen translates 
Würde as ‘position’, ‘dignity’ may be more appropriate and in the following I draw out 
the significance of dignity and honour for Schmitt’s conception of representation and 
commissary authority. 
What precisely does Schmitt mean by ‘representation’? In a later text, Schmitt 
writes that ‘[t]o represent means to make an invisible being visible and present through a 
publicly present one.’
125
 Schmitt distinguishes this from imagistic representation as 
Darstellung, typical of nineteenth-century English debates on parliament and the ‘mirror 
of the nation’.
126
 Instead, Schmitt insists it is existential and writes that representation 
‘presupposes a special type of being.’ Representation presupposes a living ‘enhanced 
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type of being’. A type he associates with ‘fame, dignity, and honor’.
127
 In Dictatorship, 
Schmitt remained focussed on the task, but in these subsequent works he elaborates the 
role of social hierarchy and attempts to synthesise a conception representation from two 
distinct models: (i) a metaphysical concept of ‘mediation’ modelled on Christ’s 
incarnation, and (ii) the Stellvertreter or personal agent embodied in the dictator. 
 
(i) Mediation 
Representation as mediation is first developed in Schmitt’s essay ‘The Visibility of the 
Church’ (1917). Based on a metaphysical dualism between a material and an ideological 
sphere, the Church acts as a ‘mediator’ by making the invisible (ideological) sphere of 
the divine logos visible in concrete mundane material reality.
128
 Representing the 
invisible (aesthetic, political, social or theological ideas) in the visible consists of giving 
‘form’ to the idea in the material world. Schmitt distinguishes between three types of 
representative form: (i) the aesthetic form, which pertains to art, (ii) the legal (rechtliche) 
form, which pertains to the application of law (Rechtsverwirklichung) and (iii) the 
‘world-historical form of power’, the political (staatliche) form.
129
 To clarify the concept 
of ‘form’, Schmitt contrasts these representational ideas of ‘form’ against two 
alternatives: the Kantian transcendental form (space and time); and the technical form of 
scientific-rationalism, governed by demands for predictability and regularity and 
utility.
130
 In the Schmittian representative form, a third figure is required, a mediator who 
makes the ideal effective in reality. In the incarnation, ‘Christ is the mediator’ of God 
because in Christ ‘God becomes man’ and in addition through Christ’s incarnation the 
‘idea of representation’ itself is represented.
131
  
Mediation, representation and the legal form lie in the space Schmitt describes as 
a ‘sociology of concepts’, which extends to all social and political institutions and 
organisations: the state, educational institutions, the Church and the arts.
132
 In Roman 
Catholicism, social experience via community is essential to the ‘visibility’ exemplified 
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in the Catholic Church.
133
 He contrasts the ‘subjective experience’ of Protestantism, a 
merely psychic phenomenon, with the social experience of a ‘community of men’.
134
 
Through communal experience Schmitt introduces a role for tradition, since ‘mediation 
remains a task that must be regenerated constantly’.
135
 According to Schmitt, this 
capacity for representation survives only in the Catholic Church.
136
 The primary example 
of such a tradition is language. In contrast, ‘technical thinking is foreign to all social 
traditions; [since] the machine has no tradition’ and ‘even the most-advanced machine 
technology’, lacks something specifically ‘human, namely, a language.’
137
 While this 
resonates with nationalist emphasis on language in the doctrine of the Volksgeist, Schmitt 
turns instead to the domain of rhetoric and the art of oratory.
138
 It is not language as such, 
but speech, in which the ‘idea obtains its visibility in the Word’ of God.
139
  
As mediation, representation requires a third entity to amalgamate concrete 
materiality and ideality. For instance, Christ’s exemplary act of mediation relies on his 
dual nature as divine and human. Similarly, the Church is both an actual physical 
congregation and an ideological entity in which the holy spirit is present.
140
  Applying 
this model, Schmit notes that the ‘legal form’ relies on a distinctive conception of human 
‘personality’ as a point of infinitude or singularity wherein the ‘legal decision’ creates an 
‘aggregate condition’ conjoining the legal idea with the concrete circumstances.
141
 This is 
specifically identified as an act of ‘legal perception’.
142
 Schmitt asserts that this act of 
legal perception (or decision/judgement) is ‘human in the deepest sense’. Through the 
specifically human capacity for decision, ‘the complexio of life in all its contradictions is 
molded into a unity of personal representation’.
143
 Similarly the Church, the religious 
form, is a complexio oppositorum that can ‘contain antitheses’. Returning to the themes 
of Dictatorship, in the legal form the act of legal perception/decision manifests the 
fundamental creative capacity of humanity, distinguishing the civil service from a 
mechanical apparatus.  
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Precisely what Schmitt means by humanity is elusive. He equivocates between 
two conceptions of personal dignity attempting to join a Kantian conception of the radical 
autonomy of the individual with a more traditional Christian conception of dignity tied to 
the hierarchy of divine right. On the one hand, the references to humanity, perception, 
creativity and the application of abstract ideas to the concrete appeal to the Kantian 
understanding of perception in The Critique of Pure Reason.
144
 Schmitt does not 
explicitly reference Kant. Nevertheless, there are clear resonances with Kant’s account of 
the ‘imagination [Einbildungskraft]’ as an ‘indispensable function of the soul’, which 
plays the central role in unifying and subsuming sensation (the ‘manifold of intuition’) 
under the categories, ‘the pure concepts of the understanding’.
145
 Schmitt depicts the 
capacity for decision, which is one source of the ‘humanity’ of the civil service, as a 
common and universal, unconditional trait of the human ‘person’.146 This evokes the 
Kantian sense of dignity, a universal quality derived from the creative autonomy of the 
human individual.  
 On the other hand, Schmitt refers to a hierarchical dignity of office drawn from 
divine right doctrine. He singles out particular individuals (dignities) (or at least the 
holder of a particular office) through the prerequisite of an auctoritas interpositio 
(authority of application) for the decision. This requires a ‘distinctive determination of 
which individual person or which concrete body can assume such an authority.’
147
 Thus 
mediation relies on a pre-existing authority. In fact, Schmitt writes that: 
 
the idea of representation is so completely governed by conceptions 
of personal authority [Autorität] that the representative as well as the 
person represented must assert [behaupten] a personal dignity 
[Würde]— it is not a materialist concept. To represent in an eminent 
sense can only be done by a person, that is, not simply a ‘deputy’ 
[Stellvertreter] but an authoritative person or an idea which, if 
represented, also becomes personified.148 
 
Mediation (or representation) now appears almost derived from a pre-existing authority 
or dignity. It presupposes the dignity [Würde] of all those involved.  
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However, it is unclear if this dignity is derived from the ‘person’ or the ‘office’. 
Schmitt attempts to intertwine these two elements: the infinite creative capacity of the 
individual (the person) and the office. Kantorowicz takes up this issue in The King’s Two 
Bodies. He discusses the ‘sometimes troubled’ distinction between the officium and the 
dignitas.
149
 In contrast to Schmitt, Kantorowicz argues that the dignity was attached to 
the office rather than the individual person: ‘Dignity does not die’. He cites a gloss on 
Pope Alexander III’s decretal dated to 1215: ‘The Dignity never perishes, although 
individuals die every day.’
150
 Kantorowicz, like Hobbes, depicts the person as a legal 
artifice to manage succession. The ‘jurists constructed a fictitious person’ in order that 
successors could be vested with that particular dignity. More recently, in Agamben’s 
archaeology of the office, he demonstrates the importance of the split between the opus 
operans (the action carried out by an agent) and the opus operantis (the act in its effective 
reality) for the Catholic sense of the office.
151
 According to Agamben, through this 
distinction, ‘the ethical connection between the subject and his action is broken.’
152
 
Schmitt seems to avoid this concept of the person (associated with their ethical or moral 
particularity) by equating the personalist element with the act of legal perception and the 
innate human capacity for judgement. 
The personalist element of commissary authority thus requires the confrontation 
with the particular, necessitating an act of judgement, to distinguish it from traditional 
authority. While commissary authority is clearly parasitic on a pre-existing social order 
already structured by concepts of ‘authority’ or ‘dignity’, the particular mandate or 
commission appears to be the source of the ‘personal’ element. However, even here 
Schmitt’s remarks are often vague or obscure. In some instances dignity appears to be 
‘given’ by the mandate, in others it is presupposed, or in the citation above it must be 
asserted and thus appears co-constituted in the act itself.  
One source of difficulty appears to be Schmitt’s attempt to combine two 
incompatible models of representation. The model of mediation presumes a framework 
structured as two ontologically distinct fields possessing the same structure. According to 
Schmitt’s ‘sociology of concepts’ the mediation between ideas and material reality 
requires that each realm possess a similar hierarchical structure. That is, the condition of 
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possibility of mediation is that both the space of ideas and material reality are ‘ordered’ 
hierarchically. Since mediation operates according to analogy, it requires resemblance 
between the two spaces.  
Schmitt plays rhetorically with the concept of ‘noble ideas’ to suggest that they 
constitute a kind of ‘nobility’ within the realm of ideas itself. He suggests that noble ideas 
have a higher rank within the hierarchy of ideas. That is the ‘hierarchy of values’ is 
depicted as an actual ranked hierarchy of concepts within a realm of.
153
 Since some ideas 
are ‘better’ than others then the space of ideas is ranked hierarchically and moreover to 
give these ideas reality, the space of reality must provide a similarly structured medium 
for their expression or representation. This appears to be the rhetorical ‘logic’ behind 
Schmitt’s claim that the ‘representative of a noble value cannot be without value’. Thus 
as a mediation between ideas and material reality, representation takes the form of 
structure preserving mapping between two distinct ontological (hierarchically structured) 
realms.  
 
(ii) Commission (Stellvertretung) 
The second model is the commission between two persons, the commissioner and 
commissar, who remain within the same ontological hierarchy. Why a specifically 
‘personalist’ hierarchy is here necessary remains unclear.
154
 
One source of difficulty is the elusiveness of Schmitt’s conception of the person 
and personification. An illustrative counterexample is given by Hobbes’ conception of 
the person.
155
 In contrast to Schmitt’s hierarchical presuppositions, Hobbes depicts 
‘personation’ as a more egalitarian process. For Hobbes, ‘to personate is to act, or 
represent’ another. That is, to ‘bear his person, or act in his name’.
156
 To personate 
another is largely a legal fiction, in which one represents another entity and ‘few things 
[...] are incapable of being represented by fiction.’ Hobbes cites various examples, 
animate and inanimate things, people, ‘children, fools, and madmen’, an ‘idol, or mere 
figment of the brain’, all such entities ‘may be personated’, that is, represented. The only 
restriction applies to the author. The author, the owner or guardian who authorises the 
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personation, must have the ‘use of reason’.
157
 In fact, the strategic role of personation for 
Hobbes was to make the populus authors and hence ultimately the owners of and 
responsible for the acts of the monarch.  
For Schmitt, however, it was important to locate the person in a sphere prior to 
law. The person is the point of infinite singularity (associated with a concrete rationality 
of the particular) that exceeds legal-rational circumscription. Schmitt’s person is thus not 
a mere ‘legal fiction’, a mask, the ‘disguise or outward appearance of a man, 
counterfeited on stage.’
158
 It precedes the formal system of law itself. In order to unveil 
the inadequacy of the liberal-rationalist political science, in its attempts to subsume the 
political and social sphere of human activity as well as the natural world under general 
and universal laws, Schmitt insists on the exemplary sublimity of the person. In 
opposition to the Enlightenment’s mechanistic visions of humanity, Schmitt argued that 
the capacity to bridge between ideality and the concrete through the act of decision 
manifested the unlimited creativity of the human individual. Reenacting, but displacing 
the strategies of counter-revolutionaries such as Joseph de Maistre, the human capacity to 
decide escapes liberal-rational explanation and marks the divinely-rational singularity of 
human existence. 
 
These two models of representation (mediation and commission) are to be unified in the 
person of the orator. In the speech of the great orator the ‘idea obtains its visibility in the 
Word’.
159
 Great rhetoric, as ‘representative discourse’, has the capacity to inspire the 
productive capacity of social groups.
160
 In contrast, the romantic bourgeois developments 
in the arts lead towards the individualist ‘art for art’s sake’.
161
 Schmitt claims that there is 
a specific ‘rational form of speech’ manifest in great rhetoric and the representation 
embodied by the orator which is not merely decorative.
162
 It does not consist in the 
‘vestments of cardinals or the trappings of a magnificent procession’.
163
 Again Schmitt 
reverses Hobbes’ evaluations. Hobbes derogated rhetoric as an inspiration to ambition 
and instead celebrated formally determined ceremonial participation. Schmitt rejects 
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ceremony, but also where politics and the Church are concerned he puts aside the 
aesthetic form of ‘great architecture, ecclesiastical painting and music, or significant 
poetic works’.
164
 With parallels to the legal form, the authority of great rhetoric is 
relatively indifferent to the specific content spoken. Schmitt’s position is determined 
against two alternatives. Firstly, against scientific and technical thought, rhetoric is not a 
form of rational persuasion by argument. It is not a ‘discussion and debate’ but ‘moves in 
antitheses’ like the complexio oppositorum of the Church.
165
 The great orator resembles 
the commissarial dictator whose only measure is the goal which must be fulfilled. The 
normal laws of syllogism are suspended and any effective means can be taken up in 
pursuit of achieving the goal. But secondly, against Rudolf Sohm’s conception of 
prophetic charisma, the force of rhetoric is not derived from content (of the Gospels). 
This would lead to a Protestant Christianity of individual experience. Instead, Schmitt 
bases the competence and the capacity of the orator on ‘dignity’ [Würde]. It is the 
position, place or office of the orator itself, their dignity, like that of the ‘soldier and the 
statesman’, that now provides authority.
166
  
Schmitt’s recourse to dignity as a basis for the commissary authority of the office 
is not entirely surprising. It is a paradoxical concept that oscillates between universality 
and particularity. For Donoso Cortés, this ambiguity marked the specific uniqueness of 
Catholic dignity, which is accorded divine origin and lies in God’s capacity to ‘raise so 
harmoniously and evenly the level of all things’.
167
 Donoso claims that divine ‘dignity’ is 
shared equally despite the hierarchical structure, because in Catholic solidarity both the 
individual man and the human species are elevated simultaneously: they are ‘conjointly 
elevated to the divine grandeur and its sublime heights’.
168
 The dignity of the species also 
‘reaches individuals’, such that human nature gains ‘grandeur’ and at the same time man 
gains in ‘nobility’. In contrast, when man alone, rather than God, ‘wishes to raise 
anything, he can never do so without depressing what he does not raise’.
169
  
Schmitt implicitly positions Christian dignity as an alternative ‘humanism’, in his 
criticisms of the humanism of ‘self-assured aristocrats’ of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. They proposed a new ‘idea of humanity’ that formed the basis of their 
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‘authority and secret societies’.
170
 But, in the name of humanity, these ‘masonic priests’ 
demonstrated a ‘diabolical… contempt from the common man.’ The result was a ‘new 
and uncontrolled power [Macht]’.
171
 Citing Bakunin’s criticism of Marx and Engels, 
Schmitt asserts that even Marxism produces an intellectualism that makes a ‘claim to 
authority, discipline and hierarchy’, which stigmatises a ‘lumpenproletariat’.
172
 However, 
there is a curious continuity between the moral imperatives Donoso Cortés derives from 
this sense of dignity and Marx’s doctrine of social justice: ‘from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs.’
173
 
While Schmitt agreed with Donoso Cortes on dignity, he rejected the theatrical 
aspect of the latter’s call for ‘bloody sacrifice’.
174
 In fact in earlier texts, Schmitt detects a 
certain danger in the theatrical sense of representation deployed by Hobbes and Donoso 
Cortés. If applied to the authority of the Church, Schmitt understood that the theatrical 
model could result in a situation resembling Fyodor Dostoevsky’s ‘Grand Inquisitor’. In 
The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky depicts the Grand Inquisitor as a Catholic priest 
who, through an alliance with the Antichrist, has established a ‘universal state’ to meet 
the immediate needs of the people (peace, bread and happiness) at the expense of their 
freedom. Confronted by the return of Christ the Grand Inquisitor has him arrested and 
subsequently sends him away. Recalling Hobbes’ quasi-transcendent sovereign, the 
Grand Inquisitor prefers the system he has established to the promised Kingdom of God. 
In an entry from February 1923, alluding to this model, Schmitt writes that 
‘representation through artistic performance [Darstellen] [would be] very dangerous’.
175
 
Schmitt elaborates that if the Church was to represent Christ like a theatre actor 
represents a hero then the return of the actual hero, whether it was Wallenstein or Christ, 
would appear as an inconvenient disturbance of the performance of an historical 
drama.
176
 Theatrical representation can only function as imaginary substitute for the 
actuality of Christian politics. 
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Dostoevsky and the Grand Inquisitor are regular points of reference in Schmitt’s 
works and there remains open debate on his evaluation of the latter figure.
177
 
Nonetheless, Schmitt explicitly derogates Dostoevsky’s portrait as an anarchistic and 
atheistic projection, a grossly distorted vision of the Church.
178
 He suggests that only 
from the point of view of the anarchist and non-believer does the Priest appear to have 
‘consciously succumbed to the wiles of Satan’.
179
 Schmitt recites his distinction between 
the anthropological presuppositions of anarchism and properly ‘political ideas’.
180
 If man 
is ‘by nature evil’ or at least ‘dangerous’, ‘ignorant and rough’ then one must admit the 
need for institutions of government and thus the unavoidablity of questions of justice and 
power [Macht]. Against Dostoevsky’s anarchistic optimism Schmitt notes that simply 
‘rejecting every earthly power [Macht] would lead to the worst inhumanity’.
181
  
 However, Schmitt acknowledges his theoretical proximity to the Grand Inquisitor. 
Like Weber, Schmitt insists that all government requires power and in order ‘to bring 
peace to the world’ even the Church cannot forgo questions of its own survival.
182
 
Schmitt’s problem is to define the particular task of the Church and distinguish it from a 
general administrative task of policing. He fails to do this in Roman Catholicism and 
instead refers broadly to the Church's general work in the ‘normative guidance of human 
social life’ and celebrates its ‘proud history’, ignoring the multiple instances of internal 
corruption and controversies, divisions, splits, abuse, simony etc.
183
 In Roman 
Catholicism, he is more concerned to counter the ‘warped’ rationality of progressivist 
technical-economic thought with Catholic rationality which maintains the ‘rationality of 
the purpose [Zweck]’ (the Last Judgement). However, against the Grand Inquisitor this is 
inadequate. In the name of fulfilling the Church’s goal to ‘to bring peace to the world,’ 
the Inquisitor admits the Last Judgement, while accepting his fate as a martyr for peace 
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 Only in the 1940s does Schmitt finally overcome this difficulty 
with the concept of the katechon. 
 While the dictator offered a model for a limited authority distinct from formal 
law, the Christian concept of dignity elaborated a more general sense of the social 
hierarchy on which the commissary authority of the office rests. However, if the authority 
of the papacy is understood through the commissary authority of the dictator, then the 
former now appears unlimited and general and its authority has lost any attachment to the 
concrete rationality of the particular. The Church appears precisely as a police state. To 
restore the particular rationality of a concrete demand Schmitt turns to the concept of the 
katechon. 
 
4 The Katechon and Nomos 
Schmitt’s Tagebücher include a fragment, dated 1928, summarising the problematic 
captured in the figure of the Grand Inquisitor. Under a heading ‘History of Humanism’ 
Schmitt sketches the paradoxical experience of eschatological existence:  
 
A multitude stands and waits for a miraculous king. Zealous and 
mysterious people assure with great certainty that he will come. But 
days and years pass without him coming. The eager and efficient 
people are now building huts and shelters for the wild crowd, taking 
care of their food, building homely and comfortable houses, and 
transforming the expectant into a workforce. Officially, however, 




Allusions to the Grand Inquisitor are evident in the setting, expectation and resulting 
activity. The supply of shelter, food and comfort, and transformation into a workforce are 
all themes mentioned by Dostoevsky. In a later essay ‘Three Possibilities for a Christian 
Conception of History’ (1950), Schmitt returns to this theme; how can Christian believers 
understand their worldly activity while they await the inevitable return of Christ. As 
Schmitt writes, the ‘vivid expectation of an imminent end seems to take away the 
meaning from all history and it causes an eschatological paralysis.’
186
 Of three possible 
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solutions to eschatological paralysis Schmitt focuses on the katechon, a figure described 
in a ‘mysterious passage of Paul’s second letter to the Thessalonians’.
187
 In this section, I 
demonstrate that with the concept of the katechon, Schmitt attempts to concretise the 
political task of religious institutions and return a sense of finitude and limitation to their 
authority, supposedly preventing their transformation into the Grand Inquisitor.  
St Paul describes the katechon as an entity that restrains or withholds the 
Antichrist, delaying the final battle between God and Satan, the last judgement and thus 
the salvation of mankind.
188
 In the theological tradition, the katechon is generally 
identified with either the Roman Empire or the Church.
189
 Schmitt largely follows the 
former tradition and generally associates it with temporal or secular political entities in 
their role in deferring conflict.
190
 For instance, Schmitt questions whether England or the 
United States will play the role of ‘great retarder [or accelerator] of world history’.
191
  
The katechon has two distinct but intertwined sides resulting in an aporetic 
valuation. On the positive side, the katechon restrains the ‘man of lawlessness [anomos]’ 
and thereby prevents suffering.
192
 The man of lawlessness, the ‘antichrist’, can be 
understood as either an agent of Satan, a false prophet, false-God or, more politically, an 
absolute ruler, who ‘exalts himself above every so-called god, … declaring himself to be 
God.’
193
 By restraining the man of lawlessness, the katechon guards and preserves the 
law (nomos) and also prevents the political and religious conflict between factions and 
sects, suggesting a certain continuity with the Catholic inquisition. This extends to the 
role of ensuring peace by preventing civil war and providing sustenance, bread and 
shelter. On the negative side, by restraining the antichrist, the katechon defers or delays 
the apocalypse, the unveiling of the Antichrist and his followers and the final 
confrontation between God and Satan which must precede the Last Judgement. Hence as 
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a result, the katechon delays the salvation of man. However, unlike the Grand Inquisitor, 
the katechon does not actively or purposefully reject Christ. To paraphrase Massimo 
Cacciari, the Grand Inquisitor is the disenchanted katechon, who has lost all hope of 
redemption and is reduced to a ‘radical despair for humanity’.
194
 The katechon is a 
conservative force in history, which restrains evil, limits human suffering, but also 
propagates the message of the Gospels, increasing the number to be saved. But as a side-
effect it prevents or delays the realisation of the eternal kingdom of God and salvation of 
mankind.  
In Schmitt’s texts of the early 1940s, the katechon lacks the conscious 
engagement or purposiveness of the commissary authority. According to the title of 
‘Beschleuniger wider Willen’ the United States is inadvertently an ‘accelerator against its 
will’.
195
 Similarly, in Land and Sea Schmitt implies that Byzantium’s role in ‘hindering 
the Arabs from conquering all of Italy’ has an accidental quality.
196
 The delayer merely 
slows world-history, with no reference to the eschatological. In identifying the katechon 
with nineteenth century England or Rudolf II, Schmitt accords a certain passivity to the 
role.
197
 Rudolf II ‘was not an active hero.’
198
 Schmitt seems guided by a progressivist 
sense of history. However, by 1947 passivity has been replaced by conscious vocation. 
Schmit writes that ‘[e]very great medieval Christian emperor fully believed himself to be 
the katechon, and so indeed he was.’ Marking a thematic alignment with Löwith’s 
Meaning and History, Schmitt writes that the katechon is the ‘only way in which to 
understand history as a Christian and to make sense of it.’
199
 The doctrine of the katechon 
legitimates active and conscious participation in history.
200
 
The idea that the doctrine of the katechon could avoid the trap of the Grand 
Inquisitor is implied in Schmitt’s various remarks on Donoso Cortés. Schmitt describes 
Donoso Cortés as the ‘spiritual descendent of the Grand Inquisitors’ who ‘failed 
theologically because this concept [the katechon] remained alien to him.’ Like the Grand 
Inquisitor, Donoso Cortés radicalised the doctrine of original sin ‘into a doctrine of 
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absolute sinfulness and depravity of human nature’ justifying an absolute, authoritarian 
rule.
201
 The katechon could avoid this fate through its alternative philosophy of history 
and its limited commissary authority. Lacking a third katechontic alternative, Donoso 
Cortés could only choose between a progressive or regressive philosophy of history. 
Choosing the latter he describes progressivist European society as the ‘greatest 
catastrophe’ leading to the ‘barbarization of Europe and before long its depopulation.’
202
 
Schmitt paraphrases letters to Count Raczynski expressing Donoso Cortés’ philosophy of 
history: ‘Humanity reels blindly through a labyrinth that we call history, whose entrance, 
exit and shape nobody knows’.
203
 In contrast, the ‘eschatological faith’ entailed by the 
katechon provides the Christian with a historical orientation that is neither progressive 
nor regressive but suspended in a kind of industrious expectation of salvation.
204
 
On the authority of the katechon, Schmitt returns to the Medieval Respublica 
Christiana to mirror the political-juridical framework of the Roman dictator.
205
 We can 
identify a series of parallels between the dictator and the katechon: if in Rome necessity 
demanded the temporary elevation of one of the consuls to the role of dictator, through a 
personal mandate from the senate, then in the Christian Middle ages, necessity demands, 
for the unknowable but finite and limited period of the eschaton, the elevation of a 
monarch to the role of emperor, through a personal mandate from the papacy.
206
 Despite 
the contextual shift from the Roman Republic to the Medieval bureaucracy of the Holy 
Roman Empire there is a continuity in the structure of authority.
207
 According to Schmitt, 
the legitimacy provided to the Christian empire as katechon is finite, limited and does not 
strive for ‘world unity’, but to overthrow such a universalist imperial crown.
208
 Thus it is 
important for Schmitt to distinguish the universal or totalised empire of Caesarism from 
the supposedly limited Christian Empire of the middle ages. 
209
 Like the Roman dictator, 
the Christian emperor possesses only a limited authority given for the completion of a 
specific task. 
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The Christian ‘emperor’s office was inseparable from the work of the katechon, 
with concrete tasks and missions’.
210
 These tasks, assigned by the pope, could include 
missions and crusades as ‘the peacemaker, the settler of disputes, and the fighter of 
tyrants’.
211
 Thus the office of emperor was itself a ‘commission’. However, it relied 
indirectly on the independent authority of the monarch, determined by the claims of local 
royalty. The concept of the katechon thus unified the two hierarchies, ‘diversi ordines 
[diverse orders]’ of temporal and divine power by turning the emperor into an office, a 
commissar.
212
 There was no specific dynasty of the emperor, instead, on occasion a 
monarch took the title of imperator ‘for missions and crusades… from the pope’ and 
thereby, according to Schmitt, ‘confirmed the orientations and orders grounding the unity 
of the respublica Christiana’.
213
 The commission ‘stemmed from a completely different 
sphere than did the dignity of the monarchy’, since each arose out of a distinct spatial 
order: the former out of Christendom, and the latter out of the autarchic local political 
entity.  
Reviving the categories of dictatorship, Schmitt attempts to base the authority of 
the katechon on a ‘concrete’ or ‘objective’ demand for peace embodied in a specific 
order. 
Peace, in particular, was not a free-floating, normative, general 
concept, but rather, one oriented concretely to the peace of the 
empire, the territorial ruler, of the church, of the city, of the castle, 




Schmitt recodes ‘abstract’ demands into ‘spatial concepts’ in order to return to the task of 
the katechon a connection with objective reality and the ‘power of the facts’.
215
 Recalling 
the temporal and spatial limits on the dictator, Schmitt asserts that the Christian empire 
was based on a ‘concrete sense of history’ and a ‘monarchy grounded in a country and its 
people’. The threat to such concreteness emerges in abstract notions of right, as well as 
‘great philosophical systems’ and ‘neutral generalisations’: an allusion to the heritage of 
systematic philosophy embodied in the work of legal positivists such as Hans Kelsen and 
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their systematic and purely legalistic conceptions of political forms.
216
 Instead, like the 
commissary dictator, the precondition of the katechon is the specific ordinance, the 
personal mandate, in contradistinction to general law and dynastic rights. At the end of 
the thirteenth century, however, with the rise of the Luxembourg and Habsburg empires, 
this concrete basis was lost. The meaning of the Christian empire ‘was robbed of its 




The antithesis to legal office accords to the katechon a ‘fundamental’ political 
force grounded in an ‘ethos of conviction’ that precedes law.
218
 Schmitt writes that for 
the Germanic monks of the medieval Christian Empire, the doctrine of the katechon 
enabled a ‘lucid Christian faith in potent historical power [stärkster, geschichtlicher 
Kraft]’. In fact, like the Church in Roman Catholicism, as long as it was supported by 
pious belief, the idea of the katechon could support various historically determinate 
‘political and juridical structures’.
219
 It could align with different political entities and 
even act as the vector through which these structures are subject to ‘transposition, 
successions, consecrations, or renovations of all types’. Like the auctoritas of the senate 
in Rome, the katechon is not a legal institution or right.
220
  
Schmitt claimed that this conceptual apparatus grounded and limited the activities 
of the emperor, by providing a flexible but strictly finite and limited jurisdiction, attuned 
to the concrete through the papal mandate.
221
 With ‘humility and modesty’, at the 
completion of its task, the katechon, like the dictator, would voluntarily abdicate.
222
 The 
eschatological framework provided a further limit defining the ‘present eon’ as a finite 
interregnum before Christ’s return. This ideological framework would supposedly 
forestall the development of an ‘absorbing and consuming power’ based on the desire for 
simply the ‘prolongation of the monarch’s power’.
223
 Schmitt insists that the ‘Christian 
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empire was not eternal. It always had its own end and that of the present eon in view.’
224
 
However, with the loss of the concept of the katechon in the late Middle Ages, the 
Christian emperor forgets the finitude of his role and strives to become a ‘super-king’, 
thereby introducing the unlimited and unrestrained ambitions of Caesarism typical of 
both the Roman and Napoleonic empires. But according to Schmitt, this ‘Caesarism is a 
typically non-Christian form of power’.
225
 Only through the concept of the katechon, 
could the Christian empire admit its inadequacy to the eternal kingdom of God, but still 
be capable of acting as a historical power.
226
  
 But can such an idea actually limit the desire for power? Cacciari is right to be 
sceptical of Schmitt’s claims. Although sympathetic to the need for a katechon, he rejects 
Schmitt’s assertion that a katechontic Christian empire can remain a limited imperial 
power. He argues that the goals of empire and katechon are antithetical and any attempt 
at accommodation will produce either political impotency or a Caesarist (and hence non-
Christian) absolutism.
227
 He describes the katechontic energy as ‘essentially executive-
administrative, producing security’ and thus in conflict with the ‘unrestrained expanding’ 
demand of all empires. Thus, he denies the validity of Schmitt’s distinction between the 
Caesaristic and Christian conceptions of empire.
228
 Cacciari’s position seems more 
accurate historically. Walter Ulmann for instance, describes the period as ‘a struggle 
fought within the precincts of the empire itself and therefore on Roman terms’.
229
 Thus, 
Schmitt’s scarce historical substantiation appears rather egregious. He refers only to 
‘German monks of the Frankish and Ottonian ages,’ explicitly naming Haimo of 
Halberstad, Adso of Montier-en-Der, and Otto of Freising.
230
 In particular, Charlemagne 
is not mentioned, nor any actual events or controversies of the respublica Christiana. 
Even in Ados’s letter to Queen Gerberga cited by Schmitt, Adso speaks of an expansive 
imperative that ‘our religious order become greater and greater’ that appears to contradict 
the limited restraint supposed to characterise the katechon.
231
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Schmitt’s strategy resembles Benjamin Constant’s conception of the monarch as a 
pouvoir neutre. Although displaced from the nation to the respublica Christiana, the 
pope takes on aspects of the neutral monarch, a kind of personalist representative of 
natural law. In fact, in the Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931), Schmitt specifically 
identified the Reichspräsident with the auctoritas of the pouvoir neutre assigning him 
qualities of influence, prestige, and trust.
232
 The dual offices of imperium and 
sacerdotium, with visible bearers the emperor and pope, are given form in the Reichstag 
and Reichspräsident, respectively.
233
 Instead of subordinating one to the other or 
constructing a ‘balance of powers’, Schmitt attempts to intertwine them by distinguishing 
between their jurisdictions. 
The structural continuity between the commissary authority and the katechon is 
also evident in the presupposition of an existing hierarchy. The emperor as katechon is 
parasitic on the existing princely hierarchies. Only a monarch could be ‘elevated’ to the 
role of katechon (emperor). The legitimacy of the emperor was separate from, but 
ultimately dependent on the ‘dignity of the monarchy’ which ‘stemmed from a 
completely different sphere’. Thus the idea of the katechon was a means of mediating 
between two independent structures of power. The commission from the pope did not 
create a king of kings who ruled Europe. Instead, the commission achieved an act of 
‘elevation of a crown, not a vertical intensification’. This obscure image evokes 
something like Donoso Cortés’ elaboration of ‘dignity’: the regional monarch is elevated 
without degrading others. The foundation of monarchical power is independent of the 
Christian empire. The papal mandate, like the ordinance of Bodin’s sovereign, is 
independent of law and the ‘indigenous formations’ of the monarchy.
234
 Thus, Schmitt 
assigns the katechon and dictator the status of an exceptional authority. Neither, the 
charisma of the prophet, nor the legal office of regular monarch, the katechon represents 
a commissary authority. Through the interplay of these two modes of legitimation, a 
tyrant could be recognised as the ‘enemy of humanity’ against whom an emperor could 
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5 The Divine Right of the Katechon 
One aim of this chapter has been to uncover the theoretical structure underlying Schmitt’s 
attempts to rearticulate a theory of authority based on the ‘monarchical principle’. 
Tracing the development of his conception of commissary authority across various 
works, I have pointed to his persistent attempts to give a rationalist gloss to this 
theorisation of authority. However, from another perspective, this can be read as an 
attempt to recode various strategies and ideas of the classical doctrine of divine right. 
Schmitt was familiar with John Neville Figgis’s The Divine Right of Kings and references 
it in Crisis precisely with respect to the distinction between law and commission.
236
 In 
addition in Nomos, Schmitt refers to Figgis approvingly as a ‘real historian’ and cites 
both From Gerson to Grotius and Churches in the Modern State before directing the 
reader to Figgis’s lecture ‘Respublica Christiana’ of 1911.
237
 And as I demonstrate in this 
section, despite the use of ostensibly pagan concepts (such as the dictator or nomos) and 
the reference to the concrete necessity, Schmitt’s conception of commissary authority is 
ultimately based on a divine foundation.
238
 Although Schmitt eschews any explicit 
reference to the phrase ‘divine right’ which was used primarily by its detractors, his later 
works can be read as an attempt to restore an original Catholic sense to the doctrine, 
against its Protestant form used to defend the monarch against the papacy.
239
 
Before it was taken up by Protestant monarchs, the idea of a divine commission 
was central to the authority of the papacy. Schmitt avoids discussing the origin of the 
papal office.
240
 But, Walter Ulmann locates it with the fifth-century pope Leo I, as the 
first to utilise ‘to the full the potentialities inherent in the Petrine commission’.
241
 
However, for Ullmann, the decisive invention of Leo I was to link the pope to St Peter 
using the Roman law concept of the heir [haeres, successor]. The basis of ‘the continuity 
of the Petrine office in the pope, [was] not because the latter occupied the same chair or 
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because Peter’s tomb was in Rome, but because he was the heir of St Peter’. Ullmann, 
like Schmitt, emphasises the personal office of the pope. The Church received its 
importance through the personal relation to the position of St Peter himself.
242
 However, 
contrary to Schmitt’s attempt to identify the commission as a pre-legal form, Ullmann 
writes that Leo is forced to take this strategy by the context of Roman law. The concept 
of the heir [haeres] is the only means of establishing the continuity of jurisdiction 
‘because, juristically speaking, the objective and depersonalised theme of the Roman 
Church was virtually incapable of being pressed into the legal framework of the Roman 
Law’.
243
 For Ullmann, the novelty of pope Leo I was his transformation of the Petrine 
Commission into an unusual form of inheritance. Through Leo, the papacy is given a 
juridical basis as an indignus haeres (an unworthy heir).
244
 That is, the familial relation of 
father and son is taken as the model for the transfer of jurisdiction to the successor.  
Although Schmitt rejects the dependency on law (in the sense of positive law 
[Gesetz] suggested in Ullmann’s commentary), he does develop the katechon in a familial 
context (household, economic, oikos) on the basis of the framework suggested by the 
concept nomos. Despite the importance of the katechon to Nomos of the Earth and the 
texts of this period, it is only an instance of a more general theory of the nomos: ‘Recht as 
a unity of order and orientation [Recht als Einheit von Ordnung und Ortung].’
245
 The 
respublica Christiana and the katechon arose as a particular historical instance of the 
nomos: the result of ‘land-appropriations by the Germanic tribes’ in the sixth century.
246
 
As a substitute for divine and natural right/law, Schmitt attempts to construct a concrete 
basis for Recht out of the ‘measurement and distribution of usable soil’.
247
 The act of land 
appropriation is a ‘legal-historical fact [rechtsgeschichtliche Tatsache]’ or a ‘great 
historical event’ not merely an ‘intellectual construction’ like the Hobbesian legal fiction 
of the social contract.
248
 From the act of land-appropriation and the ‘inner measure’ 
contained within the earth itself there emerges a new form of justice [Gerechtigkeit]. 
However, this is a justice derived from agriculture: ‘human toil and trouble, human 
planting and cultivation of the fruitful earth is rewarded justly by her growth and 
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 Thus the farmer or the household is identified as the source of the social 
order, politics and authority. Referring to the Aristotelian distinction between the oikos 
(household/economic sphere) and polis (political sphere), Schmitt derogates the polis as a 
mere ‘philosophical generalisation’ and clearly identifies the oikos, the family, as the 
originary model of political power.
250
 Instead of Aristotle, Schmitt cites Hegel’s 




Like the agricultural models that gave imperative force to the ‘Great Chain of 
Being’ and the hierarchies of divine right, the authority of the katechon is derived from 
the nomos, the ‘inner measure of sowing and reaping’, the economic sphere.
252
 A similar 
sense of the economic context is clear in Lovejoy’s account of the hierarchy of being, the 
scala natura. Between each level of the hierarchy — God, angels, man, beasts and plants 
— obedience is required and a ‘breach of obedience and breaking in of rebellion’ alone is 
enough to result in ‘vices and miseries’ as well as poverty, diseases, sickness and 
death.
253
 While the threat of disorder could also characterise Hobbes’ state of nature, the 
proximity of themes of agriculture and jurisdiction marks a closer affinity between 
Schmitt’s nomos and the doctrine of divine right. 
There are a number of argumentative commonalities between Nomos of the Earth 
and the doctrine of divine right. The references to Figgis suggest Schmitt was aware of 
these and specifically sought to reinvigorate the doctrine. Schmitt’s depiction of the 
intertwined auctoritas and potestas of the emperor and pope, largely agrees with Figgis’s 
statement that the ‘ideal of the Empire, with Christ as its King and His two vicegerents 
upon earth, was that of a theocracy.’
254
 The ‘Pope and Emperor are both conceived rather 
as executives armed from above with administrative powers.’
255
 Figgis depicts the kings 
as possessing a somewhat limited authority, determined by a fundamental sphere of 
Christian ‘law’ resembling Schmitt’s Recht. Like Schmitt’s commission, in the divine 
right tradition, the office of monarch is based on a personal relationship rather than legal 
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contract. In his Trew Law, King James, like Schmitt, depicts the divine order as a 
sequence of jurisdictions: based on dominion and sovereignty.
256
 James rejects the 
contractualist interpretations of the coronation as a ‘mutuall paction and stipulation (as 
they call it) betwixt the king and his people.’ Instead, he insists the king only ‘willingly 
promiseth to his people to discharge honourably and trewly the office giuen him by God 
ouer them.’
257
 If it is a kind of ‘contract’ James insists that it can only be an oath and as 
such can only be judged by God.
258
 In contrast to Hobbes, Figgis and Schmitt show little 
concern for the ceremonial markers of authority, the annointment or unction of the king is 
ignored, and emphasis is placed on the hereditary status of those accorded authority. The 
shift from divine right to the measure of the soil, although it appears to mark a 
displacement or break from the divine to the natural, actually repeats a theme developed 
by Figgis of the shift from divine right to natural rights.
259
  
On the origin of a nomos, Schmitt offers little explanation for the derivation of an 
order and orientation from an ‘inner measure’ of the earth. He merely cites the Book of 
Daniel: ‘[b]efore what has been appropriated through conquest, discovery, expropriation, 
or some other way can be distributed, it must be numbered and weighed, as in the ancient 
sequence: numbered/weighed/divided.’
260
 The emphasis throughout is on an act of 
measuring, ‘numbering and weighing,’ by which one is ranked.
261
 Schmitt also refers to 
the scientific measurement of the earth itself as the ground of a new nomos.
262
 But he 
equivocates between this sense of measuring, weighing something and the legal sense of 
‘statutes, acts, measures, and decrees of all sorts.’
263
 Such measures may respond to a 
situation.
264
 But this sense is extended to ‘financial, economic, and military measures’.
265
 
What is the relationship between the order (ranking, hierarchy, ordering) and the basic 
measure of a weight or number? Is there a necessary or non-arbitrary order derivable 
from a measure? In order to preserve the concreteness of the hierarchy, this would seem 
necessary. Only if we presume that ‘more is better’ can a ranking be elaborated from a 
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simple measure. The higher levels have more weight or number. In fact, Aristotle’s 
hierarchy based on the ‘powers of the soul’ relies on such a ranking, the higher levels 
have more powers: the humans are above the plants and animals because they have 
nutrition and perception and intellect.
266
 However, as a result the hierarchy seems to be 
reduced to something purely quantifiable: countable or weighed in a technical or 
economic sense. The distinctiveness of ‘Catholic rationality’ asserted by Schmitt is lost 
and it resembles the liberal-rationalist science of Protestant industrialism. In fact, in a 
certain sense the idea of the ‘nomos of the earth’ aptly describes the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century attempts to define a length (the metre) based on a physical geodesic 
arc on the earth.
267
 This proximity may explain why Schmitt remains so elusive on the 
relationship between measure and order. 
One precendent unmentioned by Schmitt is Augustine’s discussion of measure 
and order in The Literal Meaning of Genesis.
268
 Augustine’s concern is God’s relation to 
the quantifiers: measure, number and weight.
269
 While these measures are external to 
God, or at least beyond his command, in order to give priority to God, he notes that the 
realisation and maintenance of the order derived from such measures requires God’s 
active engagement. Although on the sixth day He rested from creating new things, He 
continued ‘to operate the management of the things that were then set in place,’ since ‘the 
world will not be able to go on standing for a single moment, if God withdraws from it 
his controlling hand.’
270
 Thus, for Augustine, the order or nomos is a result of God’s 
active participation. However, for Schmitt the hierarchy was supposed to have some 
independence from the vicarious commission from God. The local monarchy was to be 
independent of the Christian Empire that bestows the commission of katechon. However, 
both now appear to arise directly from God’s activity. Thus the commission of katechon 
is a mandate from God, allocated according to a hierarchical order previously established 
and maintained by God. Authority based on the monarchical principle is ultimately 
derived from a divine source. 
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* * * 
 
The chapter has traced Schmitt’s attempts to elaborate a distinctive sense of commissary 
authority and in the process argued for a theoretical continuity between the dictator and 
the katechon. I have demonstrated that Schmitt attempts to articulate a personalist 
authority dependent on (i) a particular concrete task, supposedly utilising a specifically 
human capacity for creative thought and (ii) a presupposed social hierarchy supported by 
a nomos derived from economic (agricultural) models and anthropological necessity. 
However, as I have demonstrated, both these elements are ultimately guaranteed by 
reference to divine intervention. This specific authority, elaborated across a series of 
models — the Roman dictator, the military general, the pope, the judge, the Catholic 
Priest, the great orator and the katechon — is supposed to overcome the instrumentalised 
form of the state. However, it does so only by reviving strategies of traditional ‘divine 
right’ under the guise of political ‘realism’ and by according specific cultural goals, such 
as the Last Judgement, an unquestionable status.
271
 In addition, my account has drawn 
attention to the extent that Schmitt relies on certain conceptual equivocations, rhetorical 
effects and ‘paradoxical’ concepts or complexio oppositorum such as dignity, 
representation and person. While the personalist model of authority dominates much of 
Schmitt’s work, in the next chapter I turn to the democratic works 1923-32, followed by 
the Nazi works of 1933-39. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Schmitt’s 
focus shifts to the democratic politics of Weimar era Germany and he begins to develop a 
distinctive conception of authority based on democratic principles. 
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Chapter 4: The Energy of Democratic 
Authority 
 
Every age finds its own redeeming word. ... 
and the true purport of these words becomes 
for them merely the means, if not the 





Democracy leads to oligarchy and 






This chapter investigates Schmitt’s elaboration of two distinct forms of authority: a 
‘democratic’ form between 1923 and 1932 and a ‘Nazi’ alternative based on the Führer-
prinzip from 1932 to 1939. In the former period, Schmitt relinquished the basic premise 
of monarchical politics, a hierarchically structured society, in order to elaborate a 
‘democratic’ theory of politics commensurate with contemporary public opinion. In the 
democratic writings he broadly accepts Max Weber’s 1917 diagnosis of the political 
situation in Germany: 
 
Democratisation can certainly be obstructed — for the moment — 
because powerful interests, prejudices and cowardice are allied in 
opposing it. But it would soon emerge that the price to be paid for 
this would be the entire future of Germany. All the energies of the 
masses would then be engaged in a struggle against a state in which 




Accepting that ‘monarchy’s hour has tolled’, Schmitt turned his attention to the political 
institutions of Weimar era Germany and the nature of democratic legitimation.
4
 In his 
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‘democratic writings’ Schmitt develops an account of politics in which the fundamental 
source of political authority is popular acclamation. 
 
The most proper or actual activity, capability and function of the 
people, the core of every expression of the people, the originary 
democratic phenomenon, what Rousseau had in mind as actual 





Among the difficulties posed by Schmitt’s ‘democratic writings’ are two with a 
particular relevance to the problem of authority. The first is a puzzle concerning how the 
act of acclamation relates to authority. What theoretical model describes the mechanism 
by which an act of assembly affirms, constitutes or generates authority. If Hobbes relied 
on a constructive model of cultus as the cultivation of potentia, then we can ask of 
Schmitt’s work is there a similar explanatory framework elaborating the political logic of 
an assembled crowd? How does acclamation work, according to Schmitt? At the centre of 
this puzzle is the collective entity ‘the people’ (das Volk) and reflecting his critique of the 
collective subject in Dictatorship a major stake in these works is precisely what can such 
a political entity do. The second difficulty concerns the relationship between the 
democratic authority derived from acclamation and the Führerprinzip of the Nazi 
writings from 1933. Is the authority of the Führer consistent with Schmitt’s earlier 
political structure?  
 In this chapter, I argue that acclamation is central to Schmitt’s articulation of a 
democratic form of authority. I demonstrate how this is dependent on a revisionist 
conception of democracy and an understanding of the people as a concrete assembly with 
limited but specifically ‘active’ capacities. I show that among the various influences, 
sources and references, that of Georges Sorel’s energetic and enthusiastic vision of 
political activity is central, but often overlooked in the secondary literature. 
Consequently, I demonstrate that Schmitt understands acclamation as a mode of assent 
(in a particular sense distinct from voting, legal or contractual consent). Finally, I turn to 
Schmitt’s Führerprinzip and the Nazi writings and argue that these demonstrate a 
proximity to the Volksgeist models but that the Führerprinzip remains a relatively 
incoherent or incomplete conception of authority, no longer reliant on acclamation. I 
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offer a nuanced account of relation between the two periods, suggesting there are aspects 
of continuity and discontinuity. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first I reconstruct Schmitt’s anti-
liberal conception of ‘democracy’ tracing its sources and antitheses. I argue that Schmitt 
adopts Sieyès’ conception of the pouvoir constituant, but the demise of its legitimating 
ideas — natural right and the autarchy of the nation— deprives it of justification.
6
 In 
section two, I turn to Schmitt’s conception of the people. I argue that Schmitt draws on 
the romantic doctrine of the Volksgeist. However, its passive conception of the political 
entity (based on divine or quasi-divine legitimation under the guise of history) is ill-
suited to the political and intellectual situation of twentieth-century Europe. Though 
Schmitt preserves the Hegelian ‘ethical substance’ from this doctrine, he transforms it 
using: (i) a Hegelian-Marxist logic of negation, abstracting and relativising the traditional 
model and eliminating its totalised systematic form; and (ii) an energetic and enthusiastic 
understanding ‘opposition’ (scission/division) drawn from Georges Sorel, with which 
Schmitt reformulates ‘the political’ as the ‘utmost degree of intensity of a union or 
separation’.
7
 Recalling the role of public participation in Hobbes’ account of worship, 
Schmitt displaces Hobbes’ ritual ceremonial performance for an acclamatory 
demonstration of faith. The third section reconstructs Schmitt’s conception of 
acclamation. I argue that Schmitt understands the operation of acclamation on a model of 
‘assent’ and I distinguish this from voting, legalisation and contractual consent. 
Precursors are given by Sorel’s enthusiastic support of myth, but Schmitt attenuates the 
mythical dimension for an assertoric religious exclamation indicating a blurring of the 
distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Finally, in the fourth section on the Nazi writings, I 
show that the introduction of the Führerprinzip marks Schmitt’s abandonment of the 
model of acclamatory authority. I argue that in this period Schmitt returns to a 
problematic resembling an immanent revision of the personal authority of the 
monarchical writings. In this period Schmitt struggles to produce a concrete model for 
leadership and ultimately relies again on a structure analogous to Christian concepts of 
dignity.  
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1 ‘Democracy’ in Weimar 
In the 1920s, Schmitt develops an alternative model of democratic politics, based on acts 
of acclamation, opposed to the prevailing liberal-parliamentary alternative. Although it is 
assembled from a variety of disparate sources, Schmitt’s fundamental premise is the 
assertion that ‘state power [Gewalt] derives from the people’, a presumption typical of 
Modern democratic constitutions and exemplified in the first article of the Weimar 
Republic.
8
 In order to situate the detailed discussion, I offer the following preliminary 
outline of Schmitt’s theory of democratic politics. This is intended only as a loose guide 
establishing the general structure of Schmitt’s framework. 
 In agreement with much twentieth-century political theory, Schmitt identifies the 
foundation of democratic politics as the people, das Volk, an entity/union [Einheit] of 
individuals.
9
 However, precisely how this entity is constituted or determined is the key 
problem and this is addressed in detail in the following section of the chapter. Broadly, 
Schmitt tends to depict the people as a kind of amoebic mass, unified as an entity but 
elastic and unstructured. He describes it as an unorganised ‘formless formative 
capacity’.
10
 It emerges as a political entity out of a field that may be marked by various 
non-political divisions and groupings (ethical, cultural, religious, biological, economic 
and so on). But to exist politically as a people, a group must decide to distinguish itself 
from an enemy.
11
 With the decision on the friend and enemy a group is given political 
existence and Schmitt explicitly defines ‘the political’ by associating it with a sphere of 
conflict and the ‘real possibility’ of life and death combat.
12
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Relying loosely on Sieyès’ distinction between the pouvoir constituant and the 
pouvoir constitué, Schmitt distinguishes the formless and unorganised people from the 
organised political form established and described by a constitution.
13
 One of the specific 
capacities of the people is its power [Gewalt] to give itself a ‘political form’, an organised 
counterpart defined by a legal constitution.
14
 Unlike Hobbes’ people and multitude, after 
giving itself a constitution, the people is not dissolved or destroyed, but remains intact, 
alongside the political form. It can continue to act, however, only by acts of acclamation 
or expressions of public opinion. 
In his account of democratic politics, Schmitt emphasises the principle of 
equality/sameness [Gleichheit] between all those who belong to the political entity and 
largely ignores the liberal claims for a second principle of freedom or liberty. His model 
of democracy is constructed in opposition to the prevailing liberal parliamentarism. In 
particular, Schmitt aims to displace questions of constitutional legitimacy from the sphere 
of legality to one of ‘actual activity, capability and function’.
15
 This is carried out through 
an excavation of the ‘principles’ and thus explanatory framework (metaphysics, theology 
or physics) of politics in general. Schmitt traces the crisis of Weimar to an incoherence in 
the ‘intellectual foundations’ of the institutions of ‘parliamentary government’, such that 
the cause precipitating the imminent failure of the republic is the liberal confusion of 
legality for legitimacy. This was exacerbated by the transition from an 
Honoratiorenpolitik (a politics of notables) typical of the early- to mid-nineteenth century 
to the party-based ‘mass politics’ characteristic of Schmitt’s era. According to Schmitt, 
liberal theorists failed to recognise that the legitimacy of modern bureaucracy remained 
dependent on traditional concepts of honour.
16
 The two foci of contestation are (i) the 
correct understanding of ‘democracy’ and (ii) the nature of ‘the people’ and its capacities 
in politics.  
For liberals in the 1920s, ‘democracy’ referred generally to parliamentary, 
representative forms of government and the people was understood as an aggregate of 
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individuals, often based on national identification. Its ‘capacities’ are conceived as legal 
rights or competencies which are limited and strictly circumscribed by the constitution.
17
 
For the intellectual sources of this vision of democracy, Schmitt cites a range of figures, 
including John Locke, Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, Benjamin Constant, François 
Guizot, Montesquieu, and Jeremy Bentham. This supposedly false democracy, Schmitt 
counters with an alternative constructed from a disparate set of sources including 
Emmanuel Sieyès, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Alexis de 




The liberal tradition aims to limit ‘politics’ to a strictly delimited arena of 
contestation contained by an ostensibly apolitical transcendent horizon. This could be 
through a personalist model, such as Benjamin Constant’s ‘neutral power’ where the 
constitutional monarch stands above the ‘sphere of political agitations’.
19
 The charismatic 
leader in Max Weber’s political theory arguably continues this tradition. Alternatively, 
impersonal models were developed by Guizot and Mill where the limit is ‘justice, truth 
and reason’.
20
 In both cases, however, the horizon has a privileged relation to truth.
21 
Contestation focused on the nature of the ‘sovereignty of the people’. Constant treated it 
explicitly as a ‘jurisdiction’ legally granted to the people, while Guizot rejected the 
concept entirely.
22
 Schmitt eschews both these positions. Against Constant he accords 
absolute sovereignty to the people refusing its delimitation and against Guizot he accepts 
the ultimately decisionist and despotic potential of democracy as unavoidable and 
perhaps a positive source of vitality. Despite the pretensions of liberalism, which claimed 
rationality itself carried authority (manifest in legal proceduralism), for Schmitt, the true 
source of parliamentary legitimacy is the historically determined dignity [Würde] of 
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parliament itself and an implicit ‘sacralisation [Weihe] of legality’ on which the 
parliamentary legislative state is based.
23
 
Schmitt’s alternative true democracy draws various ideas from the works of 
Rousseau, Proudhon, Tocqueville and Sieyès. Ignoring the complex history and 
revaluation of the term, Schmitt amalgamates these various sources forming a vision of 
direct democracy based on the fundamental and authoritative capacity of an assembly to 
‘acclaim’.
24
 From Tocqueville, Schmitt takes the idea that ‘democracy’ is an état social, 
expressed in the ‘principle of equality’. While Tocqueville was critical of the democratic 
demand for equality, he understood democratic equality as a ‘hatred of privilege’ 
demanding the similarity of individuals all ‘forced through the same sieve.’
25
 The 
demand for ‘democracy’ is thus manifest as a demand for an ‘egalitarian society’ and the 
destruction of the privilege state of the ancien régime.
26
 In addition, the distinction 
between a social demand for democracy (equality) and a political form, evident in 
Tocqueville and Guizot, enables Schmitt to assert that there was nothing contradictory in 
a ‘democratic monarchy’.
27
 In German history this was exemplified in the Wilhelmine 
era, which the historian Margaret Anderson describes as a ‘monarchical democracy’ in 
the period following Bismark’s extension of the suffrage in 1871.
28
  
 Against parliamentary models, Schmitt defines democracy via a ‘series of 
identities’, likely taken directly from Proudhon, who writes: 
 
The democratic ideal is that the masses who are governed should at 
the same time govern, and that society should be the same thing as 
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the state, and the people the same thing as the government, just as in 




In Constitutional Theory, Schmitt appends to these formulations Sieyès’ distinction 
between the pouvoir constituant (constitution-making power) and the pouvoir constitué 
(constituted powers).
30
 This dualist schema provides the core structure for Schmitt’s 
articulation of democratic authority.
31
 Against Benjamin Constant, Sieyès insisted the 
originary political power was not something ‘granted’ or legally circumscribed. Schmitt, 
ignoring Sieyès’ distinction between the ‘nation organized as a political body’ and a 
scattered ‘immense flock of people’, assigns the pouvoir constituant to the people [das 
Volk].
32
 The key premise adopted by Schmitt is Sieyès’ claim that there is no ‘antecedent 
authority’ to make a grant of power and the only law that precedes the nation is natural 
law/right [droit naturel].
33
 Although Sieyès locates the original power with the nation, his 
account is far from Schmitt’s version of a direct democracy. Instead, for Sieyès, the task 
of legislation is delegated to a representative government, who must ‘truly belong to the 
Third Estate’, where the latter is defined as a relatively homogenous ‘nation’ and equated 




The foundational legitimation of the power of the nation, which in Sieyès is 
conceived as ambiguously as both a right and a capacity, is based on (i) a presumption of 
natural law (droit naturel) and (ii) an argument for the economic self-sufficiency 
(autarchy) of the nation. In the first case, on the model of a social contract, the consent of 
individuals, by an act of free will produces a ‘legitimate association’ and an obligation. 
The guarantee of this relation between consent, obligation and legitimacy is, however, 
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natural law [droit naturel].
35
 For Sieyès, a ‘nation is formed solely by natural law [droit 
naturel].’ It is prior to and above the nation and the source of all the rights of the nation.
36
 
Natural law is further equated with morality and ‘just and natural means.’
37
 Thus, 
‘legitimate association’ stands in opposition to the ‘gift of the strongest’. However, 
Sieyès offers a second mode of legitimation with organic and economic bases. In order to 
‘survive and prosper’ a nation requires a certain amount of work and as Sieyès points out: 
in public services, ‘nineteen out of twenty of those employed… are members of the Third 
Estate.’ Rather than the autonomy, or self-legislating capacity of the nation, it is the self-
sufficiency that marks the Third Estate as the nation. The Third Estate, ‘within itself, 
contain[s] everything needed to form a complete nation.’
38
 The privileged order is merely 
a ‘burden’ on the ‘strong, robust man’ of the third estate. It is ‘a frightful disease 
devouring the living flesh of the body of its unhappy victim’ or a ‘malignant tumor.’
39
 
Schmitt takes up the dualist architecture of Sieyès’ political field, but disregards 
the foundational presumptions of economic self-sufficiency (autarchy) and natural law 
(droit naturel). This leaves him with a foundational void, an absence of legitimation or 
authority. Even consent alone, as Hobbes was aware, requires some additional source of 
legitimation for effectivity. Schmitt develops Sieyès’ model of the political entity and its 
capacities in order to fill this void with the idea of a ‘political decision’ firstly on the 
friend/enemy distinction, and secondly as the act of acclamation. 
 
2 The People and the Enemy 
The foundation of democratic politics is the political capacity, power or right of the 
people. Before turning to the practice of acclamation, I trace Schmitt’s attempts to 
reconceive the people as an active entity constituted by the political decision on the 
enemy. I argue that while Schmitt draws on the romantic doctrine of the Volksgeist 
(especially Hegel’s modifications of it), he abstracts from it on the basis of a Hegelian-
Marxist logic of negation and transform it into a politics of ‘intensity’ influenced by 
George Sorel’s energetic understanding of political ‘opposition’ (scission/division). 
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(i) The Doctrine of the Volksgeist 
There is an intrinsic passivity to the nationalism of the Volksgeist doctrine due to its 
polemical orientation against the interventionist politics of the French revolutionaries.
40
 
The foundational models for the doctrine are taken from Herder’s texts of the eighteenth 
century. A people is unified by a common language, out of which emerges ‘naturally’ 
(meaning passively) a specific culture [Bildung] uniquely attuned to the concrete time, 
place and age of human development.
41
 Each people or nation is a closed entity with a 
specific internal system of practices, institutions, laws, religion, morals, virtues and social 
forms.
42
 In particular, each specific Volksgeist includes a political constitution. It is a 
living organic ‘creature’ that has its own stages and cycles of life, but importantly can 
grow autonomously without human intervention.
43
 Conservative German Romantics 
argue that the folk traditions of traditional communities possess a ‘greater wisdom’ than 
interventionary rationalist projects. They emphasise the religious elements depicting the 
‘concrete historical tradition’ as the only possible source of ‘salvation’.
44
 Schmitt’s 1919 
critique of the German romantics identifies their deification of history as a defining 
trait.
45
 He is critical of their ‘new ontology’ which imagined ‘history’ as a new power 
[Macht] of legitimation.
46
 Although Schmitt is more sympathetic to the French counter-
revolutionaries such as Maistre and Bonald, Maistre’s depiction of providence acting 
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behind the back of humanity had little relevance to the situation in 1920s Germany when 
the situation demanded action, not passivity.
47
 
 Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation demonstrates a paradoxical attempt to 
re-orient the Volksgeist for political action against Napoleon’s occupation of parts of 
‘Germany’. He demands a return to the original source of character and superiority of 
German nation, its ‘original language’ and hence ancient Teutonic greatness.
48
 However, 
this is to be achieved through a progressivist project of national education, projecting a 
salvific eternal German nation and humanity itself.
49
 In Fichte’s programme for a 
national Bildung, there are clear echoes of Hobbes’ religiously inspired educational 
project: references to cultivation and the educational use of the sabbath. It is precisely 
this pedagogical programme that Schmitt rejects.
50
 He shared Fichte’s anthropological 
assumption that man is by nature dangerous rather than good. But he regularly denounces 
as ‘apolitical’ attempts to eradicate conflict through education.
51
 Schmitt derogates 
Fichte’s political thought as a ‘naive schoolmasterly “educational dictatorship”’.
52 




 Aspects of Hegel’s rationalisation of the Volksgeist as an ‘ethical substance 
[sittliche Substanz]’ are adopted by Schmitt.
54 
Recalling Herder, Hegel writes that each 
Volk ‘has the constitution appropriate and proper to it’ in the sense that it is attuned to its 
particular geographical conditions and moment in history, ‘it is the work of centuries.’
55
 
Schmitt rejects Hegel’s progressivist philosophy of history, which ultimately legitimates 
his modern state form. But there are parallels between Schmitt’s insistence on a 
substantial equality and the foundational role, for Hegel, of a shared Gesinnung, 
disposition or attitude, or ‘ethical life [Sittlichkeit].’ That is, a custom and habit as a 
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‘second nature’ supporting the state form.
56
 This Fichtean-Hegelian conceptualisation 
was directly translated to a juridical context in the writings of Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny.  
With parallels to Schmitt’s opposition to Kelsen's legal positivism, Savigny takes 
up the Volksgeist against the proposals to systematise Prussian and Austrian law on the 
model of the French Civil Code.
57
 Instead the law must be left to develop organically and 
naturally over the course of history.
58
 Although there are further parallels with Schmitt’s 
dualist vision of the constitution, in Savigny’s account there is no moment of decision. 
Between the Volksgeist and its bodily existence in a constitution there is merely a passage 
of ‘appearance’ [Erscheinung] or ‘natural manifestation’.
59
 For Savigny, the people only 
has the capacity to act after it has been given a body and real personality in the existence 
of the state.
60
 Schmitt on the other hand demands an act, if in the limited form of the 
acclaim: yes or no. 
Schmitt largely avoids the terminology associated with the Volksgeist, except for 
‘Substanz’ and ‘substanzielle’. These terms evoke Hegel’s ethical substance, the ‘sittliche 
Substanz,’ which as a ’necessity of nature’ provides an external determination of the 
Volksgeist.
61
 In defining this substance Schmitt resorts to a series of examples that recall 
the ethical sphere of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit.  
 
[Democratic equality] is about the substance of equality [Substanz 
der Gleichheit]. It can be found in certain physical and moral 
qualities, for example, in civic virtue, in arete, the classical 
democracy of vertus (vertu). In the democracy of the English sects 
during the seventeenth century equality was based on a consensus of 
religious convictions [Überzeugungen]. Since the nineteenth century 
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Schmitt’s examples suggest that any ethic, virtue or conviction can form the substance of 
the people or in The Concept of the Political, the ‘status’ or ‘situation’ of a people [Status 
or Zustand]. In later editions (1932) this is described as the authoritative or literally 
‘standard-giving situation [maßgebende Zustand]’ of a people.
63
 The variety of examples 
suggest an indifference to the particular content constituting the ethical substance and 
equality of the people. The only stipulation is that the ethic is not universally affirmed by 
all humanity. In order to constitute a political grouping there must be the ‘possibility of a 
distinction’ between the equal and unequal.
64
 Membership of the political entity rests on 
equality and those unequal are excluded as the enemy. The particular content is entirely 
contingent, the ‘substance of equality can vary among different democracies and 
historical periods.’
65
 For religious communities, the profession of a specific doctrine or 
beliefs and performance of specific requirements, insofar as they demonstrate a ‘religious 
feeling,’ can become the ‘foundation of a new community’.
66
  
In the English reception of Schmitt’s works, a false sense of continuity with the 
Volksgeist tradition is projected by the recurrent use of the term ‘way of life’ in 
translations of The Concept of the Political. However, Schmitt never actually uses 
Fichte’s term Weise von Leben. Instead, he utilises an array of formulations such as Art 
Existenz, Existenzform, politischen Existenz, seinsmäßige Art von leben, Art Leben and so 
on. For the adherents of the Volksgeist, the determining demand was the rejection of 
conscious intervention, thus the ‘way of life’ is depicted as a complete system of life, 
perfectly calibrated to the situation by transcendent, external mechanisms such as history, 
or divine providence. Schmitt’s account of the political entity and the friend-enemy 
distinction breaks with this image in two significant ways.  
Firstly, his account of the substance of equality does not require a complete 
system of culture. In Schmitt’s democratic writings the demand for homogeneity is, at 
least ostensibly, attenuated and presented as only the demand for adherence to one 
important but not necessarily totalising ‘standard’ of existence, (i.e seinsmäßige Art von 
Leben). Secondly, Schmitt breaks with the Volksgeist doctrine by inserting a moment of a 
decision in which ‘actual participants’ must ‘recognise, understand and judge the 
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concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.’
67
 The demand for a decision 
marks the uncertainty in cases of confrontation with another entity. If the political 
demands a ‘genuine decision’ then the political entity cannot already be determined as a 
complete order [Gesamtordnung]. The introduction of this latter term to Schmitt’s 
lexicon in 1934 thus marks a disjuncture with the earlier democratic writings.
68
 Further, 
although Schmitt often implies the friend-enemy distinction applies only to relations 
between state actors, in 1932 he clearly identifies the ‘enemies’ of Weimar as the 
‘National-Socialists, Communists, [and] the godless.’
69
 Internal actors who reject the 
substantial content of the Weimar constitution must also be recognised and understood as 
enemies of the ‘substance of equality’ of the present system. 
 
(ii) The Enemy 
Instead of positing a metaphysical creature, the Volksgeist, Schmitt, inspired by Lukács 
and Sorel, develops a general account of the political entity expanding on the antagonistic 
visions of politics in Fichte, Hegel and Weber. One of Schmitt’s few references to a ‘way 
of life [Art Leben]’, occurs in the 1923 edition of Crisis. Schmitt refers to the bourgeois 
as a threat to the ‘way of life’ of Russians and proletarians.
70
 Foreshadowing the 1927 
conception of the enemy, Schmitt notes that in Marxism the ‘Hegelian dialectic has 
served to create an image of the enemy [Gegner] that was capable of intensifying all the 
emotions of hatred and contempt.’
71
 In the Tagebücher in 1926, Schmitt returns to this 
problem in a passage suggesting that the friend-enemy distinction is imagined as a 
generalisation of a Hegelian-Marxist conception of ‘negation.’ Schmitt offers an 
unexpected pairing of Karl Marx and Erik Peterson.  
 
The proletariat in Marx is negatively determined; the poor 
(according to Peterson) also only negatively determined; the people 
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Although Schmitt refers often to a ‘substance’ of homogeneity and a type of life, the 
particular content is only determined abstractly, or negatively, in a Hegelian sense 
through an external relation to another content. The Hegelian-Marxist aspects are most 
pronounced in his remarks on the people in the 1923 edition. Influenced by Lukács 
History and Class, Consciousness, Schmitt treats the people as a problem of 
recognition.
73
 Schmitt writes that a ‘distance always remains’ between the ‘palpable 
reality’ and the results of identification. It ‘is not a matter of something actually equal 
legally, politically or sociologically, but rather of identifications.’ The collective entity 
exists only in an ideological sense, as the product of ‘techniques of propaganda and the 
manipulation of public opinion’ or a Sorelian myth.
74
 In the concrete sense, the ‘masses 
are sociologically and psychologically heterogenous.’
75
  
 Although Schmitt’s democratic writings (1923-32) never openly advocate a 
mythical politics, there are clear resonances with and allusions to Sorel’s theory.
76
 For 
instance, vertu, key for Sorel’s politics, is taken as exemplary of the ‘ethical substance’ 
required for the ‘minimal homogeneity’ of a political people and Schmitt explicitly 
adopts much of Sorel’s Bergsonian lexicon of ‘energy’, ‘life instinct’ and ‘enthusiasm’.
77
 
Although ostensibly descriptive there is something suggestive in his remarks that 
Mussolini’s national myth has inspired ‘another authority… based on the new feeling for 
order, discipline and hierarchy’.
78
 However, Schmitt resists totalising this minimal ethical 
substance as a Gesamtordnung as he will in the Nazi writings, and as the proponents of 
the Volksgeist had.
79
 Instead his account is pulled in two directions. One requires a 
substantial ethical imperative as a foundation for a political union, but another aims at an 
abstract and general logic, through which the political is reduced to a ‘degree of intensity’ 
that can be applied to any opposition. The first reconnects Schmitt with conservative 
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visions of the nation. But the second takes inspiration from Lukács and Sorel and inspires 
Schmitt to transform antagonism itself into a kind of energy or vital force supporting 
authority.  
 
(iii) Enthusiasm and Energy 
Fin-de-siècle Europe expressed a curious political and social interest in the concept of 
energy. It appears in nationalist rhetoric such as Maurice Barrès’ trilogy Roman de 
l'énergie nationale. Futurists such as Marinetti link energy, the human body and 
politics.
80
 Utopian visions of reform appear under the name ‘Social Energeticism.’
81
 And 
in Schmitt’s works we find occasional references to ‘political energy.’
82
 He often uses the 
term ‘living force’ [lebendige Kraft] in a political context.
83
 The nationalist adoption of 
this term grew naturally out of the Volksgeist tradition given the connection between the 
concept of energy and the ‘living force’ which was supposed to provide the motor of 
action to the living community, in contradistinction to the ‘mechanical view of society.’
84
 
Mechanical accounts of the state were often based on an analogy with a clockwork 
mechanism, powered by the force of a ‘mainspring’ [Triebfeder]. As Fichte explains, 
since it is impossible for the mainspring to act on itself, the mechanical political state is 
haunted by its impotence or subordination to a unified and more powerful external force.
 
The creaturely nature of the Volksgeist offered an alternative solution, since it was 
presumed to be driven by an internal ‘living force’.
85
  
Despite Schmitt’s rejection of the Volksgeist his work is often informed by this 
structural opposition between the (i) mechanical and calculable and the (ii) vital and 
living. In Roman Catholicism, this dichotomy is mapped onto the antagonism between 
Protestantism and Catholicism. In the democratic writings the decisive question for 
Schmitt is often to identify the ‘living idea’ behind a political form or the ‘living force’ 
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possessed by particular doctrine.
86
 In Volksentscheid the dichotomy of mechanical/living 
is given form in the threat that an ‘organised/formalised people loses its living matter and 
force’
87
 Recalling the ‘creative energy’ of Bergson and Sorel’s vitalism Schmitt refers to 
the people as bearer of the pouvoir constituant:  
 
As an entity that is not organised, they also cannot be dissolved. So 
long as they exist at all and intend to endure, their life force and 





Drawing on Sorel, life and the living are defined by their opposition to the formalised, 
organised and calculable. Living political energy stands in opposition to the systemised 
legal system that for Hans Kelsen simply is the state.  
Sorel’s energetic conception of class conflict also foreshadows the dynamic sense 
of antagonism as an ‘intensity’ on which Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction rests. In 
Sorel’s Reflections on Violence, class division [scission] is identified as a source of 
energy for both parties involved. Class conflict and the violence of the proletariat will 
also ‘restore to the bourgeoisie something of its energy’.
89
 The ‘line of cleavage 
[scission]’ between classes generates the energy and excitation, without which ‘socialism 
cannot fulfil its historic role’.
90 
Foreshadowing the function of acclamation for Schmitt 
(as the regular conscious practice of a political entity), Sorel writes that ‘if a capitalist 
class is energetic, it is constantly affirming its determination to defend itself’.
91
 For 
Schmitt’s political group, the friend/enemy antithesis ‘still remains actual/effective 
[wirklich] today.’ It ‘is an ever present possibility [reale Möglichkeit] for every people 
existing in the political sphere.’
92
 Both Sorel and Schmitt depict the possibility of conflict 
as a source of energy and enthusiasm. In Sorel this is explicitly linked with authority 
through mythical ‘images of battle.’  
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The energies of the mind can be directed and shaped by an ethic or images to 
produce an effective authority.
93
 The efficacy of images is depicted as a reserve of energy 
to be put to use in politics. ‘Images of battle’, when recalled, can be a source of energy or 
enthusiasm for ‘men who are participating in great social movements’.
94
 Collections of 
such images constitute the myths, which form part of a mental ‘reserve’ and the 
preparations for struggle.
95
 Unlike ‘a doctrine expressed entirely in words’, images (or 
myths) have an intuitive and direct efficacy that cannot be deflected.
96
 Sorel depicts such 
myths as a replacement source of energy for religion, since ‘religion is daily losing its 
efficacy with the people’ and is being replaced with mere ‘probabilism, mechanical rites 
and proceedings more or less related to magic.’
97
 Throughout Reflections, Sorel depicts 
myths and images as a reserve of energy that when added or applied to an ethic becomes 
a source of force and efficacy in politics.  
Similar themes are central to Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. The political 
distinction ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation’.
98
 This fluid 
intensity is mutable and convertible, it is not tied to a particular sphere of human life, but 
can flow into or draw upon the various ‘autonomous’ regions of life such as the moral, 
aesthetic, or economic. Unlike the totalised ‘way of life’ typical of Volksgeist doctrine, 
Schmitt depicts the political distinction as a convertible intensity that can, but also need 
not, draw on the moral, the aesthetic or the economic. In Derrida’s reading of Schmitt, 
this aspect manifests a puzzle in which ‘the political’ appears as both (i) ‘particular and 
grounded’, a concrete antagonism, but also (ii) as a general ‘determination cutting 
through all other regions of the human world’.
99
 Rather than treating the political as a 
spectre or ghost, as Derrida does, I suggest it could be interpreted according to a model of 
‘energy’.  
In the nineteenth century, a new conception of energy developed in the physical 
sciences. Energy was the source of all movement, force, and work. It designated a general 
universal ‘substance’ that could be converted and transformed into different types of 
                                                 
93
 Sorel, Reflections, 249–51. 
94
 Sorel, 20. 
95
 Sorel, 5, 28. Sorel notes that a ‘reserve of ideas stirred up by recent reading’ can be ‘exhausted’, 
recalling the logic of the fuel for the ‘motor [moteur] of the mind.’ 
96
 Sorel, 24. 
97
 Sorel, 58, 238. 
98
 CP, 26. My italics. 
99
 Derrida, Friendship, 125. 
177 
activity. But it existed in the world only in concrete and particular quanta.
100
 Historically, 
the term ‘energy’ referred to ‘efficacy’ or ‘force.’ Often it simply referred to an entity in-
effect, or in-act.
101
 For example, its etymological ancestor, enérgeia, Agamben renders as 
‘being-at-work.’
102
 Derrida focusses on Schmitt’s use of the term ‘reale Möglichkeit’. His 
problem is that this term refers to a modality which breaks with the Aristotelian 
dichotomy of potentiality and act (dúnamis and enérgeia, virtuality and actuality).
103
 
However, would this problem also apply to the contemporary (post-thermodynamic) 
sense of potential energy? Is the latent energy stored in an electrical battery actual or 
virtual? The potential energy of a raised mass or quanta of fuel seems to be more than a 
virtual ‘possibility’. It manifests a modality of raw capacity, a ‘real possibility’. It is 
indeterminate but real, a reserve that can be put to work. In a later text Schmitt describes 




Nonetheless, in Schmitt’s work the energetic framework of the political remains 
undeveloped. If it underlies his conceptual transformation of the sphere of politics into a 
‘degree of intensity’ it is never acknowledged. In contrast, Sorel specifically takes up the 
ideological relation between political forms and the physical sciences.
105
 One of the 
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general presumptions of Sorel’s political theory is that there exists a structural analogy 
between the physical sciences and political institutions.
106
 There are clear parallels 
between this and Schmitt’s formulation of ‘political theology’ as a structural homology 
between theology and the modern theory of the state.
107
 Similarly, Sorel claims there is a 
transhistorical traffic of ideas and concepts between physics and politics.
108
 He constructs 
analogies between gravity, monarchical power and the logic of progress and argues that 
experimental physics provides structural models for political institutions.
109
 Sorel even 
cites the advent of new sense of energy for the disruption of the Volksgeist doctrine. The 
distinction between ‘mechanical force’ and the ‘living force’ of creaturely beings 
(including the political being) was undermined by the universal conception of energy.
110 
Both rely on ‘storehouses of solar energy’ or ‘explosives’ manufactured by life. Inspired 
by theories of Brownian motion, he argues that its spontaneous motion attests to an 
unknown form of energy with repercussions for popular political movements.
111
 
Schmitt avoids following Sorel into the natural sciences. Instead, he attempts to 
combine (i) the ethical substance of the Volksgeist, (ii) the determinate negation of 
Lukács’ Hegelian-Marxism and (iii) the enthusiastic antagonism of Sorel’s creative 
violence. Reminiscent of Hobbes’ relativised account of power in his theory of worship, 
Schmitt relativises ethical substance. However, he displaces the outward performance of 
ceremonial ritual to one of a visible performance of faith. The ethical content of a 
particular people is determined only negatively in confrontation with an alternative. An 
ethical substance is only consciously taken up, after it has been thrown into question by 
confrontation with another content. Since the political is defined by a moment of 
‘conscious willing’, the ethical substance must first be recognised in its particularity as 
something to be defended. Only subsequently, is it transformed into a political distinction 
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by an increase in intensity and enthusiasm provoked by antagonistic opposition. 
However, just as Hobbes requires a supplemental ‘sign’ of material power, potentia, 
Schmitt requires a visible enthusiastic demonstration of faith, via acclamation, thereby 
offering a ‘sign’ of its energy.  
 
(iv) Participation 
In Constitutional Theory, Schmitt enumerates a series of examples of the ‘substance of 
equality’ across ‘different democracies and historical periods’. 
112
 Beginning in Greece, 
Schmitt cites living according to arete as the ‘relevant mark of distinction … rendering 
citizens equivalent.’
113
 For Machiavelli, Montesquieu and the Jacobins possession of 
virtus or vertu is decisive for a citizen. For the Levellers, and the Puritans of 
Massachusetts, religious confession determines equality among the people. For the 
Bolsheviks, ‘class-based homogeneity’ is essential. And for the dominant post-
revolutionary conception of democracy, national belonging, ‘the conscious willing of … 
the commonality of historical life’ is key. Although Schmitt notes that in the twentieth 
century a ‘nationally homogeneous state appears … as something normal’, he treats it as 
a contingent result of history.
114
 For Schmitt, the particular content of the ethical 
substance is only relatively determined and, unlike adherents of the Volksgeist, he does 
not presuppose that a political grouping is defined by systemic cultural totality. In the 
democratic writings, Schmitt is sceptical of the tendency of the ‘nationality principle’ to 
maximise homogeneity. There is a risk that such a radicalised total homogeneity would 
lead to a sub-political existence for the people. 
115
 All that is required of the ‘substance of 
equality’ is the possibility of inequality. Since ‘every genuine political concept includes 




 Instead, Schmitt displaces the point of emphasis to one of participation. In the 
enumerated examples, it is the visible performance of commitment to the particular 
ethical substance that is emphasised. Recalling Hobbes’ insistence that the truth of 
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religion lies in rites and ceremony, Schmitt centres on the demand made by the Puritans 
of Massachusetts that one ‘participate in the public religious service’. It is only ‘[b]ecause 
all state citizens participate in this substantive component, [that] they can be treated as 
equals.’
117
 Inverting the logic of Hobbes’ demand for worship, where participation in 
ceremony cultivates inequalities in power, for Schmitt participation is the means of 
ensuring substantial equality (gleichheit). Participation creates a ‘new religious feeling 
[which] becomes the foundation of a new community’.
118
 In the democratic writings, the 
mode of participation required is ‘acclamation’, ‘most proper or actual activity, capability 
and function of the people… the approving or rejecting call of the assembled crowd.’
119
  
 In Hobbes’ political theory the demand for worship arises as a result of an 
ostensibly scientific understanding of relations of material power [potentia] between 
individuals. According to the laws of nature, the material power of the sovereign is 
dependent on the public demonstration of its effectiveness. However, for Schmitt, the 
relation between subject and sovereign is displaced to one between subject and the 
substance of equality. Since the foundation of authority is the people, which are in turn 
defined only by equality, there is similar demand for public manifestation in acclamation. 
 
3 Acclamation: The People Can Only Cry ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
Although the importance of acclamation for Schmittian democracy is widely accepted, 
how it functions and how it is supposed to produce political authority or legitimation 
remains unclear.
120
 Schmitt himself does not provide a detailed or systematic account of 
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the practice. In the following, I reconstruct a more systematic account by piecing together 
aspects mentioned in various publications. The primary difficulty is in characterising the 
specific relationship between acclamation, right [Recht] and legality [Gesetz]. I argue that 
Schmitt depicts acclamation as a form of assent, distinct from voting procedures and both 
legalisation (modelled on positive law) and consent (modelled on a contract), but 
exhibiting an affinity to the Roman auctoritas. 
Schmitt’s explicit references to acclamation span only a brief period from 1926-
1933. There are suggestive remarks but no explicit use of the term in Dictatorship.
121
 In 
Political Theology, Roman Catholicism and the first edition (1923) of Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, it is not mentioned. Schmitt’s first use of the term in 
publication is the reference to acclamatio in the 1926 preface for the second edition of 
Crisis.
122
 Schmitt’s interest in the practice can be traced to his friendship with Erik 
Peterson, who completed a dissertation on ecclesial use of the practice.
123
 Schmitt, 
following suggestions already present in Peterson’s work, transfers the ecclesial practice 
to the political sphere. There are a few references to ‘acclamation’ in the Tagebücher of 
this period,
124
 but the most detailed discussion is found in the texts of 1927-33 such as 
Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren (1927) and Constitutional Theory (1928).
125
 The term 
is absent from The Concept of the Political (1927 & 1932). Additional brief remarks can 
be found in later essays: ‘Der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat’ (1928);
126
 ‘Wesen und Werden des 
Faschistischen Staates’ (1929);
127
 ‘Das Problem der innerpolitischen Neutralität des 
                                                                                                                                                 
448–68; Melissa Schwartzberg, ‘Prelude: Acclamation and Aggregation in the Ancient World’, in Counting 
the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
19–48. In addition, Larsen, for instance, writes that in the Homeric era descriptions of political procedure 
‘leave no room for the formal taking of votes,’ and instead relied on acclamation, ‘the old method of 
shouting to indicate agreement with a speaker’. Jakob A. O. Larsen, ‘The Origin and Significance of the 
Counting of Votes’, Classical Philology 44, no. 3 (1949): 164–8; Schwartzberg, ‘Prelude: Acclamation and 
Aggregation in the Ancient World’, 21. 
121
 See D, 240-1, fn24. Schmitt describes a practice of the Balìa of Florence that resembles acclamation: a 
limited people's assembly (of representatives) is convened, addressed and asked to nominate twelve men 
‘who, together, would be given as much authority and responsibility as the entire people of Florence. The 
question was repeated three times and the people answered three times “Yes”.’ The English translation uses 
the word ‘acclamation’ in one instance, but it translates Huldigung (homage). E54, D63. 
122
 Crisis, 16-7. The preface, with slight modifications, was also published independently in 1926 under the 
title ‘Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und moderner Massendemokratie.’ P&B, 52-66. 
123
 Schmitt’s Tagebücher attest to their weekly meetings in this period. See also Mehring, CS: Biography, 
160. 
124
 T1925-9, 15.11.25: 22, Schmitt refers to Handel as ‘Akklamationsmusic’; 7.10.27: 168, Schmitt writes 
of discussing acclamation with Eugene Rosenstock, 347; Schmitt writes that ‘acclamation has now 
disappeared from the Church’, 347. 
125
 V&V, 52-4, 56, 70, 75, 86; CT, 131, 143, 272, 275, 278, 287, 302-3, 306, 348, 370. 
126
 SGN, 48-9. 
127




 ‘Machtpositionen des Modernen Staates’ (1933);
129
 And in the 1930s, 
although the term ‘acclamation’ is not invoked, it clearly underlies his discussion of 
‘plebiscitary legitimation’ in Legality and Legitimacy.
130
  
From 1933 Schmitt ceased to speak of acclamation. In the texts of the Nazi 
period, such as State, Movement, People (1933) and On the Three types of Juristic 
Thought (1934) the act of acclamation is displaced by an emphasis on the oath of loyalty 
or allegiance.
131
 In the earlier texts there are occasional references to the oath [Eid], 
allegiance [Treue] or loyalty [Loyalität], terms which are central to questions of authority 
in the Nazi texts.
132
 However, where the oath is mentioned it tends to be denigrated as a 
‘formality’ that merely ‘supplements’ the existing political unity.
133
 For instance, in 
Constitutional Theory Schmitt discusses the ‘oath to the constitution’. Although this is an 
‘existential’ bond, the ‘oath is to the constitution in the actual and positive sense.’
134
 That 
is, the oath binds the individual to the written constitution (the constituted power), which 
is merely a secondary phenomenon derived from the ‘substantial’ political unity 
supported by acclamation. Thus, acts of acclamation and oath-taking pertain to different 
levels of political existence. Only the acclamation relates to the primordial substance of 
equality. It is an expression of the collective political will. The oath, which is primarily of 
use within the formal state structure, binds an individual to the secondary form of the 
political union, the constituted powers. Schmitt associates the oath with the logic of the 
contract, citing as examples the ‘oath of fealty’ typical of feudal political forms and the 
Swiss confederation of cantons, the oath-fellowship, Eidgenossenschaft formed through a 
series of treaties between the individual cantons.
135
 Although it rests on the substance of 
equality of Swiss nationals, the oath or treaty pertains to the subsequent formal level of 
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 Dyzenhaus’s remark that the ‘act of acclamation, [is] an informal 




(i) Acclamation and Democracy 
What then is the specific nature of acclamation, according to Schmitt? He extols in a 
hyperbolic fashion the originary significance of acclamation for democracy. It is the 
‘primordial democratic phenomena [demokratische Urphänomen]’.
138
 It is the original 
expression of the will of the people.
139
 Schmitt presents acclamation as an original and 
trans-historical requirement: ‘The acclamation is an eternal phenomenon of every 
political community. No state without a people, no people without acclamation.’
140
 While 
it is based on the ‘democratic principle’ it can support non-democratic political forms 
(pouvoir constitué), like the Wilhelmine ‘democratic monarchy’.
141
 Presidential elections 
and Caesaristic government forms must be legitimised by ‘acclamation’.
142
 Schmitt’s 
remarks recall Robert Michels’ assertion that ‘Caesarism is still democracy.’
143
 The 




These claims are supported by various strategies. Schmitt suggests it is 
foundational since it is ‘simple and elementary’.
145
 It is naturalised as a right: ‘the most 
natural and most inalienable right [Recht] of every people.’
146
 But it is also naturalised as 
an inherent ‘political instinct’, capacity or ability of any political union and as the 
‘natural form of the direct expression of a people's will’.
147
 It is the ‘most proper or actual 
activity, capability and function of the people, the core of every expression of the 
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people,’ a ‘creative capacity’.
148
 Schmitt’s strategy recalls Hobbes’ ambiguous reference 
to the rights of man in a state of nature as both physical capacities and moral rights. 
Schmitt’s third strategy is a reference to the self-evident, the intuitive or ‘feeling’ rather 
than rational deliberation.
149
 In a similar manner, in Political Parties, Michels notes that 
in political contexts, carrying motions through ‘acclamation’ or ‘general assent’ is ‘a fact 
of everyday experience’.
150
 Underlying Schmitt’s assertions is a model of the political 
entity based on a nostalgic image of the small community. The ‘self-evidence’ of 
Schmitt’s assertions presupposes an historico-logical trajectory, in which contemporary 
societies developed out of small communities. Referring to the acclamation as an 
immediate direct expression of the people presupposes the historical connection with an 




 The developmental logic and demand for immediate presence of the assembled 
community is also evident in Schmitt’s examples. He cites street demonstrations, public 
festivals, the audiences of theatres and sporting events, church services, crowds at racing 
tracks, and military events.
152
 These assemblies possess a political potential, but it is the 
act of acclamation which transforms the latent potential of a gathering into a political 
entity. Schmitt notes that ‘every popular assembly, even one that initially appears 
nonpolitical, intrinsically contains unexpected political possibilities’. For Schmitt, when a 
‘people engaged in acclamation is present [vorhanden]’, then it is ‘at least potentially a 
political entity’.
153
 Like the role of cultus for Hobbes, which generates the potentia of the 
commonwealth, Schmitt’s assembly must be actualised in a concrete form. It must be 
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made present, engaged in an act of acclamation in order to be transformed into a ‘political 
entity’.  
 
(ii) Acclamation contra Voting 
Schmitt insists that the political potential of an assembly exists only when it is not an 
‘organised interest group’.
154
 Whether it is the ‘organised’ form or the principle of private 
‘interests’ that proscribes political potential is unclear. Both factors play a role in the 
distinction between acclamation and the vote. Firstly, Schmitt objects to the priority of 
procedure and mechanism in contemporary vote counting. From his first references to the 
practice, Schmitt juxtaposes acclamation against the ‘meticulous statistical apparatus’ of 
the procedure of voting.
155
 He largely ignores the distinction between public and secret-
ballot voting.
156
 Except that when defining acclamation he always contrasts it with secret-
ballot systems, in order to strategically emphasise the publicity of acclamation against the 
private nature of the secret-ballot. However, he also appears to reject voting in general 
(whether public or secret) insofar as it equates democracy with an ‘arithmetical majority’ 
calculated through ‘normatively regulated processes’.
157
 Since the people is ‘bound to no 
particular process’, the primordiality of acclamation would also distinguish it from 
calculated majorities in public voting.
158
 
For Schmitt, the reduction of democratic participation to a technical problem of 
calculation leads inexorably towards depoliticisation, the very destruction of ‘the 
political’ and its replacement with the technocracy of ‘scientific-technical experts.’
159
 
This line of thought can be traced back to the Sorelian vitalism that equates organisation 
with mechanism and death. The ‘formless formative capacity’ of the people is their living 
force.
160
 The ‘completely formalized people lose their living being and power... the 
acclamation would have been organized away.’
161
 Liberal politics, as a politics of 
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procedure and secret-ballot voting, relies on ‘artificial machinery’ and demands a 
‘scientific-technical expert’.
162
 It isolates the individual and merely calculates a majority 
via formal methods. As we have seen, drawing explicitly on the vitalism of Bergson and 
Sorel, but implicitly also the German romantic philosophical tradition, Schmitt counters 
the mechanical with appeals to the ‘living mass and power’ of a people, the vital ‘creative 
capacity’ of the people expressed immediately and naturally through acclamation.
163
  
Secondly, he notes that ‘the individual vote transforms the distinctly democratic, 
or political, figure, the state citizen or citoyen, into a private man who, from the sphere of 
the private, … expresses a private opinion and casts his vote.’
164
 Schmitt insists that 
political participation marks the suspension of private individual interests and their 
substitution with group interests. In democracy, which is otherwise dominated by the 
principle of identity, this remains the one sphere of representation. In acclamation, the 
‘individual state citizen…. is present not in his “natural” condition as an individual 
person…. He is present as a state citizen, as “citoyen”’.
165
 In acclamation, the individual 
must represent, make present, the citizen.
166
 In Schmitt’s writings after 1933 this division 
between the natural individual and the political citizen is erased, apparently in response to 
the biological conception of the citizen propagated by the Nazi Regime.
167
 
For Schmitt, the problem with the procedural aggregation of private interests is 
the evasion of the ‘political decision’ which he suggests applies in both secret and public 
voting.
168
 That is, the evasion of ‘responsibility’ [Verantwortlichkeit]. There are two 
components. Firstly, liberal procedure leads inexorably towards ‘oversight’. A process in 
which a quasi-objective standard of judgement is simply applied in place of a decision.
169
 
Responsibility is denied by the appeal to objective standards. But secondly, the ‘result of 
such a vote will always be the preponderance of the politically uninterested over the 
bearers of conscious political responsibility’.
170
 The general apathy of the people and 
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their disinterest in politics ensure that the majority vote tends to the ‘minimum of 
political decision’.
171
 Schmitt suggests that even a public majority vote would lead to a 
minimum of ‘accountability’ [Verantwortlichkeit] by displacing the sense of participation 
with procedural standards. In voting, the uninterested majority determines the outcome, 
despite their general disinterest in political issues. 
 There are parallels between acclamation and Hobbes’ account of the 
‘authorisation’ of the sovereign.
172
 Both offer means of attributing responsibility to the 
people and appear partly modelled on theatrical performance.
173
 Schmitt’s examples of 
assemblies with political potential often distinguish between the actor and the audience. 
For Schmitt also, the publicity and visibility of acclamation (and its subsequent form 
public opinion) is grasped as a capacity to ensure responsibility or accountability for 
one’s political position.
174
 While Hobbes attempted to supplement the contract, with the 
logic of authorisation, Schmitt’s aim appears to be pure authorisation freed of the 
contract, since, as I argue in the following section (iv), Schmitt rejects the interpretation 
of acclamation as consent to a contract. 
 
(iii) The People Can Only Answer 
Schmitt plays on the etymological relation between Verantwortlichkeit (responsibility) 
and the verb antworten (to answer). The responsibility, or literally the answer-ability of 
the people for a given political decision, arises from giving an ‘answer’ to a question. 
Hence, the act of acclamation is limited to giving an answer to a particular question. 
Schmitt is adamant that the people, as a collective entity, has only the capacity to answer 
yes or no to a given question.
175
 The people cannot pose its own question, but only 
respond with approval or rejection [zustimmen oder ablehnen].
176
 Like contemporaries 
such as Walter Lippmam, William James, Robert Michels and others, Schmitt depicted 
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this limit as one of the capacities or abilities of the collective entity, rather than rights.
177
 
In the later works Schmitt does not offer any grounds for this claim, instead, he treats the 
counter-claim as requiring proof. It is not enough to simply provide a ‘terminological 
argument’ and ‘to define… a collective entity’ as a ‘genuine agent’, that is define it as a 
‘subject’.
178
 As my reading of Dictatorship in chapter three argues, for Schmitt, the 
impossibility of recognising the ‘commissary dictator’ in democratic regimes, itself 
suggests that the people lacks the capacity for deliberation and interventionary action. In 
Volksentschied, Schmitt continues along this line of thought and asks the question: ‘what 
above all the “people” can do’?
179
 Even so, his answers are ambiguous. At times he 
suggests hypothetically that if the people can formulate and initiate questions it would 
cease when the majority vote was taken.’
180
 Moreover, since the text is primarily 
concerned with the constitutionally determined plebiscites and initiatives it does not 
discuss in detail the originary capacities of the pouvoir constituant.  
What are the conditions of possibility pertaining to the people’s ability to 
deliberate or discuss? The shift from questions of the rights to the capabilities of the 
people implicitly requires an explanation of how this epiphenomena, ‘the people,’ a 
collective being, can possess such capacities. What must be presupposed for this 
capacity? In Schmitt’s account of acclamation it appears as both an originary act marking 
the existence of the people and as ongoing activity through which the strength of the 
political entity is increased. In the latter case, the political decision is merely one of 
acclaiming ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a specific question. The assembly acclaims (makes a political 
decision) by negating or affirming the predetermined question posed. Similarly, Schmitt 
often frames the originary political decision as one of negation or affirmation: the other is 
an enemy or a friend. The symmetry between the two examples of ‘political decision’ 
suggests a structural correspondence between the decision on ‘political existence’ as a 
simple yes or no answer (friend or enemy) and decision of acclamation as a yes or no to a 
                                                 
177
 In Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion, with which Schmitt was familiar he expressed much the same 
idea that the ‘limit of direct action is for all practical purposes the power to say Yes or No on an issue 
presented to the mass.’ Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929 
[1922]), 230. Lippmann himself though, cites William James’s remarks that ‘But for most of our 
emergencies, fractional solutions are impossible. Seldom can we act fractionally’ which also resonates 
clearly with Schmitt’s insistence on political Einheit (unity, union). William James, Some Problems of 
Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 
227. Similar remarks can be found in Weber, Political Writings, 126. as well as Michels, Political Parties, 
27. 
178
 D, xxxix. 
179
 V&V, 48. My italics: ‘was denn das “Volk” überhaupt kann.’ 
180
 V&V, 57. 
189 
question. Both these acts lie in the same capacity of the pouvoir constituant. This 
correlation is also suggested in Schmitt’s obsession with Theodor Daubler’s line: ‘The 
enemy is our own question as form’.
181
 The people can only acclaim yes or no, because 
the original political decision, by which their existence and capacities are actualised, is 
the affirmation or negation of the other: friend or enemy.  
Nonetheless, in the twentieth century the secret-ballot vote had largely become 
synonymous with (representative) democracy. Schmitt was not oblivious to this 
development. Rather than advocating a return to acclamatory democracy, he simply notes 
that it has been displaced to the space of public opinion or ‘publicity’ [Öffentlichkeit]: 
‘public opinion is the modern type of acclamation.’
182
 According to Schmitt, the 
formlessness, visibility and responsibility characteristic of acclamation had found a new 
mode of expression in unregulated public opinion. 
 
(iv) Acclamation as Assent 
But how does acclamation produce legitimacy? A common reading of Schmitt on 
acclamation treats it as form legalisation or consent.
183
 However, I claim Schmitt rejects 
these interpretations and instead understands acclamation as assent. Readings of 
acclamation as a form of legalisation are encouraged by Schmitt’s references to Eric 
Peterson’s Heis Theos. The ecclesiological accounts of Peterson and Kantorowicz often 
understand acclamation as a form of legalisation.
184
 Although Schmitt’s depiction of 
acclamation shared many traits with Peterson’s account, I claim he rejected the latter’s 
interpretation of it as legalisation.  
Recalling the spectacles of Schmitt’s account Peterson characterises acclamation 
as an effect evoked by the astonishment or awe before some event or figure of wonder.
185
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190 
Acclamation is elicited by a visible spectacle in the theatre or the city. Acclamations are 
the ‘passionate expressions of the popular will attributable to divine inspiration’, thus 
linking acclamation with enthusiasm. Regardless, Peterson, citing the substitutability of 
acclamation for the vote, specifically connects it to law [Recht].
186
 Kantorowicz makes a 
similar connection in Laudes Regiae: ‘The mere fact of being acclaimed by senate and 
army, at times by the army alone, had legalized the accession of Roman emperors.’
187
 On 
occasion Peterson even subordinates acclamation to positive law [Gesetz]. In a footnote, 
Peterson writes that ‘most remarkable is the meaning of the acclamation in antique court 
processes.’ Through a number of examples, he shows that acclamation could influence an 
acquittal. Nonetheless, its use (demonstrated in the case of freeing slaves) was 
circumscribed by law. Here Peterson specifically uses the term Gesetz, marking positive 
law from Recht. Readers such as Uwe Hebekus, relying on Peterson’s account thus 
describe acclamation as a short-circuit between enthusiasm and law [Recht].
188
 However, 
this vision of a short-circuit seems inadequate to Schmitt’s account. 
Although Schmitt does include ecclesial practice as an example, he refers to 
Peterson’s work as merely a ‘starting point’ for a scientific study of the phenomena.
189
 As 
the details of Schmitt’s account demonstrate, he rejected an equivalence between the vote 
and acclamation. In addition, while Schmitt occasionally associates acclamation with a 
right [Recht], he rejects subsuming it to positive law [Gesetze].
190
 Despite the use of 
‘Gewalt’ or ‘Befügnis’, which imply an association with an office, the contention that 
legality lacks authority and the association between acclamation and Sieyès’ pouvoir 
constituant, proscribe the subordination of acclamation to positive law, Gesetz.
191
 
Schmitt’s objective in the debate against liberal-parliamentary democrats like Hans 
Kelsen and Richard Thoma was specifically to reject the circumscription of politics by 
‘mere legality.’
192
 Moreover, Schmitt insists on such a radical distinction between 
legality and legitimacy as to make such an interpretation impossible or at least wholly 
inconsistent with his claims that acclamation is demokratische Urphänomen. While 
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Schmitt treats acclamation as conscious reaffirmation of an ethical substance (and 
consequently possibly a reaffirmation of a given sense of Recht or justice), ‘legalisation’ 
is a misinterpretation.  
What is the cry of yes or no, that characterises Schmitt’s acclamation? In his 
descriptions of acclaim Schmitt predominantly uses the two verbs ‘zustimmen’ and 
‘ablehnen’ to characterise ‘yes’ and ‘no’.
193
 These terms can refer to the consent to a 
contract, but my thesis is that Schmitt aims at something like a confirmation of an 
assertoric statement: a ‘yes, I agree this is true.’ He attempts to sever the act of agreement 
from any notion of contract or promise, for a purified ‘I agree,’ or in German ‘ich stimme 
zu.’ In Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren, Schmitt’s takes as a model for acclamation the 
utterance of ‘Amen’ to a prayer in Church.
194 
While the meaning of this utterance is a 
point of controversy, one traditional interpretation is that it signifies the recognition of the 
truth or certainty of the previous statement. 
 The social contract tradition relies on an act resembling acclamation. In Hobbes’ 
political theory, the artifice of the commonwealth is constituted by a mutual act of 
declaration or a promise: a ‘signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signs’ 
marking a transfer of right often understood to occur in the context of an assembly or 
gathering of the people.
195
 Nonetheless, for Hobbes, it is a largely imaginary act modelled 
as an approximation of unanimous consent or a unanimous promise. The importance of 
unanimity distinguishes the rational-legal quality of Hobbes’ construction. Only another 
unanimous decision could nullify what has been previously agreed and dissolve the rights 
of the sovereign.
196
 However, the rational-legal artifice of Hobbes’ sovereign lacks 
efficacy, as I demonstrated in part one. It must be supplemented with worship and 
education, or, for Rousseau, ‘civil religion’. Schmitt’s illusions to Rousseau appear 
largely rhetorical, given that Rousseau specifically derogates ‘acclamation’ on Schmitt’s 
model.
197 
Rousseau’s majoritarian general assembly utilises instead a kind of procedural 
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pseudo-acclamation, in which ‘everyone states his opinion’ in order to determine by a 
kind of calculation what is the general will.
198
 An earlier consent to be governed by the 
general will is presupposed, all that occurs in the assembly is an ‘open-ballot’ rather than 
a ‘secret-ballot’.  
 In contrast, Schmitt dismisses unanimity as a model for acclamation. In 
Constitutional Theory, he describes the ‘ideal of unanimity’ as a ‘misunderstanding’ of 
democracy. He clarifies that ‘even the unanimity of all decisions is useless if the 
substance of democracy … is lost.’
199
 Acclamation is not an approximation of the 
majority vote, where the latter is in turn an approximation of unanimity. Schmitt rejects 
the interpretation of democracy as a series of approximations, in which acclamation is 
reduced to merely a pragmatic solution to the problem of approximating unanimity. 
Instead, Schmitt emphasises the need to preserve the ‘substance of democracy.’ That is, 
the substantial equality on which the homogeneity of the people is based. The 
significance of acclamation is its capacity to reaffirm this substance, in its ‘truth’ or 
certainty.  
 For Schmitt, acclamation is an assent to exist politically. It confirms the ‘truth’ or 
substance on which the political entity is based. In its mode of operation, acclamation 
resembles the assent demanded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where 
political participation is premised on assent to an assertion or declaration: ’[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.
200
 Although Schmitt rejects such 
universalism as ‘non-political’, it is precisely this mode of assertion that characterises the 
form of democratic constitutions since the French Revolution. The French Déclaration 
des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789 drafted by Sieyès and Lafayette begins with 
a similar assertion: ‘Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.’
201
 The chants of 
protestors, like the ecclesiological Heis Theos, confirms or assents to an assertion or 
statement of fact. The logic of the protest chant or slogan, cheered in unison by the crowd 
exhibits precisely the assent of a claim to self-evident truth on which Schmitt’s model of 
acclamation is based. The acclamation is thus not a legalisation or consent to a contract 
                                                                                                                                                 
developed by Peterson: ‘Then fear and flattery turn voting into acclamations; they no longer deliberate, 
they worship or they curse.’ 
198
 Rousseau, bk. IV.2.[8]. 
199
 CT, 280. Translation modified. Seitzer translates entfällt as displaced, but entfallen is usually taken to 
mean ‘to fall out of’ or ‘to escape’. Harold T. Betteridge, ed., Cassell’s German and English Dictionary: 
Completely Rev. and Re-Ed (London: Cassell, 1960).  
200
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art. 1. 
201
 Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, art. 1. 
193 
but a demonstration of recognition of a certain self-evident truth. In the act of 
acclamation an assembly ‘calls high or low, cheers or grunts, strikes the shield with its 
weapons, raises its shield, says in a resolution with some word "Amen" or rejects this 
acclamation by silence.’
202
 This interpretation also reflects Schmitt scepticism of the 
active capacities of the collective entity, the people. To interpret acclamation as a 
promise or contractual consent implies the possession of a certain deliberative capacity, 
which Schmitt denies the people. Confronted with an assertoric statement (a declaration) 
one can only agree with it or reject it. The acclamation simultaneously assents to a 
particular statement of fact, but consummates this through active participation and 
commitment to action. 
Political legitimation is based on visible enthusiasm that overcomes the division 
between is and ought. Schmitt’s gloss of Sorel in the 1923 Crisis points directly towards 
this interpretation: Schmitt describes belief in vertu as the source of ‘great enthusiasm,’ a 
‘true life-instinct’. He continues, in ‘immediate intuition the enthusiastic mass creates a 
mythical image that pushes its energy forward and gives it the force [Kraft] for 
martyrdom as well as the courage to use force [Gewalt].’
203
 In these texts of 1920s 
Schmitt attenuates the mythical aspect, ostensibly disavowing the irrational mythical 
element of Sorel’s work, but replaces it with a politico-religious assertion — ‘Christus 
vincit! Christus regnat! Christus imperat!’ — resembling in form, the declaration ‘Men 
are born and remain free and equal in rights’. 
Democratic authority is thus derived directly from the ability to decide on and 
assent to a distinction between the friend and the enemy. Since this decision gives 
political life and existence to the collective entity, the people, it is the only ability (or 
capacity [Fähigkeit]) that one can be sure that the people possesses. In contrast to the 
multiple modes of support developed by Hobbes, in Schmitt all authority is unified in a 
single ability. This foundational capacity can be channelled into formally defined offices 
and legal delimitations, but ultimately it resists all artifices of containment. The people is 
simply this ability to respond or answer with assent or rejection. One simply assents to a 
statement, such as ‘Alle Gewalt geht vom das Volk aus’, ‘all power/authority emerges 
from the people.’  
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4 State, Movement, People  
The democratic authority, developed between 1923 and 1932, seems to disappear with 
Schmitt’s turn to the Führerprinzip. After Hitler’s success in the federal elections of 
March 1933, Schmitt quickly published a series of texts which claimed to offer a 
‘concrete theory of the state.’
204
 Eschewing a ‘general [Allgemein] theory of the state’ as 
a typical affectation of the nineteenth-century demand for the general or universal, his 
concrete alternative promised a structural account of a triadic state form that Schmitt 
predicted would typify twentieth-century politics and was already manifest in the Italian 
Fascist state and the Bolshevik state of the Soviet Union.
205
 Schmitt offers a speculative 
description of a National-Socialist political form based on the concepts of Artgleichheit 
and the Führerprinzip, respectively, the absolutisation of the identity principle as equality 
of type, and the principle of leadership. Is there a distinctive concept of authority 
captured in these works and what is its relationship with the ‘democratic authority’ 
produced by acclamation?   
 In the triadic political form developed in the Nazi writings acclamation no longer 
plays a role. This is replaced with an emphasis on the oath [Eid], allegiance [Treue] and 
loyalty [Loyalität], terms which were peripheral in writings of the democratic period.
206
 
The relation between the democratic texts and those of the Nazi era remains contested. A 
common reading of these works claims a continuity or even necessity linking the two 
periods.
207
 The difficulty of interpretation arises because Schmitt’s democratic works 
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clearly predict an essentially totalitarian outcome if homogeneity is misperceived and 
maximised. That is, Schmitt forecasts that a ‘maximum degree of identity’ will reduce the 
people to a ‘subpolitical… merely cultural, economic of vegetative form of existence.’ 
Hence, at issue in the interpretation of the Nazi writings is whether Schmitt’s earlier 
account of democracy could find a state of balance between the poles of a minimum and 
maximum of homogeneity without falling into absolutisation.
208
 I suggest that between 
the two periods, a nuanced relation exists with both aspects of continuity and 
discontinuity. 
After briefly setting out the structure of Schmitt’s alternative ‘concrete,’ triadic 
political form, I turn to his discussion of leadership, the Führerprinzip. I argue that 
Schmitt struggles to articulate a new concept of authority in the Nazi writings. He 
attempts to replace acclamation with a generalisation of the personal oath of allegiance or 
loyalty. I demonstrate that the central difficulty for Schmitt is tension between (i) the 
demand for equality and homogeneity entailed by Artgleichheit and (ii) the hierarchical 
power relations presupposed by the Führerprinzip. That is, Schmitt attempts to satisfy the 
contradictory demand for equality with hierarchy. This reproduces in an immanent sphere 
the problem of dignity, central to my discussion of Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form in chapter three. 
 
(i) The ‘Concrete’ State Form of the Twentieth Century 
The transitional events of 1933, Schmitt interprets using the framework established in the 
democratic writings.
209
 He implies that the change in regime was demanded by the will of 
the pouvoir constituant. According to Schmitt, in one final act of acclamation, the 
German people discarded the liberal system of the Weimar republic and assented to the 
substantial content proposed by the NSDAP. He writes that the elections of March 1933 
were not functionally ‘elections’ because ‘in the Weimar system, the so-called elections 
had long lost their true elective character.’
210
 Instead, these elections had a plebiscitary 
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and acclamatory character. But what was the question? Schmitt implies that the conflict 
between the substantial political policies advocated by the NSDAP and those of the 
existing Weimar Constitution, entails that the March elections can only be understood 
‘politically’ as a plebiscite on the new substantial content. The people were thus 
presented with precisely a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question; assent to or rejection of the political 
proposition advocated by the NSDAP. For Schmitt, the ostensibly legal transfer of power 
arises solely from practical concerns. It was merely the ‘abdication and the death 
statement’ of the old political form.
211
 Hence, Schmitt asserts that the legitimacy of the 
new regime is not based on the Weimar constitution,‘a system that has become impotent 
[Machtlosigkeit],’ but on its own foundation. As Schmitt writes, ‘[w]hat is alive cannot 




While Schmitt’s interpretation of the transition is determined by the political 
structure of the democratic writings, the triadic political form (composed of three 
elements the state, the movement and the people) elaborated in 1933/34 appears to have 
little precedent in the core democratic writings. If it is hinted at in Constitutional Theory, 
it is only as a possible ‘danger’. Even so, a clear-cut periodisation of Schmitt’s works 
correlated to the assent of Nazi regime is complicated by Schmitt’s lecture of 1932, 
Starker Staat und Gesunde Wirtschaft.
213
 As George Schwab notes, even before the 




 Schmitt’s new triadic political form is based on the presumption of a maximal 
substantial equality, ‘Artgleichheit’ of the people. This ‘radical implementation of the 
principle of identity’ is described as a danger and misperception of equality in 
Constitutional Theory. In the earlier account the consequence of this presumption is ‘that 
a people regresses from the condition of political existence into one that is subpolitical, 
thereby leading a ‘merely cultural, economic, or vegetative form of existence’.
215
 
Consistent with this degenerate possibility, in State Movement People, Schmitt describes 
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the people as the ‘apolitical side, growing under the protections and in the shade of the 
political decisions’ made by the two political elements, the state and the movement.
216
 
Partly modelled on the existing Italian fascist state and the Bolshevik state of the 
Soviet Union, Schmitt proposes that the new German National-Socialist form will have a 
triadic structure composed of (i) the state, a static part which includes the civil service 
and military bodies, (ii) the movement, a dynamic part, and (iii) the people, the apolitical 
sphere of social and economic concerns.
217
 Within the movement, Schmitt distinguishes 
between the organised hierarchy of the party and the general mass of politically engaged 
participants. The pluralist party system of the liberal state is eliminated and replaced by 
the Führungskörper, the leading-body of the political entity. The result is a ‘one-party-
state’ in which opposition parties are banned and all organs of the state are enthused with 
an concrete ethical substance (supposedly derived from their Artgleichheit). There is thus 
no longer a mere ‘state-apparatus’.
218
  
Given the empirical historical reality of the Nazi regime, which relied heavily on 
mass spectacles, the absence of acclamation from Schmitt’s triadic political form appears 
paradoxical. In particular, Schmitt’s forecast regime varies considerably from the 
accounts of fascism as a ‘political religion’ developed subsequently by Eric Voegelin or 
Emilio Gentile.
219
 Was the continued role of mass gatherings and participation so obvious 
that it need not be mentioned? There is at least one reason why Schmitt may have 
expected it would be unnecessary in the new state form. In Constitutional Theory, 
Schmitt insists on a gap or space of representation between the private individual and the 
citizen. In the democratic writings, this is the last remaining sphere in which the 
‘principle of representation’ plays a role.
220
 The function of acclamation is to provide a 
setting in which this gap is bridged. By participating in public ritual the otherwise private 
individual ‘represents’ the citizen and makes present and visible the otherwise invisible 
substance of equality on which the political union is based. ‘[T]he presentation of the 
political unity is an intrinsic part of the form.’
221
 In the democratic texts, acclamation 
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entails the possibility of either a yes or no. In contrast to the totalised systemic Volksgeist 
of Fichte, a democratic people can still decide against certain proposals. But Schmitt 
insists the national-socialist Führung does not rely on ‘recurrent legitimations 




 In the Nazi writings the possibility of saying no is eliminated, marking a partial 
break with the democratic writings. In the latter, the people only exist as a will, which 
must presume a real possibility of saying no to a particular proposal. Evoking the 
totalised image of a culture/Bildung of the Volksgeist doctrine, the Nazi writings refer to 
a ‘Volksubstanz’ that must simply be secured and cultivated. With traces of Fichte the 
task of the state is now to cultivate what is already present, the substance that is 
‘encountered in country, hereditary lineage or estate.’
223
 If the democratic writings 
accepted a certain ‘abstract’ thinking in the negative determination of the people via the 
enemy, this is eliminated by National-Socialism, which ‘does not think abstractly and 
stereotypically’.
224
 Instead of an acclamatory decision, there is the Volksubstanz, a 
‘Gesamtordnung’ (total order) which ‘expresses itself’ immediately in the ‘presumptions 
and imagination’ [Voraussetzungen und Vorstellungen] of a people.
225
 Although he 
avoids the term Volkgeist, Schmitt explicitly references Savigny, Fichte and Hegel as 
precursors.
226
 In addition, the Gesamtordnung exhibits many of its characteristic aspects. 
Like the Volkgeist, the concrete-order is a total organic whole, a Rechts-life attuned to a 
‘specific age’ and ‘specific people.’
227
 The exemplarity of the ‘Aristotelian-Thomistic 
natural law of the middle ages’ recalls the fascination with the Middle Ages typical of the 
romantic thinkers responsible for the concept.
228
 There are references to customary 
institutional practices; marriage, agriculture, Stände.
229
 In addition, like Herder and 
Fichte, Schmitt allocates a central role to language. In 1928, perhaps influenced by 
Weber, Schmitt had denigrated the role of language.
230
 But in 1934 it is central to his 
critique of Pindar’s Nomos basileus (i.e. ‘law as king’), which is taken to exemplify the 
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logic of the nineteenth-century liberal Rechtstaat. Schmitt claims that the reliance on 
‘concepts like king, master, overseer, or governor, as well as judge and court, shift us 
immediately into concrete institutional orders that are no longer mere rules.’ The 
historical use of concepts in a particular language, already determines the ‘concrete 
power and dignity or office [konkrete Macht und Würde].’
231
  
Is there a break or continuity between Schmitt’s democratic writings and the Nazi 
writings? To demand an explicit either-or response seems particularly Schmittian, 
recalling his analogy with the decision on Christ or Barabbas.
232
 I offer instead a nuanced 
response. There are elements of continuity, the framework and the threat of degenerate 
understanding of equality are consistent with Constitutional Theory. But there are also 
aspects of a break in the replacement of acclamation with the personal oath and the 
elimination of the representational role of the ‘citoyen’. Is the logical-theoretical 
consummation of Schmitt’s ‘democratic’ politics a fascist regime? If it is, then we must 
ask if the same telos characterises today’s participatory models of politics insofar as they 
are based on shared ‘ethical’ convictions, such as human rights or equality.
233
 Allusions 
to a community of shared understanding as a political ideal remain commonplace in both 
left-wing progressivist politics and right-wing alternatives. Popular participation also 
carries certain risks, as Dylan Riley’s recent work on the rise of fascism in Europe 
indicates.
234
 On the other hand, proposing a clear ‘break’ in Schmitt’s oeuvre resembles 
the Sonderweg thesis.
235
 This thesis, which identifies certain exceptional qualities or 
circumstances in order to explain the rise of National Socialism, implicitly conceals the 
political-ethical continuities across early twentieth century Europe and the continued 
proximity of the threat of fascism. Thus, neither a break nor continuity adequately 
describes the shift in Schmitt’s account. 
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(ii) The Führerprinzip and Homogeneity 
I turn to the specific authority of the Führer. The Führerprinzip is supposed to be based 
in a ‘real presence’ in contrast to the representative moment of acclamation. There is no 
longer a need to make present and immediate the existence of an invisible political 
entity/union. The political entity is ‘immediately present’ in the ‘absolute ethnic identity’ 
of the ‘idea of race.’
236
 Nonetheless, Schmitt struggles to articulate an immanent (non-
transcendent) concept of authority under this absolute identity, which, despite the claim 
of immediacy, remains haunted by mediation through the ‘idea’ of race. In 1933, Schmitt 
juxtaposes the leader against a series of classical models of authority: the military 
commander, Plato’s physician, the shepherd or steersman (gubernator), Taine’s 
horseman.
237
 He writes that ‘none of these images capture the essential meaning of 
political leadership in the essentially German sense of the word.’
238
  Regardless, failing to 
find a suitable alternative, he reverses his position and in the following year specifically 
takes up military command as the model for the hierarchy of the Führerprinzip, enforced 
by ‘concepts of discipline and honour’.
239
  
 The source of difficulty appears to be his rejection of transcendence itself. 
Motivated by adherence to the principle of equality/identity. The model of shepherd and 
flock [Hirten und Herde] is rejected because ‘[e]ssential to this image is that the shepherd 
remains absolutely transcendent to the flock’. Instead, the specifically German relation of 
Führung ‘is a concept of the immediate present age [Gegenwart] and real presence 
[Präsenz].’ It is a purely immanent concept of authority in which the basis and positive 
demand for this relation is an ‘unconditional equality of kind [Artgleichheit].’ By 
contrast, Max Weber’s charismatic authority and Bataille’s fascist ‘sovereign’ rely 
specifically on a sense of transcendent sacralisation.
240 
Schmitt appears to realise that he 
has deprived the Führer of any capacity to actually lead and in later works distinguishes 
the leader from others based on a certain personal capacities. He writes that the ‘moral 
outrage in the collapse of the German government during the war, accumulated 
(angesammelt) in Adolf Hitler and in him became the driving force [triebenden Kraft] of 
                                                 
236
 SMP, 48. 
237
 SMP, 47. 
238
 SMP, 47. 
239
 3T, 81-2. In 1934 Schmitt explicitly equates leadership with Kommandogewalt, a term used as a 
counterpoint in SMP, 46. 
240
 Georges Bataille, ‘The Psychological Structure of Fascism’, trans. Carl R. Lovitt, New German 




 The origin of Hitlers ‘right [Recht] and force [Kraft] to found a new 
state and a new order’ is his capacity to transform the lessons of history into Ernst, a 
measure of seriousness. The task of the Führer is one ‘in which all danger of the political 
accumulates.’
242
 For Schmitt, the auctoritas of the leader rests solely on the de facto 




In the end, the Führer is depicted as both special and the same as everyone else. 
He is distinguished by his very exemplarity. The leader must embody a particular sense 
of right [Recht], that is a concrete ethical [sittliche] imperative, in contrast to the liberal 




Instead of acclamation, this system is supposed to rest on a series of oaths of 
loyalty or allegiance, recalling the personal authority of the commissary dictator. Schmitt 
notes that leadership requires a ‘power of command [Kommandogewalt]’, a ‘concrete 
kingly or leadership order’ antithetical to positivist law [Gesetz].
245
 The ground of 
authority is provided by an ‘oath… to the leader [Führer].’ Personal loyalty and the 
‘rechtliche axiom that truth, discipline and honour cannot be separated from leadership’ 
provide the foundation for the authority of the leader. The emphasis on honour revives 
themes central to Schmitt’s concept of personal representation. Like the commissar, the 
movement demands absolute submission in order to maintain protection and security, 
denying the people a political will.
246
 
Schmitt attempts to construct an immanent equivalent to the office of the 
priesthood central to Roman Catholicism. There are customary aspects and demands for 
loyalty reminiscent of tradition, but a resistance to fixed privileges and anti-
proceduralism reminiscent of charisma. Affinities to both of Weber’s traditional and 
charismatic forms of authority are evident.
247
 Schmitt’s solution is indoctrination. The 
prerequisite of an oath is a ‘normal situation’. This now entails not only legal order, but 
the establishment of a broad field of common terms such as Recht, justice, honour and 
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loyalty and managing their interpretation through securing ‘personality’ itself.
248
 Despite 
the biological-racial interpretation of the identity principle, there is now a need for 
complete mental assimilation of the individual to the language-collective. Schmitt 
proposes to expand the sphere of personal relations and interpretation in law itself. 
Instead of more precision in legislation, he argues for the expansion of the space of 
interpretation. He claims that ‘a new juristic way of thinking can be brought about 
through these general clauses’.
249
 According to Schmitt, the expansion of general 
concepts would produce a more flexible type of legality and when combined with a 
firmly established ‘normal situation’ might be able to eliminate the need for a distinction 
between the state-of-exception and legality.
250
 
But what is Leadership? Schmitt does not provide a clear determination. It relies 
on a paradoxical hierarchical absolutisation of the principle of equality, a rearticulation of 
Donoso Cortés’ Christian dignity, in which a divine hierarchical authority, ‘dignity’, is 
shared equally.
251
 Instead of precisely determining concepts, Schmitt proposes an 
expansion of general terms. The paradoxical authority of the Führer, based on his 
embodiment of equality, is not to be resolved, but managed by flexible and general 
concepts. Concepts that can be stretched as appropriate and contain antithetical tensions 





* * * 
 
In the Nazi writings, Schmitt embraced and then defended the mythical ethno-nationalist 
particularity of the ‘German people’ espoused by the Nazi Party. According to Schmitt, 
the pretense of liberal-parliamentarism was that it could manifest a truly universal 
political order and that this could be given explicit form in a written constitution. Schmitt 
demonstrates in Legality and Legitimacy, that despite its claims to embody universal 
principles of truth, justice and freedom, the liberal Rechtsstaat was merely a particular 
political possibility, a Gesetzesstaat. Instead of preserving some aporetic form of 
universalist goals, Schmitt takes up the radical alternative: the intractable particularity of 
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every political body. He asserts that here could be no concrete universal constitution, all 
constitutions manifested a particular substantial political stance. Instead of working 
through this failure, Schmitt demanded the assent to particularity and openly declares: 
‘that all justice is the justice of a determinate people.’
253
 With little concern for the 
consequences, Schmitt assented to the xenophobic ethno-nationalist myths of the NSDAP 
in all their horrors.  
 However, in the period between 1923-1932, Schmitt’s democratic works suggest 
a performative alternative. Mass assemblies and spectacles like those organised by liberal 
advocates for German unity in the nineteenth century, could continue to be used to 
develop a ‘democratic’ national disposition [Gesinnung] providing political and social 
stability. He suggests that the power of the people can be massaged, through public 
opinion. A politically motivated part of the people can present the largely disinterested 
mass with particular well-crafted questions and, with its capacity to respond with ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, the people can provide assent and thereby legitimate a particular course of action. 
Regardless, by 1932, even before the Nazi’s gain power, Schmitt renounces this 
possibility, reverting to personalist rule. Authority is returned to a single individual, the 
Führer, and delegated on a model of personal representation.  
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There is a war between the ones who say 






In this dissertation, I aimed to provide a new analysis of the theoretical structures of 
authority elaborated in the political theories of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. In 
particular, I argued that concrete religious practices are centrally important to Hobbes’ 
and Schmitt’s attempts to reinforce political authority. While Hobbes relies on religious 
practices of worship and pedagogy, Schmitt models authority on the vicarious 
commission of the papacy and the ecclesial practice of acclamation. What is added to our 
understanding of their works through this close analysis of their respective attempts to 
reinforce authority?  
In part one, my analysis of Hobbes’ political writings revealed the often 
overlooked complex of theoretical mechanisms Hobbes deploys to support the fictional 
covenantal artifice of the sovereign. Tracing the chronological development of Hobbes’ 
political theory, I sought to demonstrate the logical and theoretical relations between 
these different apparatuses supplementing the covenantal potestas of the sovereign. 
In chapter one, I showed that Hobbes eschews the Tacitean image of politics 
presented by Justus Lipsius and the Stuart attempts to reinvigorate traditional chivalric 
authority and attempts to elaborate a rational alternative. I sought to demonstrate that 
worship is centrally important to Hobbes’ account of the material power of the 
commonwealth. Hobbes rejects the ideological independence of the category of 
‘authority’ as such, traditionally associated with the Roman concept of auctoritas. 
Nonetheless, I argued that in his account of worship he develops a social theory of 
‘power’ that assimilates the reputational and social aspects of authority to an expanded 
sense of material power (including wealth, prestige, honour, and worth).
2
 This is 
subsequently subsumed under a logic of universal natural laws and forces. Utilising a 
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radical distinction between command and council, Hobbes isolates a register of universal 
signification embodied in the performance of commanded worship and linked to power 
relations. Demystifying the social aspects of authority, he argues that these signs operate 
according to the laws of nature. Through an analogy with agriculture, he claims that this 
relational social power can be cultivated through worship (cultus) causing it to grow. The 
‘magnifying’ capacity of political worship, however, depends on Hobbes’ understanding 
of potentia within his natural science. The correlation between Hobbes’ understanding of 
physical forces and the operation of political forces foreshadows aspects of Georges 
Sorel’s hypothesis (i.e. that there exists a fundamental relation between the theories of 
physics and politics), as well as Schmitt’s generalised version of ‘political theology’ 
concerning the relations between ‘central domains of thought’ and political institutions.
3
 
These commonalities point to the importance of analogy for political institutions and the 
forces it relies on.  
 To address shortcomings in his account of worship and to provide a ‘seed’ for the 
cultivation of power, in Leviathan, Hobbes turns to another analogy, this time between 
theatre and politics. The seed of authority emerges from the people like a character in the 
theatre created by an author.
4
 This fictitious persona of the sovereign must be played by 
an actor. This rationalist vision of political power, which operates according to analogies 
with physics and theatre, is dependent on a rational population.  
In chapter two, I turned to Hobbes’ treatment of religion as a model for political 
education. The interpretation of Hobbes’ account of religion and use of religion in 
politics remains a relatively neglected part of his work. Focussing on the later half of 
Leviathan and the later texts Behemoth and Historia Ecclesiastica, I elaborated a 
bifurcated reading of Hobbes’ theory of religion distinguishing between his treatment of 
Christianity and that of natural religion. Utilising the formalism underlying the distinction 
between command and council (as presented in De Cive), I showed that Hobbes 
distinguishes between a juridical model of authority derived from Judeo-Christian history 
and a pedagogical authority based on natural religion. As a corollary of his rationalist 
vision of politics, the latter is important in providing the motivation for political 
obedience. Such a motivation comes with a proper education in the scientia civilis and 
knowledge of the operation of political forms and forces. To achieve this end the 
population requires a supreme pastor, a shepherd, to watch over and guide them to 
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obedience as if they were sheep. Despite Hobbes’ attempt to demystify authority, his 
political artifice remains dependent, in the last moment, on a transcendent entity, a 
shepherd guaranteed by divine right. 
 The central finding of my investigation of Hobbes’ account of political authority 
concerns the significance of religious practices (both worship and education) for his 
‘constitutive’ account of the effective material power of the sovereign.
5
 In contrast to 
one-sided contractualist readings of Hobbes’ political theory, I demonstrated that worship 
is key to the effectiveness of the Hobbesian commonwealth and that the covenant itself 
relies on a more fundamental religio-political pedagogical ‘divine right’ granted to the 
sovereign. Hobbes’ models of worship and pedagogy both utilise a formalist method to 
bracket the particular culturally dependent content of acts, signs or practices in order to 
identify a universal logic of religio-politics. With the emphasis on education in Leviathan 
and later texts, Hobbes eliminates the internal sphere of intellectual autonomy, the ‘crack’ 
of conscience identified by Carl Schmitt (and others), and demands a complete 
indoctrination of the population. In a sense, this shift foreshadows Schmitt’s own account 
of democratic authority, insofar as acts of acclamation manifest a public performance of 
inner faith, unifying the external and internal. 
 In my analysis of Schmitt’s work in part two, I sought to distinguish between this 
democratic form of authority and the monarchical and fascist alternatives he develops. In 
this respect, my investigations substantiated Schmitt’s adherence to the proposition that 
distinct political principles engender distinct theoretical structures and concepts. In 
particular, despite certain parallels between them, the concepts of authority corresponding 
to each political framework are not equivalent nor transposable. 
In chapter three, I argued that the monarchical works take the Roman dictator as 
an originary model for the authority of the ‘personal office’. I traced the development and 
elaboration of the concept of ‘commissary authority’ attached to an office through 
Schmitt’s apparently disparate series of examples: the Roman dictator, Bodin’s 
commissar, Schmitt’s reflections on the authority of legal decision, the political influence 
of the papal office and his revival of the katechon. In each case I demonstrated the 
structural composition of commissary authority from two elements and argued that both 
are ultimately derived from divine sources. The two elements include (i) a specific task, 
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rooted in objective necessity and (ii) a given (presupposed) social hierarchy or order. 
These two elements are combined in the personal office of commissary authority. 
Through this complex of the person and office, Schmitt attempts to preserve a ‘human’ or 
personalist element by insisting on the moment of decision. In contrast to Hobbes’ 
theatrical persona, Schmitt invokes a Christian conception of the person as a divine 
singularity, which exceeds scientific rationality. As I argued, commissary authority is 
ultimately derived from models of authority embodied in the parent/patriarch/father 
pertaining to an economic/household (oikos) model of politics. I also showed how 
Schmitt’s development is indebted to the traditional doctrine of divine right and takes up 
strategies and concepts elaborated in Neville Figgis’s canonical account of the doctrine.  
While Schmitt’s aim is to prevent the civil servant from being reduced to a 
technical apparatus or instrument, in the last instance, he merely replaces technically 
determined goals with the doctrine of the Last Judgement as the ultimate ground of 
responsibility for the human individual. For Schmitt, only a government under the 
commission of divine will can prevent the instrumentalisation of political institutions, 
which would occur with its subsumption under universalist rules and procedures. As I 
argued, Schmitt eschews the logic of general laws, exemplified in Hobbes’ assimilation 
of politics to natural science and instead naturalises authority through various appeals to 
the singularity of the concrete. Whether manifest through a concrete object, event or 
individual, for Schmitt, authority exists only as an excess that cannot be subsumed to 
general laws or universalist visions of science. 
In chapter four, I demonstrated that in the democratic writings this conception of 
authority as an excess beyond general laws is retained. However, the structural model of 
a task and hierarchy is replaced with the acclamatory assent of the assembly. I showed 
that Schmitt constructs a revisionist conception of democracy antithetical to liberal-
parliamentarism, and that he emphasises the demands for social equality and the 
dismantling of all privileges. Although Schmitt’s developed account of democracy takes 
up elements of the nationalist interpretation of the Volksgeist, I argued that he is also 
drawn towards a more general formulation of the political entity, the pouvoir constituant, 
influenced by Lukács’ Hegelian-Marxism and Sorel’s theories of political action. While 
the democratic authority that emerges from the pouvoir constituant is again antithetical to 
the universalist dimension of procedure and legality, it now emerges from the concrete 
actual presence of an assembly or the uncontainable dynamism of public opinion. In both 
208 
cases, authority is manifest as the capacity to respond to the concrete singularity given as 
a question.  
The key result of my research on Schmitt’s democratic political theory arises from 
my focus on the problem of the abilities and capacities of the democratic sovereign. 
Tracing this thread from Dictatorship to Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren and The 
Concept of the Political, democratic authority emerges as a result of the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
(assent or rejection) of the people to a specific question (whether one regarding policy or 
concerning the ‘other/enemy’ in the sense of Theodor Daubler’s line ‘The enemy is our 
own question as form’).
6
 I sought to show that for Schmitt, the democratic authority that 
emerges from the people is a kind of energy or enthusiasm embodied in the assent 
confirming an assertoric statement answering such a question. Influenced by the ‘life-
energy’ that underlies Sorel’s mytho-politics, Schmitt’s acclamation is not a ‘legalisation’ 
or ‘consent’ but a participatory confirmation of a particular truth. 
 In the final section of chapter four, I discussed Schmitt’s Nazi writings. While 
Schmitt’s works of this period retain the broad structural framework of ‘politics’ typical 
of his earlier works, the institutional forms and conception of authority elaborated are 
distinct from those of the democratic works. I suggested there is neither a ‘break’ nor a 
straightforward continuity between the democratic and Nazi writings. Instead, I argued 
that in the Nazi works Schmitt replaces acts of acclamation with oaths of allegiance and 
the structure of authority in works of this period returns to the commissary authority of 
the monarchical works, if in an immanent form. In particular, I showed how Schmitt 
struggles to articulate a coherent conception of this Führer-authority and ultimately relies 
on a paradoxical structuring of equality and hierarchy with parallels to Donoso Cortés’ 
conception of Christian dignity.  
In addition to the above, distinctive contributions of my research on Schmitt 
include a novel interpretation of Dictatorship and the ‘transition to sovereign 
dictatorship’ as a strategy of critique of the abilities and capacities of the collective 
subject. This in turn supports a periodisation of Schmitt’s works based on the particular 
political principles on which they are based. My research highlighted the revival of 
themes from the early works (1917-1922) in the post-World War II texts, connecting the 
Roman dictator to the katechon and further clarified the specific operative principles of 
acclamation in Schmitt’s account of democratic authority. 
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I did not aim to produce a general theory of authority like that announced by Hannah 
Arendt’s essay ‘What is Authority?’ Instead my analysis centred on two specific, broadly 
comparable and influential moments in the history of European political thought and the 
respective struggles they engendered to re-articulate a concept of political authority in 
specific periods of crisis. In spite of this narrow focus, I find that Hobbes and Schmitt do 
capture something important about authority in general. They seem correct to regard it as 
a kind of power or capacity that resists subsumption to a narrowly ‘political’ sphere. 
Even if it emerges from a paternal domain authority can spread indiscriminately into 
others, intertwining with educational concerns, drawing on theatrical or energetic 
metaphors, shifting with the dominant intellectual interests. Authority has an infectious 
character and resists confinement to a specifically ‘political’ sphere distinct from 
economics, religion or culture. Despite attempts to segregate political authority by 
constitutional means, neither ‘politics’ nor ‘authority’ can be permanently contained. 
These borders can only ever be politically determined and recent history shows they are 
easily transgressed. For example, media personalities can be rapidly transformed into 
political figures. Schmitt and Hobbes appear correct that education, religion, family, civil 
societies, gatherings of people all carry a political potential. They can form a source of 
authority precisely insofar as they can influence group behaviour.  
The infectious quality of authority recalls the nomenclature of contagion, 
suggestion, imitation, and hypnosis, popular among the crowd theorists of the nineteenth 
century (Gustave le Bon, Gabriel Tarde and others).
7
 Schmitt’s conception of the 
intensity of ‘the political’ has a similar quality. Can we deny that energy, power and 
enthusiasm possess their own kind of persuasiveness. While Hobbes sought to contain 
and limit this energy, Schmitt occasionally embraced its possibilities. In the democratic 
works, he appears tempted by the controlled chaos embodied in the acclamation of the 
crowd. Controlling the public through propaganda and mass-media influence (television, 
radio, etc) and by the presentation of specific questions appears to make possible an anti-
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liberal democratic political form. However, in Nazi writings and again with the turn to 
the katechon in the works of the 1940s this possibility is surrendered and Schmitt returns 
to the antithesis between war and order. He insists that traditional authority is the only 
way to contain conflict. For both Hobbes and Schmitt the social and reputational aspects 
of power, its authoritativeness, are inseparable from its effectiveness. It possesses a 
capacity to manifest itself in the world like a force or energy, but must be consummated 
to be put to work. 
While the monarchical, elitist or authoritarian political forms advocated by 
Hobbes and Schmitt are unacceptable today, their accounts remind us of the fragile and 
arbitrary nature of formal written constitutions. Whether determined by a truly 
representative body or an oligarchical one, our obligation to a past ‘social contract’ 
remains tenuous and depends on some other form of legitimation. In a democratic 
system, why ought we maintain a commitment to a particular formal system we had no 
part in drafting? Liberal theorists such as Mill and Guizot, relied on the presupposition 
that a constitution could actually embody the truth and justice championed by 
Enlightenment universalism. But today, even the universalism of human rights remains 
plagued by its basis in the particular political visions and customs associated with 
liberalism. Despite their elaborate structures of authority, both Hobbes and Schmitt 
ultimately rely on custom: ceremonial, educational, hierarchical or familial/economic. 
They return to Pascal’s ‘mystical’ basis of authority in the justice or equity of accepted 
custom.
8
 In the twenty-first century, a more rationalist politics remains elusive and 
traditional conceptions of authority continue to dominate politics. Attempts to address 
this by reconceiving universalism or embracing an almost Schmittian populism, remain 
largely theoretical.
9
 By retracing the accounts given by Hobbes and Schmitt, I sought to 
reveal more clearly the obstacles such attempts must avoid. 
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